THE POLICY–PEOPLE GAP: DECISION-MAKERS CHOOSE POLICIES THAT FAVOR DIFFERENT APPLICANTS THAN THEY SELECT WHEN MAKING INDIVIDUAL DECISIONS

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This work documents a contemporary organizational problem—a gap between selection policies and individual selection decisions—and suggests one intervention to address it. In college admissions and workplace hiring contexts, we find that decision-makers are more likely to favor disadvantaged applicants over applicants with objectively higher achievements when choosing between selection policies than choosing between individual applicants. We document this policy–people gap among admissions officers, working professionals, and lay people using both within-subject and between-subject designs and across a range of stimuli. We find that the gap is driven in part by shifting standards of fairness across the two types of decisions. When choosing between individuals, compared to choosing between policies, decision-makers are more likely to prioritize what is fair to individuals (a microjustice standard of fairness) over what is fair in the aggregate (a macrojustice standard of fairness). As a result, an intervention that has decision-makers prioritize the same standard of fairness across the decisions mitigates the policy–people gap.

This research helps us understand why decision-makers’ choices so frequently violate espoused organizational policies and suggests one way to increase the representation of disadvantaged groups in organizations.

In the mid-1990s, half of Americans favored affirmative action policies for women and racial minorities (NBC News & The Wall Street Journal, 1995, 1997). Yet, in that same time period, only 34% of Americans actually thought that it was a good idea to hire a woman over a man if they were both equally qualified, and only 20% thought that a college should deliberately favor a Black applicant over an equally qualified White applicant (CBS News & New York Times, 1997). Why was there a gap between respondents’ preferred policies and whom they would favor in specific cases? In the present research, we suggest that such a gap existed, and persists,1 because decision-makers prioritize different standards of fairness when making decisions about selection policies versus decisions about which specific individuals to select.

Our goals in the present paper are threefold. First, we seek to establish that decisions about selection policies diverge from decisions about which specific individuals to select. We tested this hypothesis in the contexts of college admissions and workplace hiring and found robust evidence that the decisions diverge, even when these two types of decisions have identical consequences. Across 16 preregistered studies with 10,883 participants, we found that admissions officers, employees with hiring experience in the technology industry, and members of the general public are more likely to choose a policy that favors lower-scoring, disadvantaged applicants over higher-scoring, advantaged

applicants than they are to select a specific lower-scoring, disadvantaged applicant over a higher-scoring, advantaged applicant. We refer to this systematic divergence as the “policy–people gap.”

Our second goal is to explain why a gap between selection policies and individual selection decisions exists. We theorize that when people make individual selection decisions they prioritize a “microjustice” standard of fairness, that is, what is fair to the individuals under consideration. Microjustice reflects concerns about whether opportunities (e.g., admissions spots, jobs) are allocated in proportion to individuals’ specific qualities (e.g., their accomplishments and productivity). However, the relatively more abstract nature of policy decisions leads people to consider a different standard of fairness. When people make policy decisions, we theorize that they become less motivated by a microjustice standard and become more motivated by a “macrojustice” standard of fairness, that is, what is fair in the aggregate. Macrojustice reflects concerns about how opportunities ought to be distributed overall, for example, whether those opportunities are distributed equally between groups or whether some minimum for a group is reached. These standards of fairness lead decision-makers to favor different applicants in their policy and individual decisions.

Our third goal is to present an intervention that aligns individual decisions with policy decisions by leveraging our theoretical account. Our account suggests that when decision-makers rely on the same standards of fairness across decisions, the gap between the decisions will be reduced. We crafted an intervention in which decision-makers learned about both microjustice and macrojustice and were told that their individual decisions should help accomplish their institution’s priority of macrojustice. This minimal intervention led significantly more decision-makers to make individual decisions consistent with a policy favoring lower-scoring, disadvantaged applicants, thereby helping bridge the policy–people gap.

In pursuing these goals, we make several theoretical and practical contributions. First, we document a robust and persistent gap between the selection decisions people make when choosing policies and when choosing individual applicants. This finding advances our understanding of why individuals and organizations often fail to live up to their espoused moral standards: Decision-makers care about multiple standards of fairness, but the macrojustice standard of fairness that is relevant to achieving equality across groups is often deprioritized when making individual selection decisions.

Our findings dovetail with interdisciplinary research that has examined divergences between decision-makers’ endorsement of broader principles and the concrete implementation of those principles (e.g., Bell & Hartmann, 2007; Dixon, Durrheim, & Tredoux, 2007; Smith & Mayorga-Gallo, 2017; Yogeeswaran & Dasgupta, 2014). Some existing work has found, for example, that people support principles of racial equality but oppose specific actions to achieve it (e.g., Dixon et al., 2007). Some have argued that this gap stems from the ambiguity afforded by endorsing abstract principles or a failure to consider what implementing those principles actually implies (Bell & Hartmann, 2007; Smith & Mayorga-Gallo, 2017). Another stream of research on “want–should” conflicts has suggested that people fail to implement their abstract principles because in contextualized, affect-rich contexts, they focus on what they want to do rather than what they should do (Bazerman & Tenbrunsel, 2011; Milkman, Rogers, & Bazerman, 2008). Thus far, however, the mechanisms underlying such gaps have been “hotly debated” (Tuch & Hughes, 1996: 724), with scholars noting that “there is not yet a consensus about [their] nature and causes” (Dixon et al., 2007: 868).

