

# Parochial Politics: Ethnic Competition and Politician Corruption in India

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Preliminary draft

## Abstract

We develop a model of party competition to explain how polarization of the voter population along ethnic lines may both increase entry by parochial pro-majority parties and politician corruption. Central to our model is the notion that political competition is multi-dimensional; citizens care about politician quality and have group preferences. Ethnic polarization, by increasing the electoral returns to parochialism, enhances parties and voters willingness to trade-off politician quality in favor of more parochial candidates. We use North India as a testing ground for the models predictions, exploiting the dramatic rise of low caste parties since the 1980s. Detailed survey data on politician corruption spanning 30 years suggests a strong correlation between the rise of party competition and politician corruption.

## 1 The Model

### 1.1 The set-up

- There is an underlying population of voters who are characterized by a scalar  $\lambda \in [\lambda_0, \lambda_1]$ ,  $\lambda_0 < 0 < \lambda_1$ . The scalar measures how aligned their interests are with the interests of the majority group in the population.

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- Someone with a negative  $\lambda$  is therefore someone who is worse off when a politician pursues a pro-majority policy, while someone with a high  $\lambda$  is better off.
- The population is described by a distribution function  $G(\lambda)$
- We have in mind a citizen candidate model where there are enough people who want to run even if they have no chance of winning.
- The affinity with the citizen-candidate models therefore comes from the fact that candidates cannot fully commit to specific policies in order to win elections. Voters therefore have to decide based how they expect the politicians to behave, which, in turn, depends on politician characteristics.
- At any point of time  $t$  each politician is characterized by a vector  $(Q_t, p_t)$ .

$Q_t$  represents quality—probity, charisma, competence, commitment—something that all voters value equally.

$p_t$  represents parochialism, or more specifically the willingness to favor the majority group.  $p_t$  can be positive or negative, so it is the absolute value of  $p$  that measures how parochial the politician is.

A voter  $\lambda$  at time  $t$  expects to get an expected utility of  $Q_t + \lambda p_t$  if politician  $(Q_t, p_t)$  is elected at time  $t$ .

- This formulation allows for the possibility that  $Q$  and  $p$  evolve over time: For example, the same politician may become more corrupt over time as new opportunities turn up or enforcement becomes slacker.
- It also allows  $Q$  and  $p$  to be related—perhaps parochial politicians have to be at least somewhat corrupt in order to be in a position to favor their favored groups.
- There are potentially  $n$  political parties: Party  $j$  is characterized by a set of potential candidates  $P_j = \{(Q_t^{j1}, p_t^{j1}), (Q_t^{j2}, p_t^{j2}), \dots, (Q_t^{jm_j}, p_t^{jm_j})\}$ .
- Each party gets to select one candidate per constituency. For the most part we will assume that each parties list of candidates for each constituency is separately fixed. This is probably best interpreted as a

situation where voters have a very strong preference for local candidates (say because they know more about them) and hence each party has a separate candidate list for each constituency.

- Candidates need to enter elections through parties, otherwise everyone will run for election and we can't just focus on party competition.
- We assume that parties are strictly ordered in terms of parochialism: If  $j > i$  then every  $p$  in  $P_j$  is greater than any  $p$  in  $P_i$ . Some parties are clearly more pro-majority than others.
- In any given constituency there is an election in which each party fields a candidate and then the voters decide who they want to vote for.
- People vote sincerely for the candidate they prefer.
- Finally we assume that parties want to maximize vote share. We will later describe a model of probabilistic voting that will generate this as the optimal choice for parties.

## 1.2 Caveat

- With strategic voting there may be multiple equilibria given a fixed set of choices for each party's choice of candidates: Myerson (1993).
- The fact that there is no cost of running means that we do not need to guarantee that parties have a high enough chance of winning to make them put candidates unlike in the usual citizen candidate models.
- However given the probabilistic voting assumption we do not really need this: we could actually allow for small but positive costs of running.

