Academic Research

The following represents selected academic research by faculty on corporate governance and leadership topics. Research abstracts are abbreviated and journals may require a subscription to access the complete study. We encourage you to look at the individual faculty profiles for additional references.


            • Diversity on Corporate Boards: How Much Difference Does Difference Make? 
              Deborah Rhode and Amanda K. Packel, Delaware Journal of Corporate Law 39 No. 2 (Fall 2014): 363-410. 

              Article argues that increasing diversity should be a social priority, but not for the reasons often assumed.  

            • Non-Diversifiable Volatility Risk and Risk Premiums at Earnings Announcements 
              Mary Barth and Eric C. So., The Accounting Review 89 (September 2014):1579-1607. 

              Study seeks to determine whether earnings announcements pose non-diversifiable volatility risk that commands a risk premium.  

            • Outsourcing Shareholder Voting to Proxy Advisory Firms 
              David Larcker, Allan J. McCall, Gaizka Ormazabal

              Paper examines the economic consequences of institutional investors outsourcing research and voting decisions on matters submitted to a vote of public company shareholders to proxy advisory firms.
              Online Appendix A. Compensation changes aligned with proxy advisor' voting policies
              Online Appendix B. Example disclosures of compensation changes aligned with proxy advisor' voting policies

            • Initial evidence on the market impact of the XBRL mandate 
              Elizabeth Blankespoor, 
              Brian P. Miller, Hal D. White, Review of Accounting Studies, 2015, Vol. 20, Issue 1. (Online January 2014)

              Study finds that a reduction in investors’ data aggregation costs may not have served its intended purpose of leveling the informational playing field, at least during the initial years after mandatory adoption.

            • Knowledge, Compensation, and Firm Value: An Empirical Analysis of Firm Communication 
              Feng Li, Michael Minnis, Venky Nagar, and Madhav V. Rajan, Journal of Accounting and Economics, 2014, In Press 

              Researchers find that external communication reveals the relative location of knowledge within a management team. Relative knowledge as measured by communication varies with individual and firm characteristics as predicted by theory. CEOs with relatively more knowledge receive relatively higher compensation. Find evidence of the theoretically established link between knowledge, compensation, and firm value.

            • Optimal Contracts with Performance Manipulation 
              Anne Beyer, Ilan Guttman, and Ivan Marinovic, Journal of Accounting and Research, 2014 Forthcoming

              Researchers show that poor governance quality (which proxies for low cost of manipulating reported earnings) results in a low pay-for-performance sensitivity. In equilibrium, shareholders design contracts to be convex as a means to mitigate the adverse effects of performance manipulation.

            • Measurement in Financial Reporting: The Need for Concepts  
              Mary Barth, and Doron Israeli, Accounting Horizons, 2014, Forthcoming  

              The Conceptual Framework neither specifies the objective or definition of accounting measurement, nor provides a conceptual basis for choosing among alternative measurement bases. This paper offers a starting point for developing measurement concepts based on existing Framework concepts, including the objective of financial reporting, the qualitative characteristics of useful financial information, and the definitions of assets and liabilities.

            • Reputation Repair after a Serious Restatement  
              Jivas Chakravarthy, Ed deHaan and Shivaram Rajgopal,The Accounting Review 89 (July 2014): 1329-1363.  

              New study shows how corporations with tarnished reputations can regain their financial value by undertaking broad-based goodwill efforts.

            • Acquirer-target social ties and merger outcomes  
              Joy Ishii and Yuhai Xuan, Journal of Financial Economics 112 (June 2014): 344–363.  

              Article investigates the effect of social ties between acquirers and targets on merger performance.

            • Narcissistic CEOs and executive compensation  
              Charles A. O'Reilly III, Bernadette Doerr, David F. Caldwell, Jennifer A. Chatman, The Leadership Quarterly 25 (April 2014): 218-23

              Researchers find that more narcissistic CEOs who have been with their firm longer receive more total direct compensation (salary, bonus, and stock options), have more money in their total shareholdings, and have larger discrepancies between their own (higher) compensation and the other members of their team.

            • Relevance of Differences between Net Income based on IFRS and Domestic Standards for European Firms  
              Mary E. Barth, Wayne R. Landsman, Danqing Young, Zhuang, Zili, Journal of Business Finance & Accounting 41 (April 2014): 297-327. 

              Except for French/German non-financial firms, investors view net income measured using IAS 39 Financial Instruments: Recognition and Measurement as more relevant than that measured using domestic standards, which is notable because IAS 39 was highly controversial in Europe.

            • Macroeconomic effects of corporate default crisis: A long-term perspective
              Steven R. Grenadier, Andrey Malenko, Ilya A. Strebulaev, Journal of Financial Economics 111 (February 2014): 297-310.  

              Researchers find that corporate default crises have far fewer real effects than do banking crises.

            • The Role of Dissemination in Market Liquidity: Evidence from Firms' Use of Twitter 
              Elizabeth Blankespoor,
              Gregory S. Miller, and Hal D. White,The Accounting Review, 89 (January 2014): 79-112.  

              Research suggests Twitter helps market liquidity of little-known companies.

            • Politicians and the IPO decision: The impact of impending political promotions on IPO activity in China  
              Joseph D. Piotroski,
              Tianyu Zhang, Journal of Financial Economics 111 (January 2014): 111-136.  

              Paper shows that incentives created by the impending turnover of local politicians can accelerate the pace of initial public offering (IPO) activity in certain politicized environments.


      • The London Stock Exchange's AIM experiment: Regulatory or market failure? A discussion of Gerakos, Lang and Maffett   
        Joseph D. Piotroski, Journal of Accounting and Economics 56 (December 2013): 216-223.

        The conference paper by Gerakos, Lang and Maffett (2013) provides reliable, descriptive evidence on the post-IPO performance of firms listing on the London Stock Exchange's Alternative Investment Market (AIM).  Researcher highlights the strengths and limitations of their conference paper, summarizes how various regulatory and market factors could produce the observed systematic under-performance of AIM offerings, and outline paths for future research on the topic. 

      • Disentangling Mandatory IFRS Reporting and Changes in Enforcement  
        Mary Barth, Journal of Accounting and Economics 56 (December 2013):178–188.

        Researchers discuss “Mandatory IFRS Reporting and Changes in Enforcement” by Christensen, Hail, and Leuz. 

      • Proxy advisory firms and stock option repricing  
        David F. Larcker Allan L. McCall, and Gaizka Ormazabal, Journal of Accounting and Economics 56 (November–December 2013):149–169.

        This paper examines the economic consequences associated with the board of director’s choice of whether to adhere to proxy advisory firm policies in the design of stock option repricing programs, Highlights: Proxy advisory firms provide voting recommendations to institutional investors and mutual funds. The value of a repricing is lower when it complies with the evaluation policies of ISS and Glass Lewis. Voting recommendations of proxy advisory firms are not value increasing for shareholders. 

      • The Efficacy of Shareholder Voting: Evidence from Equity Compensation Plans  
        Chris Armstrong, Ian D. Gow, and David F. Larcker, Journal of Accounting Research 51 (December 2013): 909–950.

        Study finds little evidence that either lower shareholder voting support for, or outright rejection of, proposed equity compensation plans leads to decreases in the level or composition of future CEO incentive-compensation. Thus, recent regulatory efforts aimed at strengthening shareholder voting rights, particularly in the context of executive compensation, may have limited effect on firms’ compensation policies.

      • Which U.S. Market Interactions Affect CEO Pay? Evidence from U.K. Companies
        Joseph J. Gerakos, Joseph D. Piotroski, and Suraj Srinivasan, Management Science 59 (November 2013): 2413-2434.

        Paper examines how different types of interactions with U.S. markets by non-U.S. firms are associated with higher level of CEO pay, greater emphasis on incentive-based compensation, and smaller pay gap with U.S. firms.

      • On Derivatives Markets and Social Welfare: A Theory of Empty Voting and Hidden Ownership
        Jordan M. Barry, John William Hatfield and Scott Duke Kominerst, Virginia Law Review 99 (October 2013): 1103-1167.

        Analysis lends insight into the operation of securities markets in general and derivatives markets in particular. It also provides a new justification for a robust mandatory disclosure regime and facilitates analysis of proposed substantive securities regulations. 

      • Does Voluntary Adoption of a Clawback Provision Improve Financial Reporting Quality?
        Ed Dehaan
        , Frank Hodge, and Terry Shevlin, Contemporary Accounting Research Fall 2013 (September): 10271062.

        Study examines whether financial reporting improves after firms voluntarily adopt a compensation clawback provision.

      • The Relation between Equity Incentives and Misreporting: The Role of Risk-Taking Incentives
        Chris S. Armstrong, David F. Larcker, Gaizka Ormazabal, and Daniel J.Taylor, Journal of Financial Economics 109 (August 2013): 327–350.

        Study results suggest that equity portfolios provide managers with incentives to misreport when they make managers less averse to equity risk. 

      • Power, Moral Clarity, and Punishment in the Workplace
        Scott Wiltermuth and Francis FlynnAcademy of Management 56 (August 2013): 10021023.

        Researchers investigate the linkages among power, moral clarity, and punishment across multiple studies. Individuals with an increased sense of power advocated more severe punishments for transgressors than did those with a diminished sense of power. Further, moral clarity mediated the link between power and severity of punishment.

      • The mystery of zero-leverage firms 
        lya A. Strebulaev, Baozhong Yang, Journal of Financial Economics 109 (July 2013): 1-23.