We provide a new perspective on why principle-implementation gaps exist and how to mitigate them. We establish that decision-makers’ choices diverge even when the implementation of organizational policies is clear and equivalent to the individual decision in question. In doing so, we suggest that gaps between the endorsement of principles and their specific implementation cannot be solely explained by previous accounts, such as a failure to think through implementation (Bell & Hartmann, 2007; Smith & Mayorga-Gallo, 2017) or being tempted by what one wants to do (Milkman et al., 2008). Further, we provide a novel theoretical account to explain why policy and individual decisions diverge even when decision-makers think carefully about what they should do when making both types of decisions. We theorize and find evidence that people focus on what they should do (i.e., what they find fair to do) across both policy and individual decisions but that the relevant standard of fairness shifts across them.

This work also sheds light on the psychology of policymaking. There is a desire among behavioral scientists and organizational behavior scholars to influence policy as evidenced, for example, by the creation of the peer-reviewed journal, Behavioral Science & Policy, the growing number of nudge units around the world (Benartzi et al., 2017), and the interdisciplinary publications that make policy
Selecting individuals for an organization entails evaluating them and deciding whom to select, whereas choosing a selection policy entails representing “goals, intentions, or statements” (Van Meter & Van Horn, 1975: 446) in order to make many individual selection decisions. We propose that this distinct function of policy decisions—to serve as a statement that guides future selection decisions—leads decision-makers to prioritize different standards of fairness when making policy versus individual decisions. We draw on construal-level theory (Trope & Liberman, 2010) and the concepts of microjustice and macrojustice (Brickman, Folger, Goode, & Schul, 1981) to explain the differences between the two decisions. Broadly, we posit that policy decisions are represented more abstractly than individual decisions, thus shifting decision-makers’ standard of fairness from what is fair to specific individuals being evaluated (microjustice) to what is a fair distribution in the aggregate (macrojustice). These shifting standards of fairness influence subsequent selection decisions. We depict this theoretical account in Figure 1.

People can mentally represent objects, behaviors, and other people at different levels of construal (Trope & Liberman, 2003; 2010). A “high-level construal” is a representation that is relatively abstract, decontextualized, and focused on “central, superordinate, and goal-relevant features” (Soderberg, Callahan, Kochersberger, Amit, & Ledgerwood, 2015: 2). In contrast, a “low-level construal” is a concrete, contextualized, and detailed representation. Consider, for example, the act of moving into a new apartment. When construing this action at a high level, people described it as “starting a new life,” but, when construing it at a low level, they described it as “packing and carrying boxes” (Liberman & Trope, 1998). “Starting a new life” reflects the broader goals associated with moving, whereas “packing and carrying boxes” reflects the concrete actions involved in it. A number of dispositional and contextual features, such as a person’s mood (Gasper & Clore, 2002), power (Smith & Trope, 2006), and current social role (e.g., mother, manager [Reyt & Wiesenfeld, 2015]), can shift the degree to which people construe concepts at different levels (for reviews of construal, see Trope & Liberman, 2010; Wiesenfeld, Reyt, Brockner, & Trope, 2017).

Drawing on this fundamental distinction in people’s mental representations, we theorize that selection decisions focused on individuals versus policies differ in their level of construal. Both types of decisions reflect ways to expand an organization. However, policies are crafted to represent the broader goals of organizational expansion, whereas individual selection decisions reflect the specific concrete actions taken in pursuit of those goals. Individual selection decisions require evaluating specific applicants and determining their suitability for a particular
opportunity or job. These decisions, therefore, operate at a relatively lower level of construal.

We theorize that people rely on a microjustice standard of fairness when making decisions that are construed at a low level. Microjustice reflects “principles of correspondence” and thus demands that an appropriate relation be established between an individual’s qualities or “inputs” (e.g., accomplishments, productivity, and need) and their reward or “outcome” (e.g., college admission, job placement; Brickman et al., 1981: 178). As such, microjustice is individuating—it requires knowing individuals’ qualities in order to determine what they ought to get. This means that microjustice is only possible in decisions and contexts that attend to specific information and, as attention is drawn to that information, it may seem to be the appropriate standard of fairness. In the context of selection decisions, which seek to determine applicants’ suitability for a job or opportunity, inputs pertaining to perceived merit (e.g., ability, accomplishments, and experience) are focal (see, e.g., Bohnet, Van Geen, & Bazerman, 2016; Quadlin, 2018), and thus prioritizing microjustice entails focusing on signals of merit.2

In contrast to individual selection decisions, policies guide behavior across time, situations, and people. They seek to, for example, guide behavior today or in 10 years, in the context of hiring for an executive position or an entry-level one, by decision-makers with distinct experiences and knowledge. For policies to represent the values and goals of policy-makers in a way that will traverse these variable factors, we theorize that they are necessarily represented at a higher level of construal than individual decisions.

We theorize that the relatively more abstract nature of policies prompts decision-makers to rely on a different standard of fairness. Specifically, we theorize that when thinking at a higher level of construal, decision-makers are less motivated by what is fair to specific individuals (microjustice) and instead are more motivated by what is fair in the aggregate (e.g., in society, their organization, in an industry). In other words, that decision-makers prioritize macrojustice, which is concerned with what the distribution of resources ought to be like overall, such as no one having less than a certain amount (a “minimum principle”) or having an appropriate balance in the allocation of resources between groups (a “balance principle”; Brickman et al., 1981: 190). In contrast to microjustice, macrojustice does not attend to individuals’ specific attributes because what the overall distribution of resources ought to be like does not depend on those attributes.

