In simultaneous move Bayesian games with many semi-anonymous and independent-type players all the equilibria are structurally robust. This means that they are immune (remain equilibria) to alterations that destroy equilibria in games with a small number of players. Such alterations include changes in the order of play, multiple revision possibilities, information leakage, commitments, communication and much more. Structural-robust equilibria are ex-post Nash, and even fully information proof. They eliminate the need to learn through repeated play.

The above properties imply that in large Bayesian market games of the Shapley Shubik type, under continuity and type independence conditions, the Nash equilibria are competitive, satisfy strong rational expectations properties, and are less sensitive to strategic manipulations.

Related Materials:

1. “Large Robust Games,” by E. Kalai, Econometrica, 72, No. 6, November 2004, pp 1631-1666

2. “Partially-Specified Large Games,” by E. Kalai, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Vol. 3828, 2005, pp 3-13, and