        Researchers present the puzzling evidence that, from 1962 to 2009, an average 10.2% of large public nonfinancial US firms have zero debt and almost 22% have less than 5% book leverage ratio. Zero-leverage behavior is a persistent phenomenon.

      • Fair Value Accounting for Financial Instruments: Does it Improve the Association Between Bank Leverage and Credit Risk? 
        Elizabeth Blankespoor, Thomas J. Linsmeier, Kathy R. Petroni, and Catherine Shakespeare, Accounting Review 88 (July 2013): 11431177.

        New research finds support for valuing bank securities at current market value.

      • Organizational Ambidexterity: Past, Present and Future Ambidexterity
        Charles A. O’Reilly III and Michael L. Tushman, Academy of Management Perspectives, in press.

        Organizational ambidexterity refers to the ability of an organization to both explore and exploit—to compete in mature technologies and markets where efficiency, control, and incremental improvement are prized and to also compete in new technologies and markets where flexibility, autonomy, and experimentation are needed. Paper reviews the current state of the research, highlighting what is known and what isn't known about the topic, closing with a point of view on promising areas for ongoing research.

      • Making great decisions
        Chip Heath and Olivier Sibony, Mckinsey Quarterly 2 (June 2013): 6676.

        Discussion on how senior organizational managers can improve their decision-making effectiveness.

      • Cost of Capital and Earnings Transparency
        Mary E. Barth, Yaniv Konchitchki, and Wayne R. Landsman, Journal of Accounting and Economics 55 (April-May 2013): 206224.

        Greater transparency in firms' earnings has a positive effect on the bottom line and relatedly, shareholder value. 

      • Boardroom Centrality and Firm Performance
        David F. Larcker, Eric C. So, and Charles C. Y. Wang, Journal of Accounting & Economics 55 (April 2013): 225–250.

        Firms central in the interlocking boardroom network earn superior risk-adjusted stock returns. Results suggest that board of director networks provide economic benefits that are not immediately reflected in stock prices.

      • The Brouhaha Over Intra-Corporate Forum Selection Provisions: A Legal, Economic, and Political Analysis 
        Joseph Grundfest and Kristen Amy Savelle, Business Lawyer, 68 (February 2013): 325–410. 

        The prevailing view among many economists is that derivatives markets simply enable financial markets to incorporate information better and faster. Under this view, increasing the size of derivatives markets only increases the efficiency of financial markets. Study presents formal economic analysis that contradicts this view. 


  • Do differences in financial reporting attributes impair the predictive ability of financial ratios for bankruptcy?
    William Beaver, Maria Correia and Maureen McNicholsReview of Accounting Studies 17 (December 2012): 9691010.

    Over time, financial statements of public corporations show more losses, intangibles, and earnings restatements, which lower their value for predicting corporate bankruptcies.

  • Cash Holdings and Credit Risk
    Viral Acharya, Sergei A. Davydenko, and Ilya A. Strebulaev;Review Of Financial Studies, 17 (December 2012): 35723609.

    Findings suggest that precautionary savings are central to understanding the effects of cash on credit risk. 

  • Reputation management and the disclosure of earnings forecasts
    Anne Beyer and Ronald Dye, Review of Accounting Studies 17 (December 2012): 877912.

    Findings include: strategic managers can build a reputation for being forthcoming by disclosing unfavorable forecasts; managers' incentive to build a reputation for being forthcoming may be so strong that they disclose even the most negative forecasts.

  • Voluntary Disclosure, Manipulation, and Real Effects
    Anne Beyer and Ilan Guttman, Journal of Accounting Research 50 (December 2012): 11411177.

    Research paper highlights the importance of considering the interdependencies between firms' disclosure and investment decisions and provides new empirical predictions.

  • Social Movements and Markets, Industries, and Firms
    Sarah A. SouleOrganization Studies 33 (December 2012): 1715-1733.

    This essay reviews research at the nexus of organizational and social movement studies. It begins by surveying research drawing on social movement theories to explain some organizational process, then surveys research drawing on organizational theories to explain some social movement process.

  • Prof Larcker 12/5 speech at the US Chamber of Commerce: Examining the Role of Proxy Advisory Firms [Video]

  • Information Aggregation In Dynamic Markets With Strategic Traders
    Michael Ostrovsky, Econometrica 80.6 (December 2012): 25952647.

    Paper studies information aggregation in dynamic markets with a finite number of partially informed strategic traders. It shows that, for a broad class of securities, information in such markets always gets aggregated. 

  • Guilt by design: Structuring organizations to promote guilt as an affective reaction to failure 
    Vanessa K. Bohns and Francis J. Flynn, Organization Science, (November 2012) Published online before print November 5, 2012.

    Results indicate that highly guilt-prone individuals were rated as more capable leaders than less guilt-prone individuals and that a sense of responsibility for others underlies the positive relationship between guilt proneness and leadership evaluations.

  • Capital Mobility and Asset Pricing
    Darrell Duffie, Econometrica 80 (November 2012): 2469-2509.

    Presents a model for the equilibrium movement of capital between asset markets that are distinguished only by the levels of capital invested in each.

  • Key Mechanics of the U.S. Tri-Party Repo Market
    Adam Copeland, Darrell Duffie, Antoine Martin and Susan McLaughlin, Economic Policy Review 18 (November 2012): 17-28.

    Presents a study which examines the condition of the repossession market during the financial crises in the U.S. from 2007 to 2009.

  • A Market-Based Study of the Cost of Default 
    Ilya A. Strebulaev and Xiaofei Zhao, Review Of Financial Studies 25 (October 2012): 2959-2999.

    This paper proposes a novel method of extracting the cost of default from the change in the market value of a firm's assets upon default..

  • Why do pro forma and Street earnings not reflect changes in GAAP? Evidence from SFAS 123R
    Mary E. Barth, Ian D. Gow and Daniel J. Taylor, Review of Accounting Studies 17 (September 2012): 526-562.

    This study examines how key market participants—managers and analysts—responded to SFAS 123R’s controversial requirement that firms recognize stock-based compensation expenses.

  • International equity valuation: the relative importance of country and industry factors versus company-specific financial reporting information
    George Foster, Ron Kasznik, and Baljit K. Sidhu, Accounting & Finance 52 (September 2012): 767-814.

    The relative importance of country- and industry-specified factors vis-à-vis company-specific financial statement-based information in explaining equity valuation multiples in an international setting is examined.

  • Identifying Expectation Errors in Value/Glamour Strategies: A Fundamental Analysis Approach
    Joseph D. Piotroski, and Eric C. So, Review of Financial Studies 25 (September 2012): 2841-2875.

    Classifying firms based upon whether expectations implied by current pricing multiples are congruent with the strength of their fundamentals, study documents that value/glamour returns and ex post revisions to market expectations are predictably concentrated (absent) among firms with ex ante biased (unbiased) market expectations.

  • Are IFRS-based and US GAAP-based accounting amounts comparable?
    Mary E. Barth
    , Wayne R. Landsman, Mark Lang, and Christopher Williams, Journal Of Accounting & Economics 54 (September 2012): 68-93.

    This study examines whether application of IFRS by non-US firms results in accounting amounts comparable to those resulting from application of US GAAP by US firms.

  • Uneasy Lies the Head That Wears the Crown: The Link Between Guilt Proneness and Leadership
    Rebecca L. Schaumberg, and Francis J. FlynnJournal of Personality and Social Psychology 103 (August 2012): 327-342.

    Results indicate that highly guilt-prone individuals were rated as more capable leaders than less guilt-prone individuals and that a sense of responsibility for others underlies the positive relationship between guilt proneness and leadership evaluations.

  • Here Is a Tip: Prosocial Gratuities Are Linked to Corruption
    Magnus Thor Torfason, Francis J. Flynn, and Daniella Kupor, Social Psychological and Personality Science 00 (August 2012): 1-7.

    Investigates the link between tipping, an altruistic act, and bribery, an immoral act.

  • Executive Summary: Falling Out of Favor
    Deborah H. Gruenfeld
    , Adam D. Galinsky, Business Strategy Review 23 (Summer 2012): 80-81.

    Overall, power provides a reason to doubt the purity of others' favors, creating a cynical perspective on others' generosity that undermines relationships.

  • How Power Corrupts Relationships: Cynical Attributions for Others' Generous Acts 
    M. Ena Inesi, Deborah H. Gruenfeld, and Adam D. Galinsky, Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 48 (July 2012):  795–803. 

     Five studies explored whether power undermines the quality of relationships by creating instrumental attributions for generous acts.

  • Corporate Governance, Compensation Consultants, and CEO Pay Levels
    Christopher S. Armstrong, Christopher D. Ittner and David F. LarckerReview of Accounting Studies 17 (June 2012): 322-351. 

    Study finds find that CEO pay is higher in firms with weaker governance and that firms with weaker governance are more likely to use compensation consultants.

  • When Key Employees Clash
    H. Irving Grousbeck, Harvard Business Review 90 (June 2012): 135-139.

    A case study is presented on management of personal conflict between executives.

  • Social Movement Organizational Collaboration: Networks of Learning and the Diffusion of Protest Tactics, 1960-1995
    Dan J. Wang and Sarah A. Soule, American Journal Of Sociology 117 (May 2012): 1674-1722.

    This article examines the diffusion of protest tactics among social movement organizations (SMOs) through their collaboration in protest groups.