The link between construal level and prioritizing microjustice versus macrojustice has not yet been established, but it is consistent with existing research examining allocations to individuals and groups (Chang, Kirgios, Rai, & Milkman, 2020; Colby, DeWitt, & Chapman, 2015; Ubel & Loewenstein, 1996). For example, when considering which specific patients should receive organs, decision-makers allocate organs to the patients with the highest likelihood of survival; this result reflects a correspondence between the likelihood of survival (an input) and receiving an organ (the outcome), consistent with a microjustice

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2 The relationship between microjustice and merit may be specific to the selection context. In decision contexts in which people seek to foster personal development or social relations, rather than maximize economic productivity, other inputs, like those pertaining to need, may be more relevant (see, e.g., Deutsch, 1975; Wagstaff, Huggins, & Perfect, 1993).
standard of fairness (Colby et al., 2015; Ubel & Loewenstein, 1996). However, when considering groups of patients, decision-makers allocate organs more equally across the groups; this result reflects a balance principle, consistent with a macrojustice standard of fairness (Colby et al., 2015; Ubel & Loewenstein, 1996). The broader group-based decision led decision-makers to prioritize a macrojustice standard of fairness that was not as compelling at the individual level, namely, that everyone should have the same chance at receiving an organ.

The link between construal level and prioritizing macrojustice versus microjustice is also consistent with research on the relationship between construal level and values (Luguri, Napier, & Dovidio, 2012; Mahfud, Badea, Verkuyten, & Reynolds, 2018; Mentovich, Yudkin, Tyler, & Trope, 2016; Napier & Luguri, 2013; Yogeeswaran & Dasgupta, 2014). When thinking more abstractly, people across the political spectrum increase their endorsement of values related to equality (Luguri et al., 2012; Napier & Luguri, 2013), which reflect the notion of macrojustice. Similarly, when thinking more abstractly, people make ethical choices about individuals that rely less on their specific traits, such as granting the same level of speech protections to U.S. citizens and non-citizens or making similar salary cuts for local and foreign workers (Mentovich et al., 2016), thus reflecting lower endorsement of microjustice.

We further theorize that the relative prioritization of microjustice versus macrojustice within individual versus policy decisions influences which applicants decision-makers favor. When faced with a choice between an advantaged applicant with higher objective achievements and a disadvantaged applicant with lower objective achievements, the more decision-makers prioritize microjustice relative to macrojustice, the more likely they will be to favor the applicant with higher objective achievements. Microjustice is associated with selecting the higher-achieving applicant because it attends to signals of the individuals’ merit to determine whether they ought to be selected, whereas macrojustice is associated with selecting the disadvantaged applicant because it is concerned with balance and equality in the aggregate. Overall, our theoretical account leads us to make the following predictions:

Hypothesis 1. Decision-makers favor higher-achieving, advantaged individuals over lower-achieving, disadvantaged individuals more often when making a decision about individuals than when making a decision about policies.

Hypothesis 2. A greater relative prioritization of microjustice (versus macrojustice) accounts for the relationship between making an individual versus policy decision and the likelihood of favoring higher-achieving, advantaged individuals over lower-achieving, disadvantaged individuals.

In Hypothesis 2, we posit that the relative prioritization of microjustice versus macrojustice changes between the decisions and influences choice. It need not be the case that decision-makers are more concerned about macrojustice than microjustice when choosing policies or that they are more concerned about microjustice than macrojustice when choosing individuals—only that decision-makers differentially prioritize macrojustice and microjustice between the decisions. This hypothesis assumes that most decision-makers are concerned about both microjustice and macrojustice to some extent but that making a policy versus an individual decision changes their relative prioritization. This assumption is consistent with existing work showing that people value multiple, and sometimes conflicting, standards of fairness (Colquitt, Conlon, Wesson, Porter, & Ng, 2001) and that the use of these standards can change as a function of contextual factors, such as organizational structure (Ambrose & Schminke, 2003), hunger (Huppert, Shaw, & Decety, 2020), and social relationships (Deutsch, 1975; Rai & Fiske, 2011).

We also consider how to align policy and individual decisions. We theorize that the gap in choice between policy and individual decisions stems from the different standards of fairness that underlie them. Therefore, we predict that aligning decision-makers to use the same standard of fairness across their decisions should attenuate the gap in choice. We propose that:

Hypothesis 3. Decision-makers favor higher-achieving, advantaged individuals over lower-achieving, disadvantaged individuals in their individual and policy decisions at more similar rates when they rely on the same standard of fairness (microjustice or macrojustice) across the decisions than when they do not.

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3 By achievement, we mean objective metrics, such as scores on the SAT or on a coding assignment, that signal an applicants’ qualities, like their college readiness or ability to perform a job. Though these metrics are based on unambiguously right and wrong answers (and thus objective), that does not necessarily make them accurate measures of applicants’ qualities.


PAPER OVERVIEW

Across four main studies (n = 2,698; all preregistered) we tested these hypotheses. In Studies 1 and 2, we found support for Hypothesis 1, with samples of college admissions officers and employees in the technology industry. In Study 3, we measured microjustice and macrojustice concerns and found support for Hypothesis 2, using mediation analyses. In Study 4, we tested a macrojustice intervention and found support for Hypotheses 2 and 3.