## 1.3 Analysis of the model.

### 1.3.1 Preliminaries

- Figure 1 below represents a voting equilibrium. The horizontal axis represents  $\lambda$ .

The left extreme is  $\lambda_0$  while the right extreme is  $\lambda_1$  and the intermediate vertical represents the value 0. The asymmetry between  $\lambda_0$  and  $\lambda_1$  represents the fact that the high  $\lambda$  people are a majority.

- The vertical axis represents the expected utility associated with a candidate
- In this equilibrium there are three candidates. Each of them is represented by a straight line, giving for each  $\lambda$  the value they deliver to that voter.
- With sincere voting everyone between A and B votes for Party  $P_1$ ; those between B and C vote for Party  $P_2$ ; and those between C and D vote for Party  $P_3$ . This determines  $v_1, v_2, v_3$ , the structural vote shares of the three parties.
- In the case, also shown in figure 1, where Party  $P_3$  is everywhere dominated by Party  $P_2$ ,  $v_3 = 0$ .
- The actual vote shares however are however determined by a combination of  $v$ 's and some unpredictable elements (charisma, rumors, etc.)
- We define  $W_i(v_i : v_{-i})$  to be the probability that party  $i$  wins given  $i$ 's vote share and the vector of the vote shares all the other parties.
- Assume

$$0 \leq \underline{W} \leq W_i(v_i : v_{-i}) \leq \overline{W} < 1, \text{ for all } i$$

and let  $W$  be increasing and S-shaped (first convex and then concave in  $v_i$ ).

- The assumption that  $W$  is S-shaped nests as a limiting case the case of the pure plurality rule.

### 1.3.2 Some basic observations

- A mixed strategy equilibrium always exists (Nash's Theorem)
- Generically there is at most one pure strategy equilibria.
- From now on we will assume that a pure strategy equilibrium exists and that it will continue to exist when we change the conditions of the game.

### 1.3.3 Increased polarization

- We introduce the idea of polarization here by assuming that  $G(\lambda)$  is uniform on  $[\lambda_0, \lambda_1]$ . We say that polarization has gone up when  $G(\lambda)$  is replaced by  $G^*(\lambda)$  which is uniform on  $[\lambda_0^*, \lambda_1^*]$  where  $\lambda_0^* = \mu\lambda_0$  and  $\lambda_1^* = \mu\lambda_1$ , with  $\mu > 1$ .
- In other words those who were against pro-majority policies become, on average even more against them while those were for pro-majority policies also become, on average, more in favor.
- The fraction of pro-majority people is kept constant.
- Note: because the initial mean of  $G$  was  $> 0$ , this increases the mean level of  $\lambda$  (i.e. it is not a mean preserving spread).
- Figure 2a and 2b describes what might happen when polarization goes up in a particular constituency.
- The figures are drawn assuming that even before the increase in polarization even the most anti-majority party, party 1, was getting some majority votes (a reasonable assumption in the UP context).
- In 2a we start with  $v_3 = 0$ . There were only two parties really in the game and neither was particularly pro-majority.
- In figure 2b  $v_3 > 0$ . The pro-majority party already had a significant presence.
- Assume first that none of the parties change their candidates as a result of the polarization (this may be the optimal choice).
- This gives us the pure selection effect induced by an increase in polarization.
- The increase in polarization makes  $v_3$  go up and  $v_1$  and  $v_2$  go down.
- If we compare two alternative candidates for party 3 who are differ only in quality,  $v_3$  will go up for both but the one with the higher  $Q$  will always do better (order-preserving).
- Likewise the shifts for parties 1 and 2 will also be order-preserving.

- It follows that in the case where  $W$  is close to the plurality rule, *the selection effect implies that* average quality of winners and losers from the majority party will go down and those from the non-majority parties will go up.

Intuition: because we are close to the pure plurality rule we only need to say what happens to the best (highest  $Q$ ) losers and worst (lowest  $Q$ ) winners (they are the ones who shift across the winning line).