  • Dynamics of Rate-of-Return Regulation
    Alexander Nezlobin, Madhav Rajan, and Stefan Reichelstein, Management Science 58 (May 2012): 980-995.

    Paper examines the dynamic properties of the rate-of-return regulation process when the regulated firm periodically undertakes new capacity investments.

  • Detecting Deceptive Discussions in Conference Calls
    David F. Larcker
    , and Anastasia A Zakolyukina, Journal of Accounting Research 50 (May 2012): 495–540.

    Language used by the CEO and CFO in earnings conference calls may be a better predictor of a company's health than accounting reports.

  • Does your CEO compensation plan provide the right incentives?
    David Larcker and Brian Tayan, McKinsey Quarterly (April 2012).

    Few consider a key question: how does the compensation that the CEO has already received over the years in the form of stock and stock options influence managerial decision making?

  • Liability Holding Companies
    Anat R. Admati, Peter Conti-Brown, and Paul PleidererUCLA Law Review 59 (April 2012): 852-913.

    Too much debt creates dramatic social costs, moral hazard, and systemic risk, while too little may have negative consequences for firm governance. Challenge is to find a way to optimize that tradeoff.  

  • The Influence of Proxy Advisory Firm Voting Recommendations on Say-on-Pay Votes and Executive Compensation Decisions
    David Larcker, Allan McCall, and Brian Tayan, The Conference Board Directors Note (March 2012). 

    A majority of corporate boards are likely to change CEO compensation to gain a favorable "say-on-pay" recommendation from proxy advisory firms. 

  • Asset Securitizations and Credit Risk
    Mary E. Barth, Gaizka Ormazabal, Daniel Taylor, Accounting Review 87 (March 2012): 423-448. 

    This study examines the sources of credit risk associated with asset securitizations and whether credit-rating agencies and the bond market differ in their assessment of this risk. 

  • The Incentives for Tax Planning 
    Chris Armstrong, Jennifer L. Blouin and David F. LarckerJournal of Accounting and Economics 53 (February–April 2012): 391-411.

    Researchers interpret study results as indicating that tax directors are provided with incentives to reduce the level of tax expense reported in the financial statements.

  • Pills and Partisans: Understanding Takeover Defenses
    Jordan M. Barry and John William HatfieldUniversity of Pennsylvania Law Review 160 (February 2012): 633-713.

    No consensus exists on such fundamental questions as why different corporations adopt varying levels of defenses and whether defenses benefit or harm target corporations' shareholders or society generally.

  • When Feeling Bad Leads to Feeling Good: Guilt-Proneness and Affective Organizational Commitment
    Rebecca L. Schaumberg, and Francis J. FlynnJournal Of Applied Psychology [serial online] 97 (January 2012): 124-133.

    Study finds that higher levels of guilt-proneness, counterintuitively, are associated with higher levels of affective organizational commitment.

  • The Fluency of Social Hierarchy: The Ease With Which Hierarchical Relationships Are Seen, Remembered, Learned, and Liked
    Emily M. Zitek, and Larissa Z. Tiedens, Journal of Personality & Social Psychology 102 (January 2012): 98-115.

    Research shows that we sometimes prefer hierarchical relationships over equal ones.

  • Failure is an Option: Failure Barriers and New Firm Performance (January 2012) 
    Robert Eberhart, Charles E. Eesley, and Kathleen M. EisenhardtAcademy Of Management Annual Meeting Proceedings [serial online] (January 2012): 1.

    Do bankruptcy changes in the institutional environment affect the rate of founding by particular types of founders and the performance of their ventures? Researchers argue that lowered costs of exit may have attracted individuals with greater human capital and social networks thus positively affecting new firm performance among other findings.

  • Corporate Governance Systems and Firm Value: Empirical Evidence from Japan’s Natural Experiment
    Robert Eberhart, 
    Journal of Asia Business Studies 6: (2012) 176-196.

    Paper presents evidence that the adoption by Japanese firms of a shareholder-oriented, more transparent system of corporate governance, creates greater corporate value in comparison to the traditional system of statutory auditors. 


  • Corporate Governance and the Information Content of Insider Trades

    Alan D. Jagolinzer, David F. Larcker, and Daniel J. Taylor, Journal of Accounting Research 49 (December 2011): 1249-1274.

    This study examines the role of the general counsel in mitigating informed trading by corporate insiders.

  • Social Psychological Perspectives on Power in Organizations
    Francis J. Flynn, Deborah Gruenfeld
    , Linda D. Molm, and Jeffrey T. Polzer, Administrative Science Quarterly 56 (December 2011): 495-500.

    Discusses various topics including power in an organization, instability in a social hierarchy and organizational behavior.

  • Corporate bond default risk: A 150-year perspective 
    Kay Giesecke, Francis A. Longstaff, Stephen Schaefer, Ilya Strebulaev, Journal of Financial Economics 102 (November 2011): 233-250.

    Researchers study corporate bond default rates using an extensive new data set spanning the 1866–2008 period. Find that the corporate bond market has repeatedly suffered clustered default events much worse than those experienced during the Great Depression.

  • Becoming a leader: Early career challenges faced by MBA graduates
    Beth Benjamin and Charles O'Reilly, Academy of Management Learning & Education 10 (September 2011): 452-472.

    Study investigates the early career challenges of 55 young leaders who had graduated from an MBA program in the past decade.

  • Hot or Cold: Is Communicating Anger or Threats More Effective in Negotiation?
    Marwan Sinaceur, Gerben A. Van Kleef, Margaret A. Neale, Hajo Adam, and Christophe Haag, Journal of Applied Psychology, 96 (September 2011): 1018-1032.

    Researchers argue that anger communication conveys an implied threat, and document that issuing threats is a more effective negotiation strategy than communicating anger.

  • Trust In Crisis: Organizational and Institutional Trust, Failures and Repair
    Reinhard Bachmann, Nicole Gillespie, and Rod Kramer, Organization Studies 32 (September 2011): 1311-1313.

    A call for papers on the trust of the society in institutions and organizations is presented.

  • Incidental anger and the desire to evaluate
    Scott S. Wiltermuth and Larissa Z. TiedensOrganizational Behavior & Human Decision Processes, 116 (September 2011): 55-65.

    Results indicate that people experiencing incidental anger are more likely than people in neutral and other emotional states to prefer to perform evaluative tasks, even though their anger may bias the evaluations they make.

  • The Market Reaction to Corporate Governance Regulation
    David F. Larcker, Gaizka Ormazabal, and Daniel J. Taylor, Journal of Financial Economics 101 (August 2011): 431-448.

    Investigates the market reaction to recent legislative and regulatory actions pertaining to corporate governance. Researchers find that the abnormal returns to recent events relating to corporate governance regulations are, on average, value reducing to shareholders.

  • The Economics and Politics of Corporate Social Performance
    David P. Baron, Maretno Agus Harjoto and Jo Hoje, Business Politics 13 (August 2011): 1-46.

    Firms operate in a capital market, a product market, and a market for social pressure directed at them by social activists, NGOs, and governments. This paper estimates the simultaneous equation model for a panel of over 1,600 firms and finds that CFP is uncorrelated with CSP and negatively correlated with social pressure. 

  • The Destructive Nature of Power Without Status
    Nathanael Fast, Nir Halevy, and Adam Galinsky, Journal of Experimental Social Psychology  (July 2011).

    Study finds that individuals in roles that possess power, but lack status, have a tendency to engage in activities that demean others. The combination of some authority and little perceived status can be a toxic combination.

  • Resources versus respect: Social judgment based on targets' power and status positions
    Alison R. Fragale, Jennifer R. Overbeck, and Margaret A. NealeJournal of Experimental Social Psychology 47 (July 2011): 767-775.

    ► High status people, regardless of power, are judged positively - dominant and warm. ► Low power-low status individuals are judged submissive and warm. ► High power- low status individuals are judged most negatively - as dominant and cold.. 

  • Organizational Ambidexterity in Action: How Managers Explore and Exploit
    Charles A. O'Reilly, III and Michael L. Tushman, California Management Review 53 (Summer 2011): 5-22.

    The concept of so-called organizational ambidexterity is considered in which a company is able to maintain its competitive advantage through both the exploitation of its existing competencies and the exploration of new lines of business..

  • Security Issue Timing: What Do Managers Know, and When Do They Know It?
    Dirk Jenter, Katharina Lewellen, and Jerold B. Warner, Journal of Finance 66 (April 2011): 413-443.

    Researchers study put option sales on company stock by large firms. An often-cited motivation for these transactions is market timing, and managers' decision to issue puts should be sensitive to whether the stock is undervalued. Study provides new evidence that large firms successfully time security sales.

  • Capital Structure, Cost of Capital, and Voluntary Disclosures
    Jeremy Bertomeu, Anne Beyer, and Ronald A. Dye, The Accounting Review 86 (April 2011): 857-886.

    This paper develops a model of financing that jointly determines a firm's capital structure, its voluntary disclosure policy, and its cost of capital. Investors who receive securities in return for supplying capital sometimes incur losses when they trade their securities with an informed trader.

  • Market-to-revenue multiples in public and private capital markets
    Christopher Armstrong, Antonio Davila, George Foster, John Hand, Australian Journal of Management 36 (April 2011): 15-57.

    The behavior and determinants of market-to-revenue ratios in public and private capital markets is examined.

  • Power: Why Some People Have It, and Others Don't
    Jeffrey Pfeffer
    , Rotman Magazine, (Spring 2011): 101–103.