In our Supplementary Findings section, which follows Study 4, we highlight the results from our supplementary studies (15 studies; n = 8,477) that address alternative explanations and the robustness of our effects. Our four main studies provide the most direct tests of our hypotheses. However, we report our supplementary studies for transparency (we have no “file-drawer” of preregistered studies) and for the additional insights they provide into the policy–people gap. We highlight takeaways from our supplementary studies in the Supplementary Findings section, and we list each study’s key findings in Table A2 of Appendix A. Readers interested in further details about any of our studies can consult the supplementary materials (SM) (available at https://bit.ly/3fGUxvo). We have also made all of our data, analysis files, preregistrations, and survey materials available online (https://bit.ly/3tJB1q7). Procedures for all studies were approved by the University of Chicago’s Social and Behavioral Sciences Institutional Review Board.

Experimental Design

Across our studies, participants made a choice either between two specific individuals or between two policies that would favor those individuals. Within those choices, we set up a tension between prioritizing achievement and taking into account applicants’ circumstances; the latter can allow one to realize values of equality and diversity or to assess merit based on circumstances. Hence, participants choosing between individuals faced a choice between a higher-achieving, advantaged individual and a lower-achieving, disadvantaged individual, and participants choosing between policies faced a choice between a policy that would favor higher-achieving, advantaged individuals and a policy that would favor lower-achieving, disadvantaged individuals. We surveyed 35 college admissions officers (see SM 2.15) to gauge the frequency with which actual decision-makers experience this tension and to ensure that we developed reasonable stimuli to capture it. Fifty percent of the admissions officers confirmed that they had previously faced a college admissions decision that pitted favoring applicants with greater qualifications who were relatively advantaged against applicants with lower qualifications who were relatively disadvantaged.

We also ran a recall study with 108 management faculty (see SM 2.14). The vast majority of faculty who completed our survey reported recent involvement in hiring (90% were involved within the last three years). We asked them to recall a time when they faced a trade-off between “candidates with higher objective metrics of success (e.g., many publications, excellent methodological training) or candidates with marginally lower metrics of success who may have been disadvantaged in some way (e.g., they lacked research funding, had a limited stipend, belong to a group or social category that faces more obstacles in academia).” Eighty-six percent of the management faculty could recall making faculty hiring decisions that involved this trade-off, which is the same one we represent in our studies. Based on these two pilot studies, we posit that our operationalization reasonably reflects decisions and tensions that admissions officers and hiring parties actually face.

We made three important design choices to test our hypotheses as effectively and cleanly as possible. First, we restricted the decision to just two individuals or two policies and described those options based on easily quantifiable information. Without a doubt, in actual selection contexts, there is more than one way to select an option (e.g., ranking, from a pool, in isolation), and there is often more and richer information available about the options. However, by creating a relatively bare decision environment, we were able to cleanly test the causal effect of making a decision about individuals versus policies. Second, we held constant the information presented in the individual and policy decisions. Specifically, we used the same information to describe the individuals and the policies; we describe this procedure in detail in the study methods. Third, we sampled participant populations according to the goals of our studies. In Studies 1 and 2, we sampled decision-makers within organizations to establish the gap between policy and individual decisions and its generalizability. In Studies 3 and 4, as well as in the supplementary studies, we sought to make more granular comparisons, so we sampled large numbers of participants from Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (mturk.com) and Prolific Academic (prolific.co)—two online platforms that allow for high-quality, experimental data collection (Buhrmester,
Talaifar, & Gosling, 2018; Peer, Brandimarte, Samat, & Acquisti, 2017). The participants in these platforms provide useful data for investigating varied organizational phenomena (e.g., hiring policies, as in Hideg & Ferris, 2017).

For studies with online participants, we implemented a variety of checks to ensure that participants were attentive and read all the instructions. The checks varied across the studies based on the approach we considered best at the time, but we preregistered all exclusions based on the checks to preclude “p-hacking.” Nevertheless, where relevant, we illustrate key analyses with all possible participants included (see Footnotes 5 and 7), which reveal that the results did not meaningfully change based on the specific exclusions.

**STUDY 1: COLLEGE ADMISSIONS**

In Study 1, we tested whether college admissions officers are more likely to select lower-achieving, disadvantaged applicants over higher-achieving, advantaged applicants when selecting admissions policies than they are when making individual admissions decisions. We tested this hypothesis with a sample of admissions officers using both a within-subjects and between-subjects design. This mixed design allowed us to examine whether the same decision-maker would make divergent choices. We preregistered this study on AsPredicted.org (https://aspredicted.org/DQG_UDX).

**Methods**

**Participants.** We aimed to recruit as many participants as possible during a two-day period at a national conference for college admissions. We targeted conference attendees wearing lanyards that identified them as university or college admissions officers or as high school college counselors. We ended up with a final sample of 190 participants; 159 participants completed the survey in full, and 31 participants only completed parts of it (overall demographics: 59% female, $M_{age} = 37.25, SD = 9.83$). Nearly all of the participants (96.5%) had at least one year of experience in an admissions department ($M_{AdmissionsExperience} = 10.03$ years, $SD = 8.42$).

**Procedure and materials.** We distributed paper surveys to participants. We asked them to imagine that they were the head of admissions at a four-year university and had to make decisions about which applicants to admit. Then, participants made an admissions decision between two individuals followed by a decision between two admissions policies, or they made a decision between two admissions policies followed by an admissions decision between two individuals. That is, all participants made a decision about admissions policies and about individuals to admit, but the order of the decisions varied. This design allowed us to examine the hypothesis between subjects by comparing the initial choices across participants and within subjects by comparing participants’ own first and second choices.

Before making their individual or policy decision, participants examined a table of information about the two applicants or two admissions policies. Participants saw the same information for both types of decisions. However, the table of information for the individual decision framed the information as describing, “two specific applicants for admission, Applicant A and Applicant B,” whereas the table for the policy decision framed the information as describing the “types of applicants that are typically admitted under Policy A (Applicant Type A) and Policy B (Applicant Type B).” We depict the tables of information in Figure 2.