For the pro-majority party because it becomes stronger, the best losers become the worst winners lowering quality among both winners and losers.

The argument for the anti-majority party is exactly parallel.

- Figure 2a and 2b show how parties might change candidates with increased polarization
- From revealed preference,  $P_3$  will not change unless  $P_2$  changes.
- How would  $P_2$  change?
- By revealed preference if there was an option that  $P_2$  that did better against  $P_1$  we would have already chosen it. So he will choose an option that does worse against  $P_1$  but better against  $P_3$ . So if party 2 changes its candidate  $Q_2$  must go down and  $p_2$  must go up.
- Once  $p_2$  goes up, by revealed preference  $p_3$  must go up (if it were to change) and correspondingly  $Q_3$  must go down
- By the same logic  $p_1$  must go up as well. Since we assumed that the point  $B$  is in the positive orthant, then  $Q_1$  must go down.
- To summarize:

**The *substitution* effect of a change in polarization is to reduce the quality of all three candidates.**

### 1.3.4 Implications for the data

- There are three reasons suggested by this model why overall quality of candidates would fall with polarization
  1. The pro-majority party now starts coming much more often in the top 2 and their candidates tend to be new and therefore worse because they have not yet been subject to much public scrutiny
  2. The pro-majority party candidates who start coming in the top two because of polarization tend to be its high  $p$  low  $Q$  candidates.
  3. The selection effect reduces the quality of all the candidates.
- Relative to this overall decline:

The majority party winners and losers should get worse: i.e. low caste party candidates in low caste areas and high caste party candidates in high caste areas should be worse

The non-majority party winners and losers should be better: i.e low caste party candidates in high caste areas and high caste party candidates in low caste areas.

However since we do not observe all losers but only the top loser (who are also selected) we cannot test the implications for losers.




Figure 1




Figure 2a




Figure 2b

**Figure A: Average vote difference between winner and runner up in Uttar Pradesh elections**




Figure B: Party Vote Share in Uttar Pradesh elections




Figure C: Average Voter Turnout in Uttar Pradesh Elections




Figure D: Caste composition of UP legislators




Table 1: Caste-wise voting patterns in Uttar Pradesh, 1999 National election

	Brahmins	Thakurs	Yadavs	Jatavs
Fraction voting for High caste party	77.90%	70%	9.80%	15.30%
Low caste party	7.40%	4.50%	66.60%	73.30%
Populaton share	10%	7%	15%	18%

Source: CSDS Pre-election survey, Sample size for UP~1000

Table 2: Crime Record and Electoral Success in National Elections

	Winner		Voteshare		Position	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Has criminal record	0.17 (0.07)	0.09 (0.07)	0.07 (0.02)	0.03 (0.02)	-0.80 (0.23)	-0.31 (0.20)
Low caste party		0.25 (0.05)		0.13 (0.01)		-1.54 (0.14)
Brahmin	0.02 (0.08)	0.05 (0.08)	0.01 (0.03)	0.03 (0.03)	0.04 (0.28)	-0.14 (0.25)
OBC	0.14 (0.08)	0.11 (0.07)	0.02 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)	-0.25 (0.25)	-0.06 (0.21)
Age	-0.06 (0.25)	0.09 (0.23)	0.06 (0.09)	0.13 (0.08)	-0.65 (0.84)	-1.53 (0.71)
High school	-0.04 (0.10)	-0.04 (0.10)	-0.01 (0.04)	-0.01 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.38)	0.02 (0.30)
Graduate	0.04 (0.09)	0.03 (0.09)	0.05 (0.03)	0.04 (0.02)	-0.54 (0.32)	-0.43 (0.25)
R-squared	0.03	0.11	0.07	0.28	0.08	0.34
Fixed effects			Constituency			
N	391	391	391	391	391	391

Notes: The data are for the top five candidates (in terms of voteshare) for the 80 Parliamentary constituencies in Uttar Pradesh in 2004 election