    The author discusses aspects of health awareness in line with power and status in the organizational ladder. He mentions that stress and helplessnes in an individual with a low power position may be harmful to health.

  • Do sell-side stock analysts exhibit escalation of commitment?
    John Beshears
    , Katherine L. Milkman, Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 77 (March 2011): 304-331.

    This paper presents evidence that when an analyst makes an out-of-consensus forecast of a company''s quarterly earnings that turns out to be incorrect, she escalates her commitment to maintaining an out-of-consensus view on the company.

  • The Effect of Trading Volume on Analysts' Forecast Bias
    Anne Beyer and Ilan Guttman, Accounting Review 86 (March 2011): 451-481.

    Study models the interaction between a sell-side analyst and risk-averse investors.

  • Capital Allocation and Timely Accounting Recognition of Economic Losses.
    Robert M Bushman, Joseph D. Piotroski, and Abbie J. Smith, Journal of Business Finance & Accounting38 (January 2011): 1-33.

    This paper explores direct relations between corporate investment behavior and the timeliness of accounting recognition of economic losses (TLR) reflected in a country's accounting regime.

  • Too Much Information: The Perils of Nondiagnostic Information in Negotiations
    Scott S. Wiltermuth, and Margaret A. Neale, Journal of Applied Psychology 96 (January 2011): 192-201.

    Two studies showed that possessing information about a negotiation counterpart that is irrelevant to the negotiation task can impair negotiators' effectiveness because such knowledge impedes effective information exchange. As the old adage goes, a little knowledge is a dangerous thing.

  • Power becomes you: The effects of implicit and explicit power on the self.
    Brianna Barker Caza, Larissa Tiedens and Fiona Lee, Organizational Behavior & Human Decision Processes 114 (January 2011):15-24.

    Study results suggest that the way power is conveyed and expressed can influence important outcomes in organizations.

  • On the folly of principal's power: Managerial psychology as a cause of bad incentives.
    Joe C. Magee, Gavin J. Kilduff, and Chip HeathResearch in Organizational Behavior 31 (2011): 25-41.

    Those with the power to design incentives may be those least able to effectively do so. Study discusses four specific types of bad incentive systems that can arise from these psychological tendencies in managers: those that over-emphasize compensation, generate weak motivation, offer perverse motivation, or are misaligned with organizational culture.

  • Personnel Economics: Hiring and Incentives
    Paul Oyer and Scott Schaefer, In: Orley Ashenfelter and David Card, editors: Handbook of Labor Economics, Vol 4b, Great Britain, North Holland, 2011: 1769-1823.

    Researchers survey the Personnel Economics literature, focusing on how firms establish, maintain, and end employment relationships and on how firms provide incentives to employees.

  • Institutional cross-holdings and their effect on acquisition decisions
    Jarrad Harford, Dirk Jenter, and Kai Li, Journal of Financial Economics 99 (2011): 27-39.

    Conducting a shareholder-level analysis of cross-holdings, researchers find that cross-holdings are too small to matter in most acquisitions and that bidders do not bid more aggressively even in the few cases in which cross-holdings are large. They conclude that cross-holdings do not explain value-reducing acquisitions.

  • Powerful Postures Versus Powerful Roles: Which Is the Proximate Correlate of Thought and Behavior?
    Huang Ly, Adam D. Galinsky, Deborah H Gruenfeld, Lucia E.Guillory, Psychological Science 6 (2011): 95-102.

    Standing Tall Is Key for Success: 'Powerful Postures' May Trump Title and Rank.


            • Rating the Ratings: How Good Are Commercial Governance Ratings?
              Robert Daines,
              Ian D. Gow, and David F. Larcker, Journal of Financial Economics 98 (December 2010): 439–461.

              Study casts strong doubt upon the value and validity of the ratings of governance advisory firms that compile indexes to evaluate the effectiveness of a publicly held company’s governance practices.

            • Dividend Stickiness and Strategic Pooling
              Ilan Guttman
              , Ohad Kadan, and Eugene Kandel, Review of Financial Studies 23 (December 2010): 4455-4495.

              Dividend stickiness manifests itself as the practice of firms keeping their dividends unchanged until earnings change significantly. An implication of dividend stickiness is that firms follow a partially pooling dividend policy in which the same dividend is paid over an interval of earnings realizations.
            • The financial reporting environment: Review of the recent literature 
              Anne Beyer, Daniel A. Cohen, Thomas Z. Lys, and Beverly R. Walther, Journal Of Accounting & Economics 50 (December 2010): 296-343.

              Study reviews current research on the three main decisions that shape the corporate information environment in capital market settings: (1) managers’ voluntary disclosure decisions, (2) disclosures mandated by regulators, and (3) reporting decisions by analysts.

            • Organizational designs and innovation streams
              Michael Tushman, Wendy K. Smith, Robert Chapman; George Westerman, and Charles O’Reilly, Industrial & Corporate Change 19 (October 2010): 1331-1366.

              This article empirically explores the relations between alternative organizational designs and a firm’s ability to explore as well as exploit.

            • Heterogeneity and peer effects in mutual fund proxy voting
              Gregor Matvos and Michael Ostrovsky, Journal of Financial Economics 98 (October 2010): 90-112.

              This paper studies voting in corporate director elections. Heterogeneity and peer effects are as important in shaping voting outcomes as firm and director characteristics.

            • Critical Lapses Exist in CEO Succession Planning (cover story)
              Credit Union Directors Newsletter 34 (October 2010): 1-2.

              Presents a study conducted by Stanford's Rock Center for Corporate Governance and Heidrick & Struggles on the critical lapses in chief executive officer (CEO) succession planning in private and public companies in the U.S.

            • Who's With Me? False Consensus, Brokerage and Ethical Decision Making In Organizations
              Francis J. Flynn
              and Scott S. Wiltermuth, Academy Of Management Journal 53 (October 2010):1074-1089.

              Finds that organization members overestimate the degree to which others share their views on ethical matters. Additionally, researchers argue that being a broker in an advice network exacerbates this false consensus bias.

            • How did Financial Reporting Contribute to the Financial Crisis?
              Mary E. Barth, and Wayne R. Landsman, European Accounting Review 19 (September 2010): 399-423.

              Scrutinizes the role financial reporting for fair values, asset securitizations, derivatives, and loan loss provisioning played in the Financial Crisis.

            • Morally Motivated Self-Regulation
              David P. Baron, American Economic Review 100 (September 2010): 1299-1329.

              Focuses on the role of organizations in increasing self-regulation by mitigating free-rider problems.

            • Non-Profits Are Seem as Warm and For-Profits as Competent: Firm Stereotypes Matter
              Jennifer L. Aaker
              ; Kathleen D. Vohs; Cassie Mogilner, Journal of Consumer Research 37 (August 2010): 224-237.

              Consumers use warmth and competence, two fundamental dimensions that govern social judgments of people, to form perceptions of firms. 

            • Gender and Persistence in Negotiation: A Dydadic Perspective
              Hannah Riley Bowles, and Francis FlynnAcademy Of Management Journal 53 (August 2010): 769-787.

              Findings challenge sex-stereotypic perspectives, showing that women persist more with male naysayers than with female naysayers but do so in a stereotypically low-status (more indirect than direct) manner. . 

            • Power Play
              Jeffrey Pfeffer
              Harvard Business Review 88 (July-August 2010): 84-92.

              Pfeffer offers a primer on why power matters, how to get it, and how to use it to advance your organization's agenda--thus, not incidentally, furthering your career. When push comes to shove, the author explains, there are several things powerful people do to prevail.

            • Oprah, Tiger, Lady Gaga: Do They Really Have Power?: Interaction
              Jeffrey Pfeffer,
              Harvard Business Review 88 (July-August 2010): 84-92.

              This article comments on the "Forbes Celebrity 100" ranking of media figures including Lady Gaga.

            • Endogenous Selection and Moral Hazard in Compensation Contracts
              Christopher S. Armstrong, David F. Larcker and Che-Lin Su, Operations Research, Linthicum 58 (July/August 2010):1090-1106.

              The two major paradigms in the theoretical agency literature are moral hazard (i.e., hidden action) and adverse selection (i.e., hidden information). Researchers formulate two complementary generalized principal-agent models that incorporate features observed in real-world contracting environments as mathematical programs with equilibrium constraints (MPEC).

            • I feel, therefore you act: Intrapersonal and interpersonal effects of emotion on negotiation as a function of social power
              Jennifer R. Overbeck, Margaret A Neale, Cassandra L. Govan, Organizational Behavior & Human Decision Processes 112 (July 2010): 126-139.

              Researchers examine how emotion (anger and happiness) affects value claiming and creation in a dyadic negotiation between parties with unequal power.

            • Economic and psychological perspectives on CEO compensation: a review and synthesis
              Charles O'Reilly, III and Brian G. M. Main, Industrial and Corporate Change 16 (June 2010): 675.

              Investigates the micro-underpinnings of boardroom behavior in order to explain this departure from principal-agency theory's argument that executive compensation serves to align interests between the owners of the company and its senior managers.

            • Power as Charismatic Leadership: A Significant Opportunity (and a Modest Proposal) for Social Psychology Research
              Franics J. Flynn Social Psychology of Power (eds. A. Guinote and T. Vescio), (June 2010) 284-309.

              Chapter discusses charismatic leaders who are seen as unstoppable when presented with a mission and unflappable when confronted with a mistake. In short, these individuals are considered to be responsible for changing the world in which we live.

