Jackson Library

• Datastream  - Access in Trader's Pit at Jackson Library. Guide (general), Guide for empirical exercises
• CRSP - PhD./faculty can also request individual logins. Guide (general), Guide for empirical exercises  
• Thomson One Banker (for Extel Financials) -Guide. For Extel Financials, go to Company Analysis / Financials / Financial Statements / Extel Financials.
• Corruption Perception Index (CPI) of Transparency International
• Small Arms Trade Transparency Barometer by the Small Arms Survey

• Factiva  - for newspaper articles. Guide
• Business Source Complete - for business journal articles  
• ABI/Inform - for business journal articles. Guide

• Why development is hard

Discussion focus

1. Rajan, Raghuram (forthcoming) “The persistence of underdevelopment: constituencies and competitive rent preservation", American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics. View article [PDF 724KB]

2. Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson, (2008 March). "Persistence of Power, Elites, and Institutions," American Economic Review, vol. 98(1), pages 267-93. View article

3. Madhav Aney, Maitreesh Ghatak and Massimo Morelli (2008) “Can Market Failure Cause Political Failure?" NEUDC version. View article [PDF 266KB]

Background

1. Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson (2000), "Political Losers as a Barrier to Economic Development"90, 126-134. View article

2. Greif, Avner (2005) “Commitment, Coercion and Markets: The Nature and Dynamics of Institutions Supporting Exchange" in C. Menard and M. Shirley (eds.), Handbook of New Institutional Economics, 727786, Springer. View article

3. Kenneth Sokolo  and Stanley Engerman (2000), "History Lessons: Institutions, Factor Endowments, and Paths of Development in the New World," Journal of Economic Perspectives 14, 217-232. View article

• Ethnic identities as political constituencies

Discussion focus

1. Abhijit Banerjee and Somanathan, Rohini, (2007). "The political economy of public goods: Some evidence from India," Journal of Development Economics, vol. 82(2), pages 287-314, March. View article

2. Posner, Daniel (2004) “The Political Salience of Cultural Difference: Why Chewas and Tumbukas Are Allies in Zambia and Adversaries in Malawi" American Political Science Review Vol. 98, No. 4. View article

3. Daniel Chen (2005) “Club Goods and Group Identity: Evidence from Islamic Resurgence During the Indonesian Financial Crisis" mimeo, University of Chicago. View article [PDF 374KB]

4. Susan Athey, Emilio Calvano and Saumitra Jha (2008) “A theory of community formation and social hierarchy", mimeo, Harvard University. (On Reserve at Jackson Library.)

Background

1. Roland Fryer and David Austen-Smith (2005 May)”An Economic Analysis of 'Acting White"' The Quarterly Journal of Economics, View article   

2. Debraj Ray (2006) “Aspirations, poverty and economic change" chapter 28 in Banerjee, Benabou and Mookherjee eds. Understanding poverty, OUP. View article View article (2002 ed.) [PDF 92KB]

3. Vijayendra Rao and Radu Ban (2007), The Political Construction of Caste in South India, mimeo, The World Bank. View article [PDF 382KB]

4. Alberto Alesina, Reza Baqir and William Easterly (1999) "Public Goods and Ethnic Divisions" Quarterly Journal of Economics, ,Volume CXIV, Issue 4, pp. 1243-1284. View article
  

5. Lily Tsai (2007) "Solidary Groups, Informal Accountability, and Local Public Goods Provision in Rural China", American Political Science Review, vol.101, no.2, pp.355-372. View article

• Ethnicity, resources and conflict

Discussion focus

1. Joan Esteban and Debraj Ray, (2008)”On the salience of ethnic conflict", BREAD Working Paper No. 175, June, forthcoming AER. View article [PDF 198KB]

2. Ernesto Dal Bo and Pedro Dal Bo "Workers, warriors and criminals: social conflict in general equilibrium", mimeo, Stanford GSB. View article

3. Montalvo, J. and M. Reynal-Querol (2005), "Ethnic Polarization, Potential Conflict and Civil Wars," American Economic Review 95, 796-815. View article