Table 3: Correlates of Corruption

	1969	1980	1996
<b>Economic improvement:</b> Own/family economic situation improved a lot after entering politics	0.20	0.30	0.40
<b>Business/Contracting:</b> New/ expansion of business/contracting activity since entering politics	0.27	0.40	0.54
<b>Petrol pump:</b> New/ expansion of petrol pump since entering politics	0.05	0.08	0.08
<b>Criminal Association:</b> Is Associated with Criminals	0.07	0.14	0.21
<b>Crime record:</b> Has a criminal record	0.04	0.08	0.16
Normalized Corruption rank	2.31	3.25	3.65

Notes: Each of these is a dummy variable =1 if politician is said to have undertaken the activity

Table 4: Using Vignettes on Corruption

	1969	1980	1996
Rank on 1-10 corruption scale, where 1 is most honest			
<b>For politicians</b>	2.31	3.25	3.65
<b>For hypothetical vignettes described as follows:</b>			
X: Used political position to benefit party, but not him/herself. His/her lifestyle reflected his/her honestly earned income.	2.86	2.82	3.00
Y: Used political position to benefit party. In addition, used it to benefit family/members of own social group. His/her lifestyle was better than he/she could afford on his/her honestly earned income	5.82	5.92	5.94
Z: Used political position to benefit party and family/members of own social group. He/she is known for taking money from business groups and is associated with criminals. His/her lifestyle far exceeds his/her honestly earned income	9.62	9.45	9.44
<b>Ordinal Corruption rank (scale 1-7)</b>	2.96	3.33	3.53

Table 5: Comparison of Survey Corruption data with Objective verification

	overall	1969	1980	1996
Petrol Pump				
Number candidates compared	225	75	74	76
Matches (as % of total)	0.91	0.92	0.91	0.89
% mismatches where ALL respondents disagree with objective data	0.33	0.33	0.43	0.25
Criminal Cases (comparison of survey and Local Intelligence Unit (LIU) data)				
Number candidates compared				75
Matches (as % of total)				0.8
% mismatches where ALL respondents disagree with LIU				0.53
Mismatches when ALL survey respondents say candidate criminal but not LIU (as % of cases where LIU and survey disagree and LIU says no criminal case)				0.13
Mismatches when LIU says criminal and ALL survey respondents say not (as % of cases where LIU and survey disagree and LIU says criminal case)				1
Of these, number of cases where crime in LIU data is rioting as recorded by LIU				0.86

Table 6: Party Placement of Candidates and Electoral Fortunes

	obc candidate			winner		
	1996	all years		1996	all years	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(1)	(2)	(3)
Low caste party	0.35 (0.09)			0.11 (0.13)		
High caste party	0.14 (0.08)	-0.06 (0.05)	0.02 (0.06)	0.03 (0.13)	-0.12 (0.10)	-0.25 (0.35)
High caste party *post		-0.17 (0.06)	0.07 (0.07)		0.55 (0.13)	0.64 (0.41)
High caste party *post2		<b>0.15</b> <b>(0.07)</b>	<b>-0.05</b> <b>(0.07)</b>		<b>-0.47</b> <b>(0.14)</b>	<b>0.52</b> <b>(0.44)</b>
LOshare*post		0.16 (0.11)	0.32 (0.16)		-0.04 (0.13)	0.09 (0.42)
LOshare*post2		0.14 (0.10)	0.02 (0.15)		0.07 (0.11)	1.09 (0.36)
High Caste*			-0.12			0.24
Loshare			(0.15)			(0.56)
High Caste			-0.41			-0.17
LOshare*post			(0.19)			(0.65)
High Caste			<b>0.34</b>			<b>-1.61</b>
LOshare*post2			<b>(0.17)</b>			<b>(0.68)</b>
post		0.03 (0.05)	-0.07 (0.06)		-0.28 (0.11)	-0.36 (0.26)
post2		-0.07 (0.05)	-0.01 (0.06)		0.22 (0.11)	-0.42 (0.23)
Fixed effect	no	constituency		no	constituency	
N	216	654	654	218	659	659

Notes: High Caste Party includes BJP (BJS in 1969) and Congress. Low Caste party is BKD in 1969, JD in 1980 and SP and BSP in 1996.