            • Employee stock options and future firm performance: Evidence from option repricings 
              David Aboody, Nicole Bastian Johnson, and Ron Kasznik, Journal of Accounting and Economics 50 (May 2010): 74-92.

              Investigates firms’ operating performance subsequent to the repricing of executive and non-executive employee stock options. Findings suggest employee stock options provide sufficiently large incentive effects to favorably affect firms’ performance, but primarily so at the executive level.

            • A skeptical appraisal of asset pricing tests
              Jonathan Lewellen, Stefan Nagel, Jay Shanke, Journal of Financial Economics 96 (May 2010): 175-194.

              Paper reviews and critiques the empirical methods used in the literature.

            • Chief Executive Officer Equity Incentives and Accounting Irregularities.
              Christopher S. Armstrong, Alan D. Jagolinzer, and David F. Larcker, Journal of Accounting Research 48 (May 2010): 225.

              Study examines whether CEO equity-based holdings and compensation provide incentives to manipulate accounting reports. Paper finds some evidence that accounting irregularities occur less frequently at firms where CEOs have relatively higher levels of equity incentives.

            • Building Sustainable High Growth Startup Companies: Management Systems as an Accelerator
              Antonio Davila, George Foster, and Ning Jia, California Management Review 52 (Spring 2010): 79-105.

              The article analyzes a management transition phase typically experienced by growing startup companies when they have acquired more employees than can be effectively managed on an informal basis. This usually occurs in the 50 to 100 employee range. Research is presented which indicates that successfully implementing professional management systems at this stage causes firms to enjoy higher growth than firms which fail to do so.

            • On the use of instrumental variables in accounting research 
              David F. Larcker and Tjomme O. Rusticus, Journal of Accounting and Economics 49 (April 2010):186-205

              Drawing on recent advances in statistics and econometrics, researchers identify conditions under which Instrumental variable (IV) methods are preferred to OLS estimates and propose a series of tests for research studies employing IV methods (ideas illustrated by examining the relation between corporate disclosure and the cost of capital).

            • The Timing of Analysts’ Earnings Forecasts
              Ilan Guttman, Accounting Review 85 (March 2010): 513.

              Study develops a model that endogenizes the timing decision of analysts and analyzes their equilibrium timing strategies. All else equal, analysts with a higher precision of initial private information tend to forecast earlier, and analysts with a higher learning ability tend to forecast later.

            • Extreme Governance: An Analysis of Dual-Class Firms in the United States
              Paul A. Gompers, Joy Ishii, and Andrew Metrick, Review of Financial Studies 23 (March 2010): 1051-1088.

              Researchers construct a comprehensive list of dual-class firms in the United States and use this list to analyze the relationship between insider ownership and firm value. In single-stage regressions, they find strong evidence that firm value is increasing in insiders’ cash-flow rights and decreasing in insider voting rights.

            • Estimating the Cost of Capital Implied by Market Prices and Accounting Data
              Charles M C Lee, Accounting Review 85 (March 2010): 745.

              "Estimating the Cost of Capital Implied by Market Prices and Accounting Data, Foundations and Trends in Accounting," by Peter Easton is reviewed.

            • In defense of fair value: Weighing the evidence on earnings management and asset securitizations
              Mary E. Barth
              and Dan Taylor, Journal of Accounting & Economics 49 (February 2010): 26-33.

              Dechow, Myers, and Shakespeare (DMS, 2009) find a negative relation between income from securitization activities and income from non-securitization activities. Researchers clarify the role of fair value in accounting for asset securitizations, discuss alternative explanations for the evidence presented in DMS, and offer suggestions for future research.

            • How leadership matters: The effects of leaders' alignment on strategy implementation
              Charles O'Reilly III
              , David F. Caldwell, Jennifer A. Chatman, Margaret Lapiz, and William Self, Leadership Quarterly 21 (February 2010): 104-113.

              Researchers focused on how the consistency of leadership effectiveness across hierarchical levels influenced the implementation of a strategic initiative in a large health care system. Study found that it was only when leaders' effectiveness at different levels was considered in the aggregate, that significant performance improvement occurred.

            • Building Sustainable Organizations: The Human Factor.
              Jeffrey Pfeffer,
              Academy of Management Perspectives 24 (February 2010): 34-45.

              Article briefly reviews the literature on the direct and indirect effects of organizations and their decisions about people on human health and mortality. It then considers some possible explanations for why social sustainability has received relatively short shrift in management writing.

            • Market Reaction to the Adoption of IFRS in Europe
              Christopher S Armstrong, Mary E Barth, Alan D Jagolinzer, Edward J Riedl, Accounting Review 85 (January 2010): 31-61.

              Study examines European stock market reactions to 16 events associated with adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) in Europe.

            • Earnings Quality
              Maureen McNichols
              , Accounting Review 85 (January 2010): 382-384.

              The article reviews the book "Earnings Quality," by Jennifer Francis, Per Olsson, and Katherine Schipper.

            • The Failure Mechanics of Dealer Banks
              Darrell Duffie
              , Journal of Economic Perspectives 24 (Winter 2010): 51-72.

              The mechanics by which dealer banks can fail and the policies available to treat the systemic risk of their failures differ markedly from the case of conventional commercial bank runs. These failure mechanics are the focus of this article. This is not a review of the financial crisis of 2007-2009.


        • Capital Market Prices, Management Forecasts, and Earnings Management
          Anne Beyer, Accounting Review 84 (November 2009): 1713.

          Analyzes a manager's optimal earnings forecasting strategy and optimal earnings management policy in a setting where both the mean and the variance of the distribution generating the firm's cash flows are unknown. 

        • The Stock Market's Pricing of Customer Satisfaction
          Christopher Ittner, David F. Larcker and Daniel Taylor, Marketing Science, Linthicum 28 (September/October 2009): 826-835.

          The broad purpose of these studies is to investigate the stock market's valuation of customer satisfaction. However, a key focus is on whether customer satisfaction information predicts long-run returns. Study provides evidence on the market's pricing of ACSI information using a more comprehensive set of well-established tests from the accounting and finance literatures.

        • Organizational Ambidexterity: IBM and Emerging Business Opportunities
          Charles O'Reilly III, J. Bruce Harreld, and Michael L. Tushman, California Management Review 51 (Summer 2009): 75-99.

          The article discusses organization theory from an evolutionary perspective and organizational dynamics that lead to change with a focus on the IBM Emerging Business Organization (EBO) process which allows IBM to respond to changing economic and market conditions. The metrics, key success factors, outputs, and focus of the EBO model of management are discussed.

        • Inexperienced investors and bubbles
          Robin Greenwood and Stefan Nagel, Journal of Financial Economics 93 (August 2009): 239-258.

          Uses mutual fund manager data from the technology bubble to examine the hypothesis that inexperienced investors play a role in the formation of asset price bubbles.

        • Shareholders First? Not so Fast
          Jeffrey Pfeffer, Harvard Business Review 87 (July 2009): 90-91.

          When did we start measuring the success of a company only according to the increase in its share price? Stanford professor Pfeffer argues that it's time for CEOs to once again to balance shareholders' interests with those of the other stakeholders: employees, suppliers, and customers.

        • The wisdom of the minority.
          Steven Callander, Journal Of Economic Theory 144 (July 2009): 1421-1439.

          Study demonstrates that it is possible for the minority to be wise even when the minority consists of a lone dissenter and a majority of citizens are well informed.

        • The "Wall Street Walk" and Shareholder Activism: Exit as a Form of Voice
          Anat Admati, and Paul Pfleiderer, Review of Financial Studies 22 (July 2009): 2645-2685.

          Examines whether a large shareholder can alleviate conflicts of interest between managers and shareholders through the credible threat of exit on the basis of private information. Results are consistent with empirical findings on the interaction between managers and minority large shareholders and have further empirical implications.

        • Accounting and Control, Entrepreneurship and Innovation: Venturing into New Research Opportunities
          Antonio Davila, George Foster, and Daniel Oyon, European Accounting Review 18 (June 2009): 281-311.

          The relevance of accounting and control to entrepreneurship and innovation has become more salient over the last few years.  This paper presents a review of this emerging literature.

        • Scale Effects In Capital Markets-Based Accounting Research
          Mary E. Barth
          and Greg Clinch, Journal Of Business Finance & Accounting 36 (April-May 2009): 253-288.

          Study finds that share-deflated and undeflated specifications generally perform the best, regardless of the type of scale effect. 

        • Illusory Control: A Generative Force Behind Power's Far-Reaching Effects. Nathanael J.Fast, Deborah H; Gruenfeld, Niro Sivanathan, Adam D. Galinsky, Psychological Science 20 (April 2009): 502-508.

          Three experiments demonstrated that the experience of power leads to an illusion of personal control. These results demonstrate the theoretical importance of perceived control as a generative cause of and driving force behind many of power's far-reaching effects. The discussion considers implications for existing and future research on the psychology of power, perceived control, and positive illusions.

        • Reasons for management control systems adoption: Insights from product development systems choice by early-stage entrepreneurial companies
          Antonio Davila, George Foster, and Mu Li, Accounting, Organizations & Society 34 (April 2009): 322-347.

          Recent theoretical and empirical work indicates that management control systems (MCS) are an important element in enhancing innovation. We extend this research thrust examining the adoption of MCS in product development, arguably one of the business processes where innovation plays a major role.

        • Discussion of “The Impact of the Options Backdating Scandal on Shareholders” and “Taxes and the Backdating of Stock Option Exercise Dates”
          Christopher S. Armstrong and David F. Larcker, Journal of Accounting & Economics 47 (March 2009): 50-58.