The applicants were identical in all respects except for their SAT scores and estimated household incomes. One applicant (or type of applicant) had higher scores and household income, while the other had lower scores and household income. Hence, participants chose between a higher-scoring, economically advantaged option and a lower-scoring, economically disadvantaged option. The specific numbers provided in the table (e.g., SAT and household income) were the same for all participants and were always associated with the same (type of) applicant (e.g., Applicant A always had an SAT score of 1200 and a household income of $60,000).

After examining the table of information, participants indicated which of the two options they would select (“If you had to choose one [applicant to admit/admissions policy], which [applicant/policy] would you choose?”: A or B) and how likely they would be to choose either option on a scale of 0 (much more likely to [admit Applicant A / choose Policy A]) to 10 (much more likely to [admit Applicant B / choose Policy B]). We also asked participants to indicate which option would be the fairer one to select (“Which [applicant/policy] is it fairer to select?”: A or B). Measuring fairness provides initial insight into our account; we hypothesized that participants would make choices they believe are fair in both decision contexts but that they would use different standards of fairness to make those judgments.
After participants answered the questions for their first (individual or policy) decision, they proceeded to their second decision. They reviewed the same table of information, now framed for the other type of decision, and answered the same set of questions. We also collected a series of exploratory mechanism items (see SM 1.1). Finally, participants reported their demographic information and provided general details about their admissions experience and academic institutions.

**Results**

Some participants did not provide answers to all questions or their answers were not decipherable by research assistants transcribing the surveys. In order to maintain a higher level of statistical power, we considered all available responses for each analysis. Therefore, we have a different number of participants across analyses. For each analysis, we examined participants’ decisions in two ways. We compared (a) only participants’ first policy and individual choices (a between-subjects comparison) and (b) participants’ first policy and individual choices to their own subsequent choices in the other condition (a within-subjects comparison).  

**Choice.** Comparing only participants’ first choices (between subjects), we found that participants chose the higher-scoring, higher-income option in the individual condition at a higher rate (70.11%) than in the policy condition (36.56%; $\chi^2[1, 180] = 20.31, p < .001$). Comparing participants’ own choices (within subjects), we also found this pattern of results (individual: 66.08% vs. policy 39.18%; McNemar test, $\chi^2[1, 171] = 31.12, p < .001$).

**Likelihood of choice.** Between subjects, participants reported a greater likelihood of choosing the higher-scoring, higher-income option in the individual condition ($M = 5.97, SD = 2.22$) than in the policy condition ($M = 5.20, SD = 2.84$; $t[183] = 2.04$.

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**FIGURE 2**
Stimuli (Study 1)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Panel A. Individual Decision table</th>
<th>Applicant A</th>
<th>Applicant B</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SAT score</td>
<td>1200</td>
<td>1350</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAT percentile</td>
<td>81st</td>
<td>94th</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GPA</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>3.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extracurriculars (No.)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Letters of Recommendation</td>
<td>2 strong recommendations</td>
<td>2 strong recommendations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estimated Household Income, $ (percentile, approx.)</td>
<td>60,000 (50th percentile)</td>
<td>120,000 (80th percentile)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Panel B. Policy Decision table</th>
<th>Applicant type A</th>
<th>Applicant type B</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SAT score</td>
<td>1200</td>
<td>1350</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAT percentile</td>
<td>81st</td>
<td>94th</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>60,000 (50th percentile)</td>
<td>120,000 (80th percentile)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Participants used these tables of information to make their individual and policy decisions. Participants made both decisions, one after another (the first decision and corresponding table was on the first page of the survey and the second decision and table was on the second page). We randomized the order of the decisions across participants.

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4 As indicated in our preregistration, we also tested for order effects. We did not find any differences in choice based on whether the individual or policy decision came first. We report these tests and their results in SM 1.1.
p = 0.043). We also found this pattern of results within subjects (M_{Individual} = 6.19, SD = 2.38 vs. M_{Policy} = 5.11, SD = 2.70; t(179) = 5.54, p < .001).

**Fair choice.** Between subjects, participants indicated that the higher-scoring, higher-income option was the fair choice to select in the individual condition at a higher rate (53.75%) than in the policy condition (35.16%; $\chi^2(2, n = 1850) = 18.84, p < .001$). We also found this pattern of results within subjects (individual: 54.60% vs. policy: 35.58%; McNemar test, $\chi^2(2, n = 1850) = 18.84, p < .001$).

**Discussion**

We found that the majority of admissions officers preferred to admit higher-scoring, advantaged applicants over lower-scoring, disadvantaged applicants. However, when choosing an admission policy, most officers preferred the policy that would admit lower-scoring, disadvantaged applicants over higher-scoring, advantaged applicants.

The admissions officers also indicated that admitting the higher-scoring, advantaged applicant was the fairer applicant to select more often than they indicated that the policy that would favor that applicant was the fairer policy. Hence, this study provides evidence that what decision-makers choose and what they think is fair to choose differs when selecting individual applicants versus policies. This finding is consistent with our theorizing.