LOshare is the fraction population in the constituency that belongs to SC/ST or OBC (1931 census)

Table 7: The Rise in Corruption

Dependent variable	Sample	Coefficients		
		Post	Post 2	N
Economic Improvement	All	0.10 (0.03)	0.11 (0.03)	1818
	Agreed	0.06 (0.04)	0.16 (0.05)	1063
Business/Contracting	All	0.15 (0.04)	0.14 (0.04)	1818
	Agreed	0.21 (0.06)	0.14 (0.06)	1130
Petrol Pump	All	0.04 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)	1818
	Agreed	0.02 (0.02)	0.00 (0.02)	1626
Criminal association	All	0.07 (0.03)	0.06 (0.03)	1716
	Agreed	0.02 (0.02)	0.06 (0.03)	1397
Crime record	All	0.04 (0.02)	0.07 (0.02)	1724
	Agreed	-0.01 (0.01)	0.07 (0.02)	1509
Corruption Rank	All	0.98 (0.18)	0.31 (0.19)	1776
Ordinal Corruption Rank	All	0.46 (0.09)	0.22 (0.09)	1776

Notes: All regressions include constituency fixed effects and a set of respondent controls. These include respondent age, whether college educated, whether journalist, whether knows politician as relative/friend, whether shares politicians party affiliation and caste.