          Researchers specifically discuss the decision models for executives engaged in backdating and the potential role of social networks among directors, selection considerations, institutional voting behavior, and how backdated options can be replicated with existing equity instruments.

        • A Positive Theory of Moral Management, Social Pressure, and Corporate Social Performance
          David P. Baron, Journal Of Economics & Management Strategy 18 (March 2009): 7-43.

          Study provides a theory of firm behavior motivated by moral duty, self-interest, and social pressure. Discusses how corporate social performance (CSP) provides product differentiation.

        • SEC Rule 10b5-1 and Insiders’ Strategic Trade
          Alan D. Jagolinzer, Management Science 55 (February 2009): 224-239.

          The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission enacted Rule 10b5-1 to deter insiders from trading with private information, yet also protect insiders' pre-planned, non-information-based trades from litigation. Despite its requirement that insiders plan trades when not privately informed, the rule appears to enable strategic trade.

        • An Empirical Investigation of the True and Fair Override in the United Kingdom
          Gilad Livne and Maureen McNichols, Journal of Business Finance & Accounting 36 (January 2009): 1-30.

          The True and Fair View concept requires companies to depart from GAAP or the law if necessary to present a true and fair view of the corporation's financial affairs. Researchers analyze UK public companies invoking a true and fair override to assess whether overrides are associated with weakened performance, earnings quality and informativeness. Findings are relevant for the debate on principle- vs. rules-based accounting.

        • Objective Versus Subjective Indicators of Managerial Performance
          Madhav V. Rajan
          and Stefan Reichelstein, Accounting Review 84 (January 2009): 209-237.

          Managerial bonus payments are frequently determined by both objective and subjective indicators of managerial performance. Research analysis examines the structure of optimal bonus pool arrangements.


          • Power Reduces the Press of the Situation: Implications for Creativity, Conformity, and Dissonance
            Adam D.Galinsky, Joe C. Magee, Deborah H. Gruenfeld, Jennifer A. Whitson, Katie Liljenquist, Journal of Personality & Social Psychology 95 (December 2008): 1450-1466.

            5 experiments (using experiential primes, semantic primes, and role manipulations of power) demonstrate that the powerful (a) generate creative ideas that are less influenced by salient examples, (b) express attitudes that conform less to the expressed opinions of others, (c) are more influenced by their own social value orientation relative to the reputation of a negotiating opponent, and (d) perceive greater choice in making counterattitudinal statements.

          • Does Earnings Management Affect Firms’ Investment Decisions
            Maureen McNichols
            and Steve Stubben, Accounting Review 83 (November 2008): 1571-1603.

            Paper examines whether firms manipulating their reported financial results make suboptimal investment decisions. Findings suggest that earnings management, which is largely viewed as targeting parties external to the firm, can also influence internal decisions.

          • Introduction: Social Movements in Organizations and Markets
            Gerald F. Davis, Calvin Morrill, Hayagreeva Rao, and Sarah A. Soule, Administrative Science Quarterly 53 (September 2008): 389-394.

            Paper that examines themes at several intersections among organizations, movements, and markets.

          • Executive Stock-Based Compensation and Firms' Cash Payout: The Role of Shareholders' Tax-Related Payout Preferences
            David Aboody and Ron Kasznik, Review of Accounting Studies 13 (September 2008): 216-251.

            Researchers investigate the role of shareholders’ tax-related payout preferences in the design of executive stock-based compensation and extends the prior literature that has largely focused on the role of incentive contracts in inducing managerial effort, risk taking, and retention.

          • Power and the objectification of social targets
            Adam D.Galinsky, Joe C. Magee, M. Ena Inesi, Deborah H. Gruenfeld, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 95 (July 2008): 111–127.

            Power appears to be a great facilitator of goal pursuit through a combination of intrapersonal and interpersonal processes. The nature of the power holder’s goals and interpersonal relationships ultimately determine how power is harnessed and what is accomplished in the end.

          • International Accounting Standards and Accounting Quality
            Mary E. Barth
            , Wayne R. Landsman and Mark H. Lang, Journal Of Accounting Research 46 (June 2008): 467-498.

            Examines whether application of International Accounting Standards (IAS) is associated with higher accounting quality.

          • Personality and organizational culture as determinants of influence
            Cameron Anderson, Sandra E. Spataro, and Francis J. Flynn, Journal of Applied Psychology 93 (May 2008): 702-710.

            Consistent with expectations, extraverts attained more influence in a team-oriented organization, whereas conscientious individuals attained more influence in an organization in which individuals worked alone on technical tasks.

          • Regulation and Bonding: The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Flow of International Listings
            Joseph D. Piotroski
            and Suraj Srinivasan, Journal of Accounting Research 46 (May 2008): 383-425.

            Paper examines the economic impact of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) by analyzing foreign listing behavior onto U.S. and U. K. stock exchanges before and after the enactment of SOX in 2002. Researchers find that the listing preferences of large foreign firms choosing between U.S. exchanges and the London Stock Exchange's (LSE) Main Market did not change following the enactment of SOX.

          • The Power of the Pen and Executive Compensation
            John E. Core, Wayne Guay, and David F. Larcker, Journal of Financial Economics 88 (April 2008): 1-25.

            Examines the press’ role in monitoring and influencing executive compensation practice using more than 11,000 press articles about CEO compensation from 1994 to 2002. Study finds little evidence that firms respond to negative press coverage by decreasing excess CEO compensation or increasing CEO turnover.

            Related: Excessive Executive Pay Makes Headlines, But So What? Stanford GSB News, April 2008

          • Managerial contracting and corporate social responsibility
            David P. Baron, Journal of Public Economics 92 (February 2008): 268-288.

            Paper presents a theory of corporate social responsibility in the form of the private provision of public goods and private redistribution by a firm. These social expenditures are determined by a manager operating under a compensation contract chosen by shareholders in a capital market that prices social expenditures.


    • Performance-based compensation in member-owned firms: An examination of medical group practices
      C.D. Ittner, David F. Larcker and M. Pizzini, Journal of Accounting & Economics 44 (December 2007): 300-327.

      Examines the importance of agency considerations for the mix of salary and performance-based compensation in member-owned medical practices. Inexperienced physicians receive more compensation from salary, but compensation mix does not change as physicians near retirement.

    • Insider Trades and Private Information: The Special Case of Delayed-Disclosure Trades
      Shijun Cheng; Venky Nagar; Madhav Rajan, Review of Financial Studies 20 (November 2007): 1833-1864.

      In certain circumstances, insider trades such as private transactions between executives and their firms could be disclosed after the end of the firm’s fiscal year, on a Form-5 filing. We find that insider sales disclosed in such a delayed manner for large firms are predictive of negative future returns (−6 to −8 percent), as well as lower future annual earnings relative to analyst forecasts.

    • Strategic Activism and Nonmarket Strategy
      David P. Baron and Daniel Diermeier, Journal of Economics and Management Strategy 16 (Fall 2007): 599-634.

      Activist NGOs have increasingly foregone public politics and turned to private politics to change the practices of firms and industries. This paper focuses on private politics, activist strategies, and nonmarket strategies of targets.

    • Corporate Social Responsibility and Social Entrepreneurship
      David P. Baron, Journal of Economics and Management Strategy 16 (Fall 2007): 683-717.
      Milton Friedman argued that the social responsibility of firms is to maximize profits. This paper examines this argument for the economic environment envisioned by Friedman in which citizens can personally give to social causes and can invest in profit-maximizing firms and firms that give a portion of their profits to social causes.

    • Beware the Corporate Raters
      Jeffrey PfefferBusiness 2.0 ( September 2007): 52.

      Article presents the author's views on the legitimacy of corporate rating agencies such as Institutional Shareholder Services Inc. (ISS). He views that though ISS has some 65 rules and guidelines, there is almost no evidence that ISS's prescribed practices for corporate governance are actually related to outcomes such as higher rates of return for shareholders or improved company performance. He views that there is no way to know whether its ratings are affected by its own self-interest.

    • Biases in multi-year management financial forecasts: Evidence from private venture-backed U.S. companies
      Christopher Armstrong, Antonio Dávila, George Foster, and John Hand, Review of Accounting Studies 12 (September 2007): 183-215.

      This paper studies the properties and determinants of managers’ multi-year financial forecasts.

    • An Unconscious Desire for Hierarchy? The Motivated Perception of Dominance Complementarity in Task Partner
      Larissa Z. Tiedens
      , Miguel M. Unzueta, and Maia J. Young, Journal of Personality & Social Psychology 93 (September 2007): 402-414.

      In six studies, the authors examined the perception of dominance complementarity, which is the perception of a target as different from the self in terms of dominance. The authors argue that these perceptions are motivated by the desire for positive task relationships.

    • Corporate Governance, Accounting Outcomes and Organizational Performance
      David F. Larcker and Scott A. Richardson, Accounting Review 82 (July 2007): 963-1008.

      The empirical research examining the association between typical measures of corporate governance and various accounting and economic outcomes has not produced a consistent set of results. Using a sample of 2,106 firms and 39 structural measures of corporate governance the exploratory principal component analysis suggests that there are 14 dimensions to corporate governance.

    • Delisting returns and their effect on accounting-based market anomalies
      William Beaver, Maureen McNichols, and Richard Price, Journal of Accounting & Economics 43 (July 2007): 341-368.