4. Oeindrila Dube and Juan Vargas (2008), “Commodity Price Shocks and Civil Conflict: Evidence from Colombia", mimeo, Harvard. View article [PDF 2MB]

5. Saumitra Jha (2008) “A theory of ethnic tolerance", mimeo, Stanford GSB. (On Reserve at Jackson Library.)

6. Saumitra Jha (2008) “Trade, institutions and religious tolerance: evidence from India", Stanford GSB working paper 2008. View article

7. Timothy Besley and Torsten Persson (2008) ``The Incidence of Civil War: Theory and evidence", mimeo, Stockholm. View article [PDF 510KB]

8. James Fearon (2008) ``Economic development, insurgency and civil war'' in Elhanan Helpman (ed) Institutions and economic performance, Harvard University Press. View article [PDF 249KB]

Background

1. Joan Esteban and Debraj Ray (1994), "On the Measurement of Polarization," Econometrica 62(4), 819-851. View article   

2. Joan Esteban and Debraj Ray (1999), "Conflict and Distribution," Journal of Economic Theory 87, 379-415. View article   

3. Edward Miguel, Shanker Satyanath, and Ernest Sergenti (2004), "Economic Shocks and Civil Conflict: An Instrumental Variables Approach," Journal of Political Economy 112, 725-753. View article

4. Christopher Blattman and Edward Miguel (2008) ``Civil War'' (forthcoming) in the Journal of Economic Literature. View article [PDF 295KB]

• The aftermath of conflict

Discussion focus

1. Sebastian Galliani, Martin Rossi and Ernesto Schargrodsky (2006) “Conscription and crime" World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No 4037. View article

2. Macartan Humphreys and Jeremy Weinstein (2007) “Demobilization and reintegration" Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 51, No. 4, 531-567. View article

3. Christopher Blattman and Jeannie Annan (2007) “The Consequences of child soldiering" HiCN working paper, August version. View article [PDF 973KB]

4. John Bellows and Edward Miguel (2008) “War and collective action in Sierra Leone" mimeo, UC Berkeley. View article [PDF 759KB]

5. Abadie, Alberto, and Javier Gardeazabal (2003) "The Economic Costs of Conflict: A Case-Control  Study for the Basque Country." American Economic Review 93.1: 113-132. View article
  
Background

1. Joshua Angrist (1990) “Lifetime earnings and the Vietnam era draft lottery: evidence from Social Security administrative records" American Economic Review, Vol 80:3, pg 313-336. View article

2. Edward Miguel and Gerard Roland (2006) “The long run impact of bombing Vietnam" mimeo, UC Berkeley, November. View article [PDF 664KB]

3. Prashant Bharadwaj, Asim Khwaja and Atif Mian (2008) “The Big March: migratory flows after the Partition of India" Economic and Political Weekly Vol. 43 No. 35 August. View article

4. Saumitra Jha and Steven Wilkinson “Veterans and conflict intensity: evidence from the Partition of India", mimeo. (On Reserve at Jackson Library.)

• Corruption and "forensic" economics

Discussion focus

1. Eliana la Ferrara and Stefano della Vigna (2007),"Detecting illegal arms trade", mimeo, Boccon. View article

2. Arindrajit Dube, Ethan Kaplan and Suresh Naidu (2008) “Coups, Corporations, and Classified Information", mimeo, November version. View article [PDF 244KB]

3. Raymond Fisman and Shang-Jin Wei (2007), “The Smuggling of Art, and the Art of Smuggling: Uncovering the Illicit Trade in Cultural Property and Antiques", mimeo, Columbia Business School. View article [PDF 144KB]

4. Asim Khwaja and Atif Mian (2005) “Do Lenders Favor Politically Connected Firms?  Rent provision in an Emerging Financial Market" Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 120, Issue 4, November. View article

5. Finan, Federico and Claudio Ferraz (2008) “Exposing Corrupt Politicians: The Effects of Brazil's Publicly Released Audits on Electoral Outcomes", Quarterly Journal of Economics. Vol. 123, Issue 2: 703-745.
View article