Strikingly, we found that the policy–people gap persists both between subjects and within subjects. Forty percent of admissions officers made a subsequent choice about specific individuals (or policies) that diverged from their initial choice about policies (or specific individuals). This result is even more striking because the admissions officers made their second decision immediately after the first one, and the information used to describe each type of decision was identical. These results suggest that the gap cannot be easily explained by decision-makers attending to or having different information in each decision or by failing to consider how the policies would inform individual decisions. If those mechanisms drove the policy–people gap, we would not expect to see divergent choices when the same decision-makers make both decisions and the consequences of each were salient. Rather, these results are more consistent with the possibility that decision-makers are aware of their divergent choices and see them as reasonable because they believe different standards are relevant for each decision. We test this directly in Studies 3 and 4.

**STUDY 2: WORKPLACE HIRING**

In Study 2, we tested Hypothesis 1 in a new selection context: hiring decisions within a technology start-up. Employees in the technology industry were randomly assigned to make individual or policy decisions about whom to interview for a job. As in the admissions context of Study 1, the choice between job candidates presented a trade-off between prioritizing achievement and taking circumstances into account. We preregistered this study on AsPredicted.org (https://aspredicted.org/EGG_NRT).

**Methods**

**Participants.** We recruited United States-based and United Kingdom-based online participants on Prolific Academic for a small monetary sum. Using Prolific’s filters, we sought to recruit participants with experience working in technology-related fields. The majority of participants (68.2%) reported working in STEM and technology-related occupations, and about one-third (34.7%) reported experience in hiring ($M = 5.78$ years, $SD = 6.28$). We presented an attention check before assigning participants to a condition; those who failed the check were not allowed to continue with the study. Therefore, we are not able to conduct analyses with and without participants who failed the check. Our final sample included 360 participants (36.67% female, $M_{age} = 35.24$, $SD = 10.24$).

**Procedure and materials.** We asked participants to imagine that they were the head of human resources at a technology start-up and that they had to decide which job candidates to interview for their start-up’s software engineer position. Then, some participants chose one of two job candidates to interview, while other participants chose one of two interviewing policies.

Before making their decision, participants examined a table of information with the two options they could choose between. Participants saw the same table of information for both types of decisions, but the framing of the options differed slightly for each. For the individual decision, the table described “two candidates,” whereas for the policy decision, the table described the “types of candidates that would be interviewed under each policy.” We provide the table of information in SM 1.3.

The two options described in the table were identical in all respects except for their “coding assignment score” and the “candidate gender.” Before seeing the table, participants read that technology companies
often give a coding assignment to job candidates “to make sure that they can do the job they are applying for” and that their start-up “gives an assignment scored from 0 to 10, where 5 (the average) indicates the candidate is competent enough to do the job well.” One of the options had a male candidate with a score of 8.1, whereas the other option had a female candidate with a score of 8.0. We chose these stimuli because we anticipated that participants would face a tension between prioritizing achievement (by favoring the male candidate with an objectively higher score) and taking the applicants’ gender into account (by favoring the female candidate, aware that there are more barriers for women in STEM and that they are underrepresented in the industry). We counterbalanced whether the higher-scoring, male option or the lower-scoring, female option was labeled “A” and appeared on the left.

After examining the table of information, participants indicated which of the two options they would select (“If you had to choose one [candidate to interview/interviewing policy], which [candidate/policy] would you choose?”: A or B) and which option would be the fairer one to select (“Which [candidate/interviewing policy] is it fairer to [interview/select]?”: A or B). We also collected a series of exploratory mechanism items (see SM 1.2). At the end of the study, participants reported demographic information (age, gender, and political attitudes), their current employment sector or industry, and years of hiring experience (if any).

Results

Choice. Participants chose the higher-scoring, male option in the individual condition at a higher rate (64.48%) than in the policy condition (52.54%; \( \chi^2 [1, 360] = 5.29, p = .021 \)).

Fair choice. Participants indicated that the higher-scoring, male option was the fair option to choose in the individual condition at a higher rate (79.23%) than in the policy condition (56.50%; \( \chi^2 [1, 360] = 21.40, p < .001 \)).

Discussion

We found that technology employees were more likely to interview—and believed it was fairer to interview—higher-scoring, male candidates, over slightly lower-scoring, female candidates when making decisions about individual candidates than when choosing an interviewing policy. These results provide further evidence of a gap between policy decisions and decisions about individuals (Hypothesis 1) and suggest that these results extend to the workplace. Moreover, these results are consistent with our theoretical account that decision-makers’ choices reflect what they consider to be fair but that the standard of fairness differs across the decisions.

STUDY 3: MEDIATION BY SHIFTING STANDARDS OF FAIRNESS

In Study 3, we directly tested the mechanism proposed by our theoretical account, specifically, whether the policy–people gap is explained by decision-makers being relatively more motivated by microjustice than macrojustice when making individual versus policy decisions (Hypothesis 2). We also compared the individual and policy decisions in a more controlled way than in Studies 1 and 2. Specifically, we compared an individual admissions decision (choosing one of two applicants) to a policy decision that would only affect two applicants, thereby making the consequences of the decisions identical. Finding a policy–people gap in this more controlled paradigm would suggest that any differences between the decisions in this study were due to how decision-makers think about policies rather than underlying features of typical policy decisions, such as the greater number of people they affect or the reduced identifiability of those people (Ritov & Zamir, 2014). We preregistered this study on AsPredicted.org (https://aspredicted.org/9K8_HXJ).

Methods

Participants. We recruited United States-based online participants on Amazon Mechanical Turk for a small monetary sum. We estimated requiring a sample size of 800 in order to run the intended mediation analyses. Based on Study S7, we assumed a small X-to-M effect and a large M-to-Y effect, which would require approximately 400 participants (Fritz & MacKinnon, 2007). However, because we also introduced another factor (randomizing the order in which the dependent variables and mechanism measures were collected), we doubled our target sample size to 800.