      Research shows that tests of market efficiency are sensitive to the inclusion of delisting firm-years. When included, trading strategy returns based on anomaly variables can increase (for strategies based on earnings, cash flows and the book-to-market ratio) or decrease (for a strategy based on accruals).

    • Management Control Systems in Early-Stage Startup Companies
      Antonio Davila, and George Foster, Accounting Review 82 (July 2007): 907-937.

      This paper uses a multi-method, multi-case field research design to study the evolving portfolio of the management control systems (MCSs) of 78 early-stage startup companies.

    • Employee sentiment and stock option compensation
      Nittai K. Bergman and Dirk Jenter, Journal of Financial Economics 84 (June 2007): 667-712.

      Researchers provide empirical evidence that firms use broad-based option compensation when boundedly rational employees are likely to be excessively optimistic about company stock, and when employees are likely to strictly prefer options over stock.

    • Endogeneity and Empirical Accounting Research
      David F. Larcker and Tjomme O. Rusticus, European Accounting Review 16 (May 2007): 207-215.

      The discussion reinforces and expands on some of the fundamental issues about endogeneity raised by Chenhall and Moers (European Accounting Review, this issue, pp. 173-195). Paper suggests need for better theory to guide the empirical work.

    • Discussion of the Book-to-Price Effect in Stock Returns: Accounting for Leverage
      Joseph D. Piotroski, Journal of Accounting Research 45 (May 2007): 469-479.

      Discusses conference paper that provides a theoretical decomposition of the book-to-market ratio and uses this framework to document a robust negative relation between future returns and leverage after holding the net operating asset dimension of the firm's pricing multiple constant. Unfortunately, the authors do not reconcile this result to either a risk-based or misvaluation based framework, resulting in the paper generating more questions than answers.

    • Inside the Family Firm: The Role of Families in Succession Decisions and Performance
      Morten Bennedsen, Kasper Meisner Nielsen, Francisco Perez-Gonzalez, and Daniel Wolfenzon, Quarterly Journal of Economics 122 (May 2007): 647-691.

      This paper uses a unique dataset from Denmark to investigate the impact of family characteristics in corporate decision making and the consequences of these decisions on firm performance. Find that family successions have a large negative causal impact on firm performance: operating profitability on assets falls by at least four percentage points around CEO transitions.

    • Multi-Period Corporate Default Prediction with Stochastic Covariates 
      Darrell Duffie
      , Leandro Saita and Ke Wang, Journal of Financial Economics 83 (March 2007): 635-665.

      Provides maximum likelihood estimators of term structures of conditional probabilities of corporate default, incorporating the dynamics of firm-specific and macroeconomic covariates. The out-of-sample predictive performance of the model is an improvement over that of other available models.

    • Setting the CEO's Pay: It's more than Simple Economics
      Charles A. O'Reilly and Brian G. M. Main, Organizational Dynamics 36 (February 2007): 1-12.

      Researchers offer a social psychological perspective on board functioning, in which the CEO and the Board are jointly responsible for firm performance- and subject to the inevitable effects of reciprocity and social influence. Implications for board functioning are discussed.

    • Fitting in: The effects of relational demography and person-culture fit on group process and performance
      Hillary Anger Elfenbein, Charles A. O'Reilly III, Organization Management 32 (February 2007): 109-142.

      The authors integrate two complementary streams of research on ‘fit’ that document positive impacts of similarity and negative effects of dissimilarity. Fit with an organization's culture typically focuses on similarity in values whereas relational demography examines similarity in demographic attributes.

    • What breaks a leader: The curvilinear relationship between assertiveness and leadership
      Daniel R. Ames, and Francis J. Flynn, Journal of Personality & Social Psychology 92 (February 2007): 307-324.

      Findings suggest that assertiveness (and other constructs with nonlinear effects) may be overlooked in studies that focus on identifying what “makes a leader” rather than what “breaks a leader.”

    • Common Failings: How Corporate Defaults are Correlated
      Sanjiv Das, Darrell Duffie, Nikunj Kapadia and Leandro Saita, Journal of Finance 62 (February 2007): 93-117.

      Researchers test the doubly stochastic assumption under which firms' default times are correlated only as implied by the correlation of factors determining their default intensities. Using data on U.S. corporations from 1979 to 2004, this assumption is violated in the presence of contagion or “frailty” (unobservable explanatory variables that are correlated across firms).

    • Power, Propensity to Negotiate, and Moving First in Competitive Interactions
      Deborah Gruenfeld
      , Joe C. Magee, and Adam D. Galinsky, Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 33 (February 2007): 200-212.

      High-power individuals are (a) more likely to seize opportunities to engage in negotiations and (b) more proactive in trying to obtain those rewards by making the first move than will low-power individuals.

    • Evidence on the Nonlinear Relation between Insider Trading Decisions and Future Earnings Information
      Joseph D. Piotroski
      and Darren T. Roulstone, Journal of Law, Economics, and Policy 4 (January 2007): 409-448.

      Paper explores an insider’s decision to trade or not trade on the basis of future earnings information. One, of several finding, is that insiders only trade on persistent earnings innovations, and that, after controlling for persistence, insiders still curtail trading when earnings innovations are extreme.

    • Cross-Boundary Disruptors: Powerful Inter-Industry Entrepreneurial Change Agents
      Robert A. Burgelman, Andrew S. Grove,
      Stanford GSB Research Paper 1978. (2007).

      Based on comparative case studies of Apple Computer’s strategic actions in the music and cellular telephony industries, we develop the concept of “cross-boundary disruptor” as a new type of entrepreneurial actor in inter-industry strategic dynamics.


          • Emotional Ties That Bind: The Roles of Valence and Consistency of Group Emotion in Inferences of Cohesiveness and Common Fate
            Joe C. Magee and Larissa Z. Tiedens, Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 32 (December 2006): 1703-1715.

             Findings have implications for the literature on entitativity, the perception of a group as pure entity, and regarding the function of emotions in social contexts. 

          • Power and Perspectives Not Taken
            Adam D.Galinsky, Joe C.Magee, M Ena Inesi, Deborah H. Gruenfeld, Psychological Science 17 (December 2006): 1068-74.

            Four experiments and a correlational study explored the relationship between power and perspective. Across these studies, power was associated with a reduced tendency to comprehend how other people see, think, and feel.

          • Do firms understate stock option-based compensation expense disclosed under SFAS 123?
            David Aboody, Mary E. Barth, and Ron Kasznik, Review of Accounting Studies 11 (December 2006): 429-461.

            Focusing on the four key option pricing model inputs—expected option life, expected stock price volatility, expected dividend yield, and the risk-free interest rate for the expected life of the option—this study finds that firms understate option value estimates and, thus, stock-based compensation expense disclosed under SFAS 123.

          • Helping One's Way to the Top: Self-Monitors Achieve Status by Helping Others and Knowing Who Helps Whom
            Francis J. Flynn, Ray E. Reagans,  Emily T. Amanatullah, Daniel R. Ames, Journal of Personality & Social Psychology 91 (December 2006) 1123-1137.

            The authors argue that high self-monitors may be more sensitive to the status implications of social exchange and more effective in managing their exchange relations to elicit conferrals of status than low self-monitors.

          • Inherited Control and Firm Performance
            Francisco Perez-Gonzalez, American Economic Review 96 (December 2006): 1559-1588.

            Study finds that firms where incoming CEOs are related to the departing CEO, to a founder, or to a large shareholder by either blood or marriage underperform in terms of operating profitability and market-to-book ratios, relative to firms that promote unrelated CEOs.

          • Why It Pays to Be Private
            Jeffrey Pfeffer, Business 2.0 (November 2006): 78.

            The article presents information on why more and more U.S. companies are abandoning the public markets. According to Kevin Callaghan, a partner with leading private equity firm Berkshire Partners, there are several factors behind this trend. One is the "hassle" factor which includes the higher risk of shareholder lawsuits and dealing with issues of board size and composition.

          • Costs of Broad-Based Stock Option Plans
            Paul Oyer
            and Scott Schaefer, Journal of Financial Intermediation 15 (October 2006): 511-534.

            Researchers generate estimates of the costs of broad-based stock option programs under varying assumptions about why firms use these pay schemes.

          • Delineating Culture
            Jennifer Aaker
            , Journal Of Consumer Psychology [serial online] 16 (October 2006): 343-347.  

            How are notions of hierarchy and equality structured cognitively, how do they link to the self-concept, and how do they develop? 

          • Overpaid CEOs and Underpaid Managers: Fairness and Executive Compensation 
            James B. Wade, Charles A. O'Reilly, Timothy G. Pollock, Organization Science 17 (September 2006): 527-544.

            This article discusses the issues of fairness with regards to CEO and subordinate salaries. In this study the authors propose that norms of fairness are salient to top decision makers and show that over- or underpayment of the CEO cascades down to lower organizational levels. Implications for the design of executive compensation packages are discussed.

          • Leadership style and regulatory mode: Value from fit?
            Lilly Benjamin and Francis J. Flynn, Organizational Behavior & Human Decision Processes 100 (July 2006): 216-230.

            Researchers consider the relationship between regulatory orientation and transformational leadership. Specifically, they propose that the effectiveness of transformational leadership depends on the followers’ regulatory mode—the manner in which they pursue goals.

          • The Powerful Want To, the Powerless Have To: Perceived Constraint Moderates Causal Attributions 
            Jennifer R. Overbeck, Larissa Z. Tiedens, Sebastien Brion,  European Journal of Social Psychology 36 (July-August 2006): 479-496.

