David P Baron

David S. and Ann M. Barlow Professor of Political Economy and Strategy, Emeritus

Phone: (650) 723-3757

Email: dbaron@gsb.stanford.edu

CV: BaronCV

Academic Areas: Political Economy

David Baron has published in the fields of industrial organization, economic theory, political science, business strategy, operations research, statistics, and finance. He has authored over 100 articles and 3 books, one of which is in its 5th edition. His principal research interests have been the theory of the firm, the economics of regulation, mechanism design and its applications, political economics, and nonmarket strategy. His current research focuses on political economics and strategy in the business environment.


David Baron began his academic career at Northwestern University where he taught for thirteen years in the Kellogg Graduate School of Management. He joined the Graduate School of Business of Stanford University in 1981. He has also been a visiting professor at the Université d’Aix-en-Provence in France, the Katholieke Universiteit Leuven in Belgium, and Harvard University. At Stanford he is the David S. and Ann M. Barlow Professor of Political Economy and Strategy (Emeritus) in the Graduate School of Business, and Professor of Economics and Professor of Political Science (by courtesy) in the School of Humanities and Sciences. He received a BS from the University of Michigan, an MBA from Harvard University, and a Doctorate in Business Administration from Indiana University. In 2005 he was awarded an honorary doctorate degree by the Katholieke Universiteit Leuven in Belgium.

Professor Baron has taught in the MBA, PhD, and Executive Education programs, receiving the MBA teaching award at Kellogg and the PhD teaching award at Stanford. He has been an innovator in the field of business and its social, political, and legal environment, and is the author of the leading textbook in the field. In 2007 he received the lifetime achievement award from the Aspen Institute.

His research has been supported by the National Science Foundation, Bureau of Health Services Research, Alfred P. Sloan Foundation, and the Citicorp Behavioral Sciences Research Council. He is a Fellow of the Econometric Society and has served on the Board of Editors of the American Economic Review, the Quarterly Journal of Economics, the Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, Business and Politics, and Decision Sciences.

Academic Degrees

Doctor Honoris Caura, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, 2005; DBA, Indiana Univ., 1968; MBA, Harvard Univ., 1964; BS, Univ. of Michigan, 1962.

Professional Experience

At Stanford since 1981. Visiting Prof., Harvard Univ., 1990-91; Morrison Prof. of Decision Sciences, Northwestern Univ., 1978-81; Visiting Prof., Katholieke Univ., Leuven, 1977-78; Visiting Prof., Univ. d'Aix-Marseille, Aix-en-Provence, 1973-74; Asst. Prof: Northwestern Univ., 1968-78; Corporate Analyst, Standard Oil (Indiana), 1964-66.

Selected Publications

  • Morally-Motivated Self-Regulation: American Economic Review, (forthcoming), 2009
  • “A Positive Theory of Moral Management, Social Pressure, and Corporate Social Performance.”: Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, 2009
  • Corporate Social Responsibility and Social Entrepreneurship: Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, 2007
  • Elections, Governments, and Parliaments in Proportional Representation Systems with Daniel Diermeier: Quarterly Journal of Economics (August): 933-967, 2001
  • Persistent Media Bias: Journal of Public Economics, 90: 1-36, 2006

Working Papers

  • 1993R: The Economics and Politics of Corporate Social Performance
  • 2031: Common Agency Lobbying over Coalitions and Policy
  • 1960: Policy Dynamics and Inefficiency in a Parliamentary Democracy with Proportional Representation
  • 629: A Model of the Demand for Investment Banking Advising and Distribution Services for New Issues
  • 632: Regulatory Strategies Under Asymmetric Information
  • 670: Tender Offers and Management Resistance
  • 692: Regualtion, Asymmetric Information, and Auditing
  • 725: A Theory of Regulation and Information in a Continuing Relationship
  • 756: Regulation of Prices and Pollution Under Incomplete Information
  • 757: Noncooperative Regulation of a Nonlocalized Externality
  • 809: Commitment in Multiperiod Information Models
  • 832R: Monitoring, Moral Hazard, Asymmetric Information, and Risk Sharing in Procurement Contracting
  • 834R: Service-Induced Campaign Contributions and the Electoral Equilibrium
  • 869: Agency Theory and the Supply of Effort
  • 896: Distributive Politics and the Persistence of Amtrak
  • 897: Regulation and Legislative Choice
  • 903: An Efficiency Analysis of Proposed Rules to Limit Resistance to Tender Offers
  • 936: Bargaining in Legislatures
  • 937: Design of Regulatory Mechanisms and Institutions
  • 943: Monitoring of Performance in Organizational Contracting: The Case of Defense Procurement
  • 954: The Power to Propose
  • 955: Procurement Contracting: Efficiency, Renegotiation and Performance Evaluation
  • 1001: A Noncooperative Theory of Legislative Coalitions
  • 1020: Service-Induced Campaign Contributions, Incumbent Shirking, and Reelection Opportunities
  • 1028: Regulatory Incentive Mechanisms, Commitment, and Political Action
  • 1044: Majoritarian Incentives, Pork Barrel Programs, and Procedural Control
  • 1074: Defense Procurement: Politics, Management, and Incentives
  • 1075: A Spatial Bargaining Theory of Government Formation in Parliamentary Systems
  • 1143: Dividing a Cake By Majority: The Simplest Equilibria
  • 1151: Campaign Contributions and Party-Candidate Competition in Services and Policies
  • 1161: Government Formation and Endogenous Parties
  • 1174: Spatial Electoral Competition and Campaign Contributions with Informed and Uninformed Voters
  • 1207: Information, Control, and Organizational Structure
  • 1240: A Theory of Collective Choice for Government Programs
  • 1247: The Economics and Politics of Regulation: Perspectives, Agenda, and Approaches
  • 1273: A Sequential Choice Theory Perspective on Legislative Organization
  • 1312: A Dynamic Theory of Collective Goods Programs
  • 1315: Informational Hierarchies, Self-Remedying Hidden Gaming, and Organizational Neutrality
  • 1346: Informational Alliances
  • 1363: Integrated Strategy and International Trade Disputes: The Kodak-Fujifilm Case
  • 1394: Global Strategy and Organization
  • 1397: Matrix Organization
  • 1437: Comparative Dynamics of Parliamentary Governments
  • 1480: Integrated Market and Nonmarket Strategies in Client and Interest Group Politics
  • 1488: Strategy, Organization, and Incentives: Global Corporate Banking at Citibank
  • 1493: Dynamics of Parliamentary Systems: Elections, Governments, and Parliaments
  • 1559: A Dynamic Model of Multidimensional Collective Choice
  • 1564: Theories of Strategic Nonmarket Participation: Majority Rule and Executive Institutions
  • 1572: Legislative Organization with Informational Committees
  • 1602: Competitve Lobbying in a Majority-Rule Institution
  • 1656: Private Politics, Corporate Social Responsibility, and Integrated Strategy
  • 1689: Private Politics
  • 1709: Private Ordering on the Internet: The eBay Community of Traders
  • 1711: Relations Between Fully-Revealing Equilibria of Multiple-Sender Signaling and Screening Models
  • 1766: Private Politics and Private Policy: A Theory of Boycotts
  • 1808: Competing For The Public Through The News Media
  • 1845R: Persistent Media Bias
  • 1909: Strategic Activism and Nonmarket Strategy
  • 1916: Corporate Social Responsibility and Social Entrepreneurship
  • 1940: A Positive Theory Of Moral Management, Social Pressure, And Corporate Social Performance
  • 1945: Managerial Contracting and Corporate Social Responsibility