At the beginning of the study, we tested whether participants were able to see a sample table of information (we tested for this because we displayed the information about applicants and policies in a table). Participants who gave a response that did not match the words on the table were prevented from taking the rest of the survey. As indicated in our
preregistration, our analyses excluded participants who failed any of the three following attention checks. Two checks pertained to the individual or policy decision that participants made. One check asked participants what their choice was about: “who to admit to college” (this was the correct answer based on the subject matter of the entire scenario), “... interview for a job,” “... nominate for a prize,” “... recommend for a promotion,” or “... choose for a sports team.” The other check asked which of two answer options participants chose between in the preceding screen: “two applicants” or “two policies.” The final check was embedded in the eight justice questions we presented to participants and stated, “Please select the middle answer option (4) to show you are paying attention.” Our final sample comprised 802 participants \( (M_{\text{age}} = 41.00, SD = 12.72; 56.36\% \text{female}) \).

**Procedure and materials.** We randomly assigned participants to one of two conditions (decision type: individual or policy) in a between-subjects design. As in Study 1, we asked participants to imagine that they were the head of admissions at a four-year university and had to make decisions about which applicants to admit. We presented them with the same table of information as in Study 1 and counterbalanced whether the higher-scoring, higher-income option or the lower-scoring, lower-income option was labeled “A” and appeared on the left.

However, unlike in Study 1, participants in the individual and policy conditions made functionally equivalent decisions. The only thing that differed was the framing of the decision—whether participants conceptualized their choice as one about policies or individuals. Participants in the policy condition learned that they would choose between two admissions policies that “only affect one final pair of applicants this year.” Because participants might find it odd that the policies would only affect two applicants, we explained that the policy would “only affect one final pair of applicants” because “it is almost the end of admissions season.” We did not want participants to speculate whether the policies would affect more applicants down the line, so we further explained that they and their “fellow admissions officers can create a new policy next year.” Then, participants saw a table of information describing “the two specific applicants that would be admitted under each policy.” Participants in the individual condition similarly learned that “it is almost the end of admissions season” and that they were making a decision about “one final pair of applicants,” and then they proceeded to see the table of information describing the two specific applicants. After reading about each applicant or policy, participants responded to our dependent measures.

**Choice and fairness.** Participants selected one of the two applicants or policies (forced choice: A or B), indicated which applicant or policy was the fairer one to select (forced choice: A or B), and reported how likely they were to pick either option on a scale of 1 (much more likely to choose A) to 7 (much more likely to choose B).

**Microjustice and macrojustice.** Participants also reported how much their choice of applicant or policy was motivated by eight concerns related to microjustice and macrojustice on a scale of 1 (not at all) to 7 (extremely). We presented all eight items together in random order and counterbalanced whether they came before or after the choice, fairness, and likelihood questions. When the items came before making a choice, we asked participants how much their choice “would be motivated” by these concerns, whereas when the items came after making a choice, we asked how much the choice “was motivated” by the concerns.

The macrojustice items measured the extent to which participants were motivated by “making sure that there is a diverse population within my university,” “creating greater equality in the opportunities disadvantaged and advantaged applicants receive,” “balancing the number of opportunities given to disadvantaged and advantaged applicants,” and “making sure that there are not too few disadvantaged applicants in my university,” whereas the microjustice
items measured the extent to which participants were motivated by “selecting applicants based on their hard work,” “selecting applicants based on their qualifications,” “selecting applicants based on their potential to succeed,” and “selecting applicants based on their accomplishments.” We developed these items based on the original conceptualization of the macrojustice and microjustice constructs (Brickman et al., 1981) and our other studies (Studies S7–S9).

We conducted a confirmatory factor analysis to test the factor structure of the items. We assessed model fit with $\chi^2$, root-mean-square error of approximation (RMSEA), comparative fit index (CFI), and Tucker–Lewis index (TLI). The hypothesized two-factor model (microjustice and macrojustice) fit the data reasonably well ($\chi^2$ [n = 802, df = 19] = 123.53, $p < .001$; CFI = .98; RMSEA = .08, CI = [.07, .10]; TLI = .97), and all items loaded significantly onto their intended factors. An alternative one-factor model fit the data poorly ($\chi^2$ [n = 802, df = 20] = 1643.63, $p < .001$; CFI = .64; RMSEA = .32, CI = [.31, .33]; TLI = .50). Consequently, we averaged the macrojustice items into one scale, which revealed high reliability (Cronbach’s $\alpha = .93$, coefficient $H = .95$), and the microjustice items into another scale, which also revealed high reliability (Cronbach’s $\alpha = .87$, coefficient $H = .90$).

We tested the content validity of these macrojustice and microjustice scales in Study S9 (see SM 2.9 for details). Specifically, we used the Hinkin and Tracey (1999) validation approach and the guidelines proposed by Colquitt, Sabey, Rodell, and Hill (2019). We interpreted these scores using Colquitt et al.’s (2019) evaluation criteria. We found that the microjustice and macrojustice scales had similar levels of definitional correspondence (“the degree to which a scale’s items correspond to the construct’s definition”) and definitional distinctiveness (“the degree to which a scale’s items correspond more to the construct’s definition than to the definitions of other orbiting constructs”; Colquitt et al., 2019: 1243) as other commonly used organizational justice scales, namely distributive and procedural justice. The mean correspondence score for each scale was as follows: macrojustice ($M = .80, SD = .19$), microjustice ($M = .77, SD = .19$), distributive justice ($M = .87, SD = .15$), and procedural justice ($M = .83, SD = .12$). These levels are similar to the correspondence observed in other scales published in industrial and organizational psychology and organizational behavior (the scales examined in Colquitt et al.’s review of 112 scales published between 2010 and 2016 ranged from .60 to .96, $M = .87, SD = .06$).

The mean distinctiveness score for each scale was as follows: macrojustice ($M = -.01, SD = .07$), microjustice ($M = -.02, SD = .07$), distributive justice ($M = .03, SD = .06$), and procedural justice ($M = .01, SD = .06$). As Colquitt et al. (2019) explained, the range for the distinctiveness score is from −1 to 1, where a positive value reflects items receiving higher ratings on the intended construct than on orbiting ones, and a negative value reflects items receiving lower ratings on the intended construct than on the orbiting ones. The distinctiveness we observed also fell within the typical range. The scales examined in Colquitt et al. (2019) ranged from −.04 to .64 ($M = .27, SD = .14$). We note, however, that the distinctiveness scores may have been relatively low because we compared closely related orbiting constructs, which likely made it difficult for participants to distinguish between the scales’ items.

**Additional measures.** At the end of the study, participants answered questions that assessed how much their responses reflected socially desirable responding (i.e., the tendency for participants to respond in a way that will be viewed favorably by others; Paulhus, 1991). We used two abridged versions of common social desirability scales, the Marlowe–Crowne Social Desirability Scale (Crowne & Marlowe, 1960) and the Balanced Inventory of Desirable Responding (Paulhus, 1991). We report analyses of these measures in SM 1.3 (we find that the social desirability scales improve prediction and do not account for the effect of decision type). At the end of the study, participants provided demographic information (age, gender, race or ethnicity, level of education, income, and political attitudes).

**Results**

**Choice.** Consistent with Hypothesis 1, participants choosing between individuals chose the higher-scoring, higher-income option at a significantly higher rate (56.59%) than participants choosing between policies with equivalent consequences (45.58%); $\chi^2$ [1, 802] = 9.64, $p = .002$.

**Likelihood.** As with choice, participants reported a greater likelihood of choosing the higher-scoring, higher-income option when choosing between individuals ($M = 4.33, SD = 2.10$) than between equivalent policies ($M = 3.86, SD = 2.16$; $t[800] = 3.15, p = .002$).

**Fair choice.** Consistent with our theoretical account, participants also indicated that it was fair to choose the higher-scoring, higher-income option...
at a significantly higher rate when choosing between individuals (63.41%) than choosing between equivalent policies (38.67%; \( \chi^2 [1, 802] = 48.70, p < .001 \)).

**Microjustice and macrojustice.** Participants indicated that their decision was (or would be, depending on the order of the measures) motivated by microjustice considerations significantly more when choosing between individuals (\( M = 5.79, SD = 0.97 \)) than when choosing between equivalent policies (\( M = 5.51, SD = 1.22 \); \( t[800] = 3.63, p < .001 \)). Conversely, they indicated that their decision was (or would be) motivated by macrojustice considerations marginally less when choosing between individuals (\( M = 3.89, SD = 1.93 \)) than when choosing between equivalent policies (\( M = 4.14, SD = 1.91 \); \( t[800] = 1.80, p = .072 \)).

**Mediation analysis.** We also tested whether the data were consistent with the proposed causal model in which the effect of making an individual versus policy decision on choosing the higher-scoring, higher-income option was mediated by one’s macrojustice and microjustice concerns (Hypothesis 2; see Figure 1). Assuming this causal model, we conducted mediation analysis setting the choice of applicant or policy as the dependent variable (1 = higher-scoring, higher-income option, 0 = lower-scoring, lower-income option), the type of decision as the independent variable (1 = individual, 0 = policy), and the microjustice and macrojustice scales as simultaneous mediators. We ran the model using the PROCESS Macro for SPSS (Model 4, Hayes, 2018), which allowed us to estimate the indirect effect using a percentile bootstrap estimation approach with 10,000 samples.

We found that participants making the individual decision, as compared to the policy one, were significantly more motivated by microjustice concerns (\( b = 0.28, p < .001 \)), which were significantly associated with a higher likelihood of choosing the higher-scoring, higher-income option (\( b = 0.70, p < .001 \); microjustice indirect effect = 0.20, 95% CI = [0.08, 0.33]). Furthermore, participants making the individual decision, compared to the policy decision, were marginally less motivated by macrojustice concerns (\( b = -0.25, p = .072 \)), which were significantly associated with a lower likelihood of choosing the higher-scoring, higher-income option (\( b = -1.15, p < .001 \)). However, due to the marginal effect of condition on macrojustice, the confidence intervals for the indirect effect did not omit zero (macrojustice indirect effect = 0.28, 95% CI = [-0.03, 0.60]). The indirect effects partially account for the relationship between making an individual versus a policy decision and decision-makers’ choices. For completeness, we also depict the correlations between decision type, choice, macrojustice, and microjustice in Table A1 of Appendix A.

**Discussion**

In Study 3, we tested Hypothesis 2, whether a relative reliance on microjustice versus macrojustice accounts for the relationship between making individual versus policy decisions and the likelihood of favoring higher-achieving, advantaged individuals over lower-achieving, disadvantaged individuals. We found that decision-makers’ microjustice concerns, but not their macrojustice concerns, significantly mediated the relationship between making a policy decision versus an individual decision and their choice of applicant or policy. Overall, these results are consistent with Hypothesis 2. Indeed, in the individual condition, participants prioritized microjustice