            It is popularly believed that powerful people enjoy a nearly-absolute lack of constraints, and that
            powerless people suffer under overwhelming constraints; in fact, such differences largely define the
            social categories of ‘powerful person’ and ‘powerless person.’ As a result, the actions of powerholders may
            tend to be seen as dispositionally motivated and those of the powerless as situationally motivated.

          • Ending CEO Pay Envy
            Jeffrey Pfeffer, Business 2.07 (June 2006): 62.

            The article presents the author's comments on the rise in CEO pay package. The author affirms that the only way to stop the CEO pay boom is to stop writing about it.

          • Subjective Performance Indicators and Discretionary Bonus Pools
            Madhav V. Rajan
            and Stefan Reichelstein,Journal of Accounting Research 44 (June 2006): 585-618.

            When a principal must rely on subjective information to create incentives for a group of agents, discretionary bonus pools are shown to be optimal mechanisms. Despite their optimality, however, discretionary bonus pools entail an additional agency cost relative to the benchmark of optimal contracts based on objective and verifiable information.

          • Mandated Disclosure, Stock Returns, and the 1964 Securities Acts Amendments
            Michael Greenstone, Paul Oyer and Annette Vissing-Jorgensen, Quarterly Journal of Economics 121 (May 2006): 399-460.

            The 1964 Securities Acts Amendments extended the mandatory disclosure requirements that had applied to listed firms since 1934 to large firms traded Over-the-Counter (OTC). Results suggest that mandatory disclosure causes managers to focus more narrowly on maximizing shareholder value.

          • Get Mad and Get More Than Even: The Benefits of Anger Expressions in Negotiations
            Marwan Sinaceur, and Larissa Z. Tiedens, Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 42 (May 2006): 314–322.

            Recipients of anger expressions who had poor alternatives in negotiations conceded more.

          • Co-Worker Complementarity and the Stability of Top Management Teams
            Rachel M. Hayes, Paul Oyer and Scott Schaefer, Journal of Law, Economics & Organization 22 (April 2006): 184-212.

            Researchers analyze changes in the composition of top management teams when a key member of the team (the chief executive officer [CEO]) departs. We find that the probability of non-CEO top manager turnover increases markedly around times of CEO turnover. Further, the magnitude of this increase depends on the relations between the tenure of the manager and tenures of the departing and incoming CEOs.

          • Buys, holds, and sells: The distribution of investment banks’ stock ratings and the implications for the profitability of analysts’ recommendations
            Brad M. Barber, Reuven Lehavy, Maureen McNichols, and Brett Trueman, Journal of Accounting & Economics 41 (April 2006): 87-117.

            This paper analyzes the distribution of stock ratings at investment banks and brokerage firms and examines whether these distributions can predict the profitability of analysts’ recommendations.

          • What’s good for the goose may not be good for the gander: The benefits of self-monitoring for men and women
            Francis J. Flynn
            , and Daniel R. Ames, Journal of Applied Psychology 91 (March 2006): 272-283.

             In a study of mixed-sex task groups, the authors found that female group members who were high self-monitors were considered more influential and more valuable contributors than women who were low self-monitors. Men benefited relatively less from self-monitoring behavior. 

          • Sometimes Less Is More
            Jeffrey Pfeffer
             and Robert I. Sutton, Leadership Excellence 23 (March 2006):14-15.

            Discusses the advantages and disadvantages of placing too much faith in leaders. Drawbacks of the cultural stereotype of leadership; Effect of power on leaders; Behavior of effective leaders.

          • Venture-backed Private Equity Valuation and Financial Statement Information
            Chris Armstrong, Antonio Davila, George Foster, Review of Accounting Studies 11 (March 2006): 119-154.

            The relationship between (a) private and public equity market valuations and (b) financial statement information is examined for a sample of 502 venture capital backed companies from six different industries over the 1993–2003 period. Findings support prior research for Post-IPO companies that revenues are value enhancing and costs are value diminishing. 

          • The Great Intimidators
            Roderick M. Kramer
            , Harvard Business Review 84 (February 2006): 88-96.

            Despite all the obvious drawbacks of working under them, great intimidators often attract the best and brightest. And their appeal goes beyond their ability to inspire high performance. Many accomplished professionals who gravitate toward these leaders want to cultivate a little "inner intimidator" of their own.

2005 and Prior

      • Identity orientations and forms of social exchange in organizations
        Francis J. Flynn
        Academy of Management Review 30 (October 2005): 737-750.

        The author attempts to explain why employees prefer different forms of social exchange by proposing that such preferences align with their identity orientations. In addition, he develops a model that outlines how identity orientations play an important role in the development of employee exchange relations and may help predict the consequences of exchange dynamics.

      • What Differences Make a Difference?
        Elizabeth Mannix and Margaret A. Neale, Psychological Science in the Public Interestt 6 (October 2005): 31-55.

        Why is the reality of diversity less than the promise? Answering this requires understanding a variety of factors, including how diversity is defined and categorized, and the moderating as well as mediating processes that affect the diversity–process–performance linkage. 

      • Management Accounting Systems Adoption Decisions: Evidence and Performance Implications from Early-Stage/Startup Companies
        Antonio Davila, and George FosterAccounting Review 80 (October 2005): 1039-68.

        Using a sample of 78 startup companies, researchers document cross-sectional differences in the adoption of operating budgets as well as seven other management accounting systems.

      • Managing Internal Corporate Venturing Cycles
        Robert. A. Burgelman
        , and Lisa Valikangas, MIT Sloan Management Review 46 (Summer 2005): 26-34.

        Study suggests that companies can achieve better outcomes if executives recognize the strategic importance of internal corporate venturing activities and view them as a way of gaining insights into emerging business opportunities.

      • Building Organization Theory from First Principles: The Self-Enhancement Motive and Understanding Power and Influence
        Jeffrey Pfeffer
        , and Christina T. Fong, Organization Science 16 (July-August 2005): 372-388.

        Authors argue that many psychological processes related to power and social influence (such as escalation of commitment, similarity attraction and in-group favoritism, the disinhibiting effects of power, and the persistence of hierarchical structures) can all be logically derived from the self-enhancement idea, the desire to see oneself and one's actions in a positive light.

      • Leadership Matters-- Or Does It?
        James A. Phills Jr.
         Leader to Leader 36 (Spring 2005): 46-52.

        Senior executives consistently cite leadership as critical to their organizations. Board members, professional investors, consultants, and the media regularly invoke leadership as the explanation for the successes, failures, and misdeeds of companies, government institutions, and nonprofit organizations. For leadership to matter, one needs to understand the mechanisms through which leaders influence factors that determine organizational performance--which is to say,we need to understand how leadership matters.

      • Cisco Systems: Developing a Human Capital Strategy
        Jennifer Chatman, Charles O'Reilly, and Victoria Chang, California Management Review 47 (Winter 2005): 137-167.

        The article analyzes how Mary Eckenrod, Cisco's Vice President of Worldwide Talent, developed a human capital strategy to identify and develop leaders from within a company with no tradition of developing people internally, thus moving from a "buy" to a "make" human capital strategy.

      • The influence model: Using reciprocity and exchange to get what you need
        Allan R. Cohen, and David L. BradfordJournal of Organizational Excellence 25 (March 2005): 57-80.

        In organizational life, you can't always get what you want, especially from people over whom you have no authority. The Cohen-Bradford Influence model offers a practical process of reciprocity and exchange—trading what you have that the other person desires in exchange for what you need to accomplish workplace and personal goals.

      • Lend Me Your Wallets: The Effect of Charismatic Leadership on External Support for an Organization
        Francis J.Flynn
        , and Barry M. Staw, Strategic Management Journal 25 (February 2004): 309-330.

        Researchers argue that charismatic leadership can influence external support for the organization, particularly in making the company more attractive to outside investors. Two studies were conducted to test this general hypothesis.

      • How Much Should I Help and How Often? The Effects of Generosity and Frequency of Favor Exchange on Social Status and Productivity
        Francis J. Flynn
        Academy of Management Journal 46 (October 2003): 539-553.

        This article draws attention to an understudied form of social exchange in organizations–favor exchange among peer employees.

      • Power, Approach and Inhibition
        Dacher Keltner, Deborah H. Gruenfeld, and Cameron Anderson, Psychological Review 110 (April 2003): 265-284.

        Power is associated with (a) positive affect, (b) attention to rewards, (c) automatic information processing, and (d) disinhibited behavior. In contrast, reduced power is associated with (a) negative affect; (b) attention to threat, punishment, others' interests, and those features of the self that are relevant to others' goals; (c) controlled information processing; and (d) inhibited social behavior.

      • Who's Being Served? 'Self-Serving' Attributions in Social Hierarchies
        Fiona Lee, and Larissa Z. Tiedens, Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 84 (March 2001): 254-387

        The results supported the researchers hypotheses: external attributions can be highly disserving for people in high-status positions.

      • Is it Lonely at the Top: The Independence and Interdependence of Power Holders Research
        Fiona Lee, and Larissa Z. Tiedens, Organizational Behavior 23 (2003): 43.

        Reviews evidence on the relationship between power and self construals; Important skills for acquiring and maintaining power.

      • Sentimental Stereotypes: Emotional Expectations for High-and Low-Status Group Members
        Larissa Z. Tiedens, Phoebe C. Ellsworth, and Batja Mesquita, Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 26 (May 2000): 560-575.

        Three vignette studies examined stereotypes of the emotions associated with high-and low-status group members.