6. Raymond Fisman and Edward Miguel (2008) “Corruption, Norms, and Legal Enforcement: Evidence from Diplomatic Parking Tickets", Journal of Political Economy. View article

Background

1. Shleifer, Andrei and Robert Vishny (1993) “Corruption”  The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 108, No. 3, pp. 99-617, August. View article    

2. Vito Tanzi (1997) “Corruption: arm's length relationships and markets" chapter 7 in The economics of organized crime, Gianluca Fiorentini and Sam Peltzman eds., Cambridge University Press. (Book on Reserve at Jackson Library. Call Number: Law HV6441 .E36 1995).

3. Banerjee, Abhijit (1997) "A theory of misgovernance" The Quarterly Journal of Economics Vol. 112, No. 4, pp. 1289-1332, November. View article
.

• Political implications of (mis)coordination

Discussion focus

1. Gerard Padro (2007) "The Control of Politicians in Divided Societies: The Politics of Fear", Review of Economic Studies 74(4): 1259-12747. View article

2. Michael Chwe (2000) "Communication and coordination in social networks" Review of Economic Studies 67: 1-16. View article

3. Timur Kuran (1989) "Sparks and prairie fires: a theory of unanticipated political revolution", Public Choice, 61:41-74. View article

Background

1. Stephen Morris and Hyun S Shin (2000). "Global Games: Theory and Applications." View article [PDF 462KB]

2. Sylvain Chassang (2007) "Fear of Miscoordination and the Robustness of Cooperation in Dynamic Global Games with Exit." View article [PDF 385KB]

3. Michael Chwe (2001) “Rational ritual: culture, coordination and common knowledge”, Princeton University Press. View article [PDF 109KB]

• The importance of leaders in development

Discussion focus

1. Ben Olken and Benjamin Jones (2005 August) “Do Leaders Matter? National Leadership and Growth since World War II.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 120 (3), pp. 835-864. View article

2. Ben Olken and Benjamin Jones (2007) “Hit or Miss? The Effect of Assassinations on Institutional Change and War.” NBER Working Paper 13102. View article [PDF 173KB]

3. Edward L. Glaeser, (2005) "The Political Economy of Hatred," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. 120(1), pages 45-86, January. View article

4. Macartan Humphreys, William Masters, Martin E. Sandbu, (2006 July) "The Role of Leaders in Democratic Deliberations: Results from a Field Experiment in Sao Tome and Principe." World Politics. View article

5. Radu Ban and Vijayendra Rao (2008) “Is deliberation equitable? Evidence from transcripts of village meetings in South India", mimeo, The World Bank. View article [PDF 168KB]

6. Abhijit Banerjee and Rohini Pande (2007) “Parochial politics: ethnic preferences and politician corruption", KSG working paper no RWP07-031. View article [PDF 408KB]

Background

1. Edward L. Glaeser, Rafael LaPorta, Florencio Lopez de Silanes, and Andrei Shleifer (2004), “Do institutions cause growth?" Journal of Economic Growth. View article

2. Esther Duflo, Lori Beaman, Raghabendra Chattopadhyay, Rohini Pande and Petia Topalova (2008) “Powerful Women: Does Exposure Reduce Bias?", mimeo, MIT. View article [PDF 443KB]

3. Esther Duflo and Raghbendra Chattopadhyay (2004) “Women as Policy Makers: Evidence from a Randomized Policy Experiment in India" Econometrica Vol 72, No. 5, 1409-1443. View article

4. Rohini Pande, “Can Mandated Political Representation Increase Policy Influence for Disadvantaged Minorities? Theory and Evidence from India." View article

• Democratisation and threats to democracy

Discussion focus

1. Daron Acemoglu (2008 January) “Oligarchic Versus Democratic Societies.” Journal of European Economic Association. Vol. 6, pp. 1-44. View article

2. Alessandro Lizzeri and Nicola Persico (2004 May) “Why Did the Elites Extend the Suffrage? Democracy and the Scope of Government, with an Application to Britain's Age of Reform” Quarterly Journal of Economics. View article