Table 8: Ethnic Make-up and Candidate Quality: sample of winners

Reports	Economic Improvement		Business/ Contracting		Petrol pump		Criminal Association		Criminal record		normaliz edrank	Ordinal rank
	All	Agreed	All	Agreed	All	Agreed	All	Agreed	All	Agreed	All	All
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
High caste party*	-0.06	0.29	-0.31	-1.08	0.04	-0.26	-0.03	-0.06	-0.15	0.02	0.63	-0.85
LOshare	(0.28)	(0.50)	(0.33)	(1.06)	(0.29)	(0.21)	(0.24)	(0.23)	(0.15)	(0.14)	(3.00)	(1.70)
High caste party*	-0.09	-0.02	0.87	2.26	-0.01	0.13	0.18	0.30	0.37	0.44	6.43	4.35
LOshare*post	(0.36)	(0.56)	(0.45)	(1.89)	(0.36)	(0.16)	(0.30)	(0.26)	(0.21)	(0.21)	(1.82)	(1.03)
High caste party*	<b>-1.27</b>	<b>-5.07</b>	<b>-1.27</b>	<b>-1.98</b>	<b>0.39</b>	<b>0.50</b>	<b>-0.72</b>	<b>-0.71</b>	<b>-0.98</b>	<b>-0.84</b>	<b>-12.93</b>	<b>-7.23</b>
LOshare*post2	<b>(0.41)</b>	<b>(1.13)</b>	<b>(0.64)</b>	<b>(1.34)</b>	<b>(0.39)</b>	<b>(0.35)</b>	<b>(0.50)</b>	<b>(0.52)</b>	<b>(0.42)</b>	<b>(0.47)</b>	<b>(6.52)</b>	<b>(3.31)</b>
High caste party	0.05	-0.15	0.15	0.55	-0.11	0.11	-0.02	-0.04	0.04	-0.05	-0.76	0.55
	(0.15)	(0.23)	(0.19)	(0.64)	(0.16)	(0.09)	(0.17)	(0.16)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(2.01)	(1.14)
High caste party	0.08	-0.05	-0.51	-1.22	0.10	-0.03	-0.09	-0.17	-0.17	-0.10	-3.69	-2.71
*post	(0.19)	(0.24)	(0.28)	(1.19)	(0.21)	(0.06)	(0.20)	(0.18)	(0.10)	(0.07)	(1.19)	(0.66)
High caste party	<b>0.85</b>	<b>3.41</b>	<b>0.84</b>	<b>1.11</b>	<b>-0.16</b>	<b>-0.19</b>	<b>0.37</b>	<b>0.41</b>	<b>0.53</b>	<b>0.41</b>	<b>8.48</b>	<b>4.79</b>
*post2	<b>(0.24)</b>	<b>(0.67)</b>	<b>(0.40)</b>	<b>(0.88)</b>	<b>(0.23)</b>	<b>(0.18)</b>	<b>(0.31)</b>	<b>(0.30)</b>	<b>(0.26)</b>	<b>(0.26)</b>	<b>(4.21)</b>	<b>(2.14)</b>
LOshare*post	0.47	0.40	-0.71	-1.40	0.06	0.02	-0.10	-0.12	0.03	-0.30	-4.64	-3.05
	(0.27)	(0.36)	(0.29)	(1.56)	(0.25)	(0.14)	(0.22)	(0.18)	(0.15)	(0.18)	(1.39)	(0.84)
LOshare*post2	<b>0.93</b>	<b>2.51</b>	<b>1.11</b>	<b>1.56</b>	<b>-0.24</b>	<b>-0.32</b>	<b>0.64</b>	<b>0.51</b>	<b>0.77</b>	<b>0.83</b>	<b>11.65</b>	<b>6.65</b>
	<b>(0.35)</b>	<b>(0.65)</b>	<b>(0.41)</b>	<b>(1.05)</b>	<b>(0.31)</b>	<b>(0.22)</b>	<b>(0.36)</b>	<b>(0.41)</b>	<b>(0.32)</b>	<b>(0.40)</b>	<b>(4.61)</b>	<b>(2.35)</b>
post	-0.14	-0.12	0.58	1.00	0.00	0.02	0.14	0.12	0.04	0.07	3.89	2.40
	(0.12)	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.97)	(0.12)	(0.04)	(0.16)	(0.14)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.94)	(0.52)
post2	<b>-0.51</b>	<b>-1.41</b>	<b>-0.53</b>	<b>-0.63</b>	<b>0.10</b>	<b>0.11</b>	<b>-0.33</b>	<b>-0.28</b>	<b>-0.39</b>	<b>-0.33</b>	<b>-6.93</b>	<b>-3.93</b>
	<b>(0.20)</b>	<b>(0.33)</b>	<b>(0.30)</b>	<b>(0.73)</b>	<b>(0.20)</b>	<b>(0.11)</b>	<b>(0.23)</b>	<b>(0.23)</b>	<b>(0.19)</b>	<b>(0.21)</b>	<b>(2.99)</b>	<b>(1.53)</b>
Controls	Constituency and respondent											
Fixed effect	Constituency											
N	990	513	990	606	990	862	943	741	941	790	973	973

Notes: 1. Post=1 if year=1980 or 1996 and Post2=1 if year=1996. Loshare is fraction SC/ST and OBC population (according to 1931 census)

2. Constituency controls include controls for reserved constituency and bothobc and their interactions with post and post2. We also include interactions of reserved constituency with LOshare, High caste party and Highcasteparty\*LOshare and interactions of all 3 with post and post2. Respondent controls are respondent age, whether college educated, whether journalist, whether same party as candidate, whether same caste as candidate.

