Theodore J. Kreps Professor of Economics
Professor of Economics (by courtesy), School of Humanities and Sciences
Lacob Family Faculty Fellow for 2012-2013
Andrzej (Andy) Skrzypacz's research is in the area of microeconomic theory. His focus is on the areas of information economics, market design, and dynamic games. His recent papers consider auction design, bargaining theory, repeated games, and collusion in markets.
Professor Skrzypacz's research focuses on microeconomic theory and its applications. His main papers are in the areas of auction theory, bargaining theory, dynamic games, information economics, and collusion in markets.
Andy teaches Managerial Economics to MBA students and a class on Auctions, Bargaining, and Pricing to PhD students. He also advises numerous PhD students in their dissertation research. In 2005 he received PhD Distinguished Service Award from the GSB PhD Association.
Andy received his PhD in Economics from the University of Rochester in 2000, and since then he has worked at the Stanford Graduate School of Business.
PhD, Univ. of Rochester, 2000, MA, 2000, MA, Warsaw School of Economics, 1997, BS, 1995.
At Stanford since 2000.
- Bidding with Securities - Auctions and Security Design, joint with Peter DeMarzo, Ilan Kremer, and Andy Skrzypacz: The American Economic Review, 95, 4, pp. 936-959, 2005
- Uncertainty about uncertainty and delay in bargaining, joint with Yossi Feinberg: Econometrica, 73 (1), pp. 69 - 91, 2005
- Dynamic signaling and market breakdown, joint with Ilan Kremer, forthcoming: Journal of Economic Theory, 2006
- Collusion under Monitoring of Sales, with Joseph E. Harrington, forthcoming: Rand Journal of economics, 2006
- Tacit Collusion in Repeated Auctions, joint with Hugo Hopenhayn: Journal of Economic Theory, 114 (1), pp. 153-169, 2004
- 1887: Impossibility of Collusion under Imperfect Monitoring with Flexible Production
- 1879: Network Externalities and Long-Run Market Shares
- 1885: Collusion under Monitoring of Sales
- 2030: Limited Records and Reputation
- 2088: Time Horizon and Cooperation in Continuous Time
- 2102: Not Only What But also When: A Theory of Dynamic Voluntary Disclosure
- 1641: The Behavior of Price Dispersion in a Natural Experiment
- 1695: Inflation and Price Setting in a Natural Experiment
- 1698R2: Tacit Collusion in Repeated Auctions
- 1765: Uncertainty about Uncertainty and Delay in Bargaining
- 1814R2: Ratings, Certifications and Grades: Dynamic Signaling and Market Breakdown
- 1872: Bidding with Securities: Auctions and Security Design
Awards and Honors
- PhD Faculty Distinguished Service Award, 2005