3. Toke Aidt and R. Franck (2008) “How to get the snowball rolling and extend the franchise: Voting on the Great Reform Act of 1832" Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 0832. View article [PDF 331KB]

4. John McMillan and Pablo Zoido (2004) “How to subvert democracy: Montesinos in Peru." Journal of Economic Perspectives, 18:4:69-92. View article

Background

1. Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson and James Robinson, (2005)"The Rise of Europe: Atlantic Trade, Institutional Change, and Economic Growth," American Economic Review, vol. 95(3), pages 546-579, June. View article

2. Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson (2000 November). "Why Did The West Extend The Franchise?  Democracy, Inequality, And Growth In Historical Perspective," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 115(4), pages 1167-1199. View article

3. Adam Przeworski (2007) "Conquered or Granted? A History of Suffrage Extensions" mimeo, NYU.
View article [PDF 393KB]

4. Dani Rodrik and Romain Wacziarg, (2005 May) “Do democratic transitions produce bad economics outcomes?" American Economic Review, Vol. 95(2). View article

• Lowering political barriers to development

Discussion focus

1. Raghuram Rajan and Luigi Zingales (2003) “Saving capital from the capitalists”, New York: Crown Business (Book on Reserve at Jackson Library: HG4523 .R345 2003)

2. Saumitra Jha (2008)”Shares, coalition formation and political development: evidence from 17th century England" Stanford GSB working paper 2005. View article

3. Cheryl Schonhardt-Bailey (1991) “Specific factors, capital markets, portfolio diversification and free trade: domestic determinants of the repeal of the Corn Laws" World Politics, 43(4), 545-549. View article

4. Avinash Dixit and John Londregan (1995) “Redistributive politics and economic efficiency" American Political Science Review, Vol. 89 No. 4, pp. 856-866. View article

5. Richard Sylla (1999) "Emerging Markets in History: The United States, Japan, and Argentina," in Ryuzo Sato et al., eds., Global Competition and Integration.  Boston:Kluwer Academic Publishers, chap. 19, 427-46. (Book on Reserve at Jackson Library: HF1379 .G58 1999)

6. Frederico Finan and Claudio Ferraz (2008) “Motivating Politicians: The Impacts of Monetary Incentives on Quality and Performance”, mimeo, UCLA, August. View article [PDF 1MB]

7. Daron Acemoglu, Michael Kremer and Atif Mian (2008 Oct) “Incentives in Markets, Firms and Governments.” Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Vol.24, No. 2, pp. 273-306.View article

Background

1. Douglass North and Barry Weingast (1989) “Constitutions and commitment: the evolution of institutions governing public choice", Journal of Economic History, 49:802-32, December. View article

2. Mark Roe (2003) The political determinants of corporate governance, Oxford University Press. (Book on Reserve at Jackson Library: HD2741 .R64 2003)

• A rigorous framework for understanding institutions

Discussion focus

1.  Paul Milgrom and John Roberts (1994 June) ``Comparing Equilibria'', American Economic Review, Vol. 84, No. 3, pp. 441-459. View article

2. Paul Milgrom, Susan Gates and John Roberts (1996) ``Complementarities in the transition from socialism: a firm-level analysis'' in John McMillan and Barry Naughton (eds)  Reforming Asian Socialism: the Growth of Market Institutions, University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor. (Book on Reserve at Jackson Library: HC412 .R437 1996)

3. Avner Greif and David Laitin (2004 November) ``A theory of endogenous institutional change'', American Political Science Review, Vol. 98, No. 4, pp. 633-652. View article

Background

1. Susan Athey, Paul Milgrom and John Roberts (1998) Robust comparative statics, mimeo, Stanford. View article [PDF 979KB]

2. Paul Milgrom, Yingyi Qian and John Roberts (1991 May) ``Complementarities, momentum and the evolution of modern manufacturing'' The American Economic Review, Vol. 81, No. 2, Papers and Proceedings of the Hundred and Third Annual Meeting of the American Economic Association, pp. 84-88. View article