Table 9: Political Corruption within Constituencies

Reports	Economic Improvement		Business/ Contracting		Petrol pump		Association with Criminals		Crime record		normalized rank	Ordinal rank
	All	agreed	All	agreed	All	agreed	All	agreed	All	agreed	All	All
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
winner*LOshare*	1.13	0.48	0.40	3.98	-0.60	-1.28	-0.08	0.06	0.31	-0.02	0.05	-0.07
reserved	(1.55)	(0.89)	(0.34)	(2.37)	(0.31)	(2.93)	(0.12)	(0.10)	(0.12)	(0.05)	(0.12)	(0.08)
winner*LOshare*	7.06	3.55	0.10	-3.90	1.30	3.23	-0.40	-0.44	0.06	0.17	0.01	0.23
reserved*post	(2.33)	(1.26)	(0.42)	(2.38)	(0.44)	(2.98)	(0.25)	(0.24)	(0.18)	(0.09)	(0.17)	(0.13)
winner*LOshare*	<b>-11.58</b>	<b>-5.92</b>	<b>-0.31</b>	<b>-0.51</b>	<b>0.05</b>	<b>-4.63</b>	<b>0.00</b>	<b>-0.12</b>	<b>-0.75</b>	<b>-0.15</b>	<b>-0.93</b>	<b>-8.39</b>
reserved*post2	<b>(2.43)</b>	<b>(1.25)</b>	<b>(0.37)</b>	<b>(0.57)</b>	<b>(0.55)</b>	<b>(2.29)</b>	<b>(0.33)</b>	<b>(0.34)</b>	<b>(0.28)</b>	<b>(0.13)</b>	<b>(0.32)</b>	<b>(4.65)</b>
winner*reserved	-0.03	-2.47	0.60	1.24	0.05	-0.04	-0.02	-0.01	0.01	0.07	-0.04	-0.06
	(0.20)	(1.51)	(0.17)	(1.94)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.02)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.88)	(0.50)
winner*reserved	-0.11	2.36	-0.73	-1.86	0.04	0.11	-0.13	-0.03	-0.02	-0.10	-4.37	-2.00
*post	(0.24)	(1.51)	(0.22)	(1.96)	(0.11)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.04)	(0.08)	(0.06)	(1.38)	(0.72)
winner*reserved	-0.26	-0.19	-0.51	2.04	-0.04	0.01	0.35	-0.02	0.52	5.77	5.39	2.77
*post2	(0.21)	(0.35)	(0.27)	(1.49)	(0.12)	(0.11)	(0.13)	(0.06)	(0.14)	(3.22)	(1.39)	(0.69)
winner*LOshare	1.10	0.46	0.02	0.00	0.16	0.55	0.09	0.04	0.03	0.03	0.05	0.08
share	(1.05)	(0.56)	(0.13)	(0.10)	(0.18)	(0.38)	(0.06)	(0.04)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.09)	(0.08)
winner*LOshare	-3.20	-1.77	-0.20	-0.20	-0.40	-1.43	0.12	0.07	-0.26	-0.19	-0.02	-0.13
*post	(1.59)	(0.85)	(0.19)	(0.23)	(0.28)	(0.59)	(0.10)	(0.07)	(0.11)	(0.09)	(0.11)	(0.09)
winner*LOshare	5.78	3.20	0.25	0.44	0.18	0.39	-0.16	-0.11	0.47	0.15	0.29	0.29
*post2	(1.61)	(0.81)	(0.23)	(0.57)	(0.32)	(0.62)	(0.11)	(0.08)	(0.14)	(0.12)	(0.16)	(0.17)
winner	0.01	-0.04	-0.11	-0.38	-0.03	-0.01	-0.01	0.00	-0.04	-0.07	-0.87	-0.27
	(0.08)	(0.05)	(0.11)	(0.26)	(0.03)	(0.01)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.68)	(0.37)
winner*post	0.19	0.22	0.20	0.89	0.00	0.00	0.15	0.05	0.05	0.08	2.00	0.93
	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.17)	(0.37)	(0.06)	(0.03)	(0.06)	(0.04)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(1.03)	(0.56)
winner*post2	-0.01	0.24	0.02	0.04	0.05	0.02	-0.20	0.01	-0.16	-0.15	-2.77	-1.53
	(0.15)	(0.35)	(0.20)	(0.38)	(0.06)	(0.03)	(0.08)	(0.06)	(0.10)	(0.11)	(1.04)	(0.53)
Others	Respondent control and constituency*year fixed effects											
N	1818	1063	1818	1130	1818	1626	1716	1397	1724	1509	1776	1776