Selected Cases

  • P54: Google in China
  • P71: Social Entrepreneurship: Banco Compartamos
  • P70: Social Entrepreneurship: Kiva
  • P68: Siemens: Anatomy of Bribery
  • P66: Compulsory Licensing, Thailand, and Abbott Laboratories
  • P55: The Nonmarket Environment of Google
  • P56: Carried Interest Taxation
  • P59: Mattel: Crisis Management or Management Crisis
  • P53B: Gilead Sciences (B): Implementing the Gilead Access Program for HIV Drugs
  • P53A: Gilead Sciences (A): The Gilead Access Program for HIV Drugs
  • P51: Molecular Insight Pharmaceuticals: Integrated Strategy for a Development Stage Molecular Medicine Company
  • P65: MTN Group Limited
  • P69: Consumer Awareness or Disease Mongering?: GlaxoSmithKline and the Restless Legs Syndrome
  • P57: Responsible Lobbying?
  • P62: Tesco PLC in India?
  • P58: Fuel Economy Standards 2007
  • P76: Google Out of China
  • P77: Goldman Sachs and Its Reputaion
  • P17: The Kodak-Fujifilm Trade Dispute
  • P22: Echelon in Europe
  • P23B: Proposition 211: Securities Litigation Referendum (B)
  • P23A: Proposition 211: Securities Litigation Referendum (A)
  • P20A: Echelon and the Home Automation Standard (A)
  • P20B: Echelon and the Home Automation Standard (B)
  • P4: Cemex and Antidumping
  • P5: Section 936 Tax Credit
  • P14: Levi Strauss & Co. Terms of Engagement Audits
  • P24: The Staples-Office Depot Merger?
  • P11: University Games, Inc.
  • P12: Levi Strauss & Co. Global Sourcing Guidelines
  • P13: Levi Strauss & Co. in China*
  • P34A: Sophis Networks and Encryption Export Controls (A)
  • P34B: Sophis Networks and Encryption Export Controls (B)
  • P32: DoubleClick and Internet Privacy
  • P33: eBay and Database Protection
  • P38: Pharmaceutical Switching
  • P36: Internet Taxation
  • P37: eBay: Private Ordering for an Online Community
  • P42A: Anatomy of a Corporate Campaign: Rainforest Action Network and Citigroup (A)
  • P42C: Anatomy of a Corporate Campaign: Rainforest Action Network and Citigroup (C)
  • P43: CAFE Standards 2002
  • P41: Note on AIDS and the Pharmaceutical Industry
  • P46: The Nonmarket Environment of McDonald's
  • P48: Exclusive Resorts: Entrepreneurial Positioning and Nonmarket Defense
  • P42B: Anatomy of a Corporate Campaing: Rainforest Action Network and Citigroup (B)
  • P49: Obesity and McLawsuits
  • P45: The FCC and Broadband Regulation
  • P39: GlaxoSmithKline and AIDS Drugs Policy
  • P44: Strategic Activism: The Rainforest Action Network
  • P50: The Microsoft Antitrust Case
  • P52A: Wal-Mart: Nonmarket Pressure and Reputation Risk (A)
  • P52B: Wal-Mart: Nonmarket Pressure and Reputation Risk (B): A New Nonmarket Strategy

Awards and Honors

  • PhD Distinguished Faculty Award, 1999, Stanford Graduate School of Business
  • Teacher of the Year, 1981, Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University
  • Lifetime Achievement Award, 2008, Aspen Institute
  • Nancy L. Schwartz Lecture, 2001, Northwestern University
  • Andersen Consulting Award for Best Article., 1995, California Management Review


In The Media

  • Ethical Soul-Searching at Business School, Financial Times
  • Lobbyists Tied to Microsoft Wrote Citizens' Letters, Los Angeles Times