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Renee Bowen

Renee Bowen
Assistant Professor, Economics
Contact Info
ReneeBowen
Assistant Professor of Economics
Academic Area: 
Economics

Research Statement

Renee Bowen’s research focuses on International Trade, Political Economy and Microeconomic Theory. In her work she applies dynamic game theoretic models to study the behavior of individuals who are constrained by institutions and who have long-term strategic considerations. Her recent papers examine efficiency of flexible budgetary institutions.

Bio

Renee Bowen is an Assistant Professor of Economics at the Stanford Graduate School of Business where she teaches The International Economy: Policies and Theory. Her current research examines characteristics of dynamic political institutions that yield compromise. Renee received her PhD in Economics from Georgetown University and her BSc in Civil Engineering from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT). She has been a consultant at the World Bank working on international trade policy for Sub-Saharan Africa, and was an Investment Banking Analyst at J.P. Morgan Securities working with emerging markets.

Academic Degrees

  • PhD in economics, Georgetown University, 2008
  • MA in economics, Georgetown University, 2003
  • BSc in civil engineering, MIT, 2000

Academic Appointments

  • At Stanford since 2008
  • Arch W. Shaw National Fellow, Hoover Institution, 2013-14

Awards and Honors

  • The John A. Gunn and Cynthia Fry Gunn Faculty Scholar Award, Stanford University, 2010
  • Razin Prize for the Best Dissertation in Economics, Georgetown University, 2008
  • Dissertation Fellowship, Georgetown University Graduate School, 2007
  • Teaching and Research Scholarship, Georgetown University, 2002
  • W. Glenn Campbell and Rita Ricardo-Campbell National Fellow, 2013-2014

Publications

Journal Articles

Renee Bowen. International Economic Review. November 2015, Vol. 56, Issue 4, Pages 1349-1384.
Renee Bowen, Cecila Mo. Journal of Theoretical Politics (forthcoming). 2015.
Renee Bowen, Ying Chen, Hülya Eraslan. American Economic Review. 2014, Vol. 104, Issue 10, Pages 2941-2974.
Renee Bowen, David M. Kreps, Andrzej Skrzypacz. Quarterly Journal of Economics. January 2013, Vol. 128, Issue 3, Pages 1273-1320.
Renee Bowen, Zaki Zahran. Games and Economic Behavior. 2012, Vol. 76, Issue 2, Pages 391-419.

Working Papers

Reform Fatigue | PDF
Renee Bowen, Jackie M.L. Chan, Oeindrilla Dube, Nicolas S. Lambert, March 282016
Collective Choice in Dynamic Public Good Provision:Real versus Formal Authority | PDF
Renee Bowen, George Georgiadis, Nicolas S. Lambert, December 182015
Dynamic Coalitions and Communication: Public versus Private Negotiations | PDF
David P. Baron, Renee Bowen, Salvatore Nunnari, December 172015
Dynamic Coalitions | PDF
David P. Baron, Renee Bowen, July 222015
Efficiency of Flexible Budgetary Institutions | PDF
Renee Bowen, Ying Chen, Hulya Eraslan, Jan Zapal, January 52015

Teaching

Degree Courses

2015-16

The objective of this course is to give students an understanding of what international economic policy means for business leaders. To do this, students will have to understand the economic forces that determine the patterns and consequences of...

2014-15

The objective of this course is to give students an understanding of what international trade policy means for business leaders. To do this, students will have to understand the economic forces that determine the patterns and consequences of...

This course is intended to be an introduction to dynamic political economy theory. We will cover research at the frontier of this field and some useful tools. Tools will be primarily dynamic game theory - including Markov models and models of...

Stanford University Affiliations

Stanford GSB

  • Center for Global Business and the Economy

Insights by Stanford Business

March 18, 2015
A Stanford economist shows how warring political parties could get better results by building some flexibility into mandatory spending programs.
March 11, 2015
More protests and political competition help, but surprisingly, so does elected officials' salaries.
January 28, 2014
Game theory shows why “discretionary” spending programs lead to more self-interested behavior by politicians than “mandatory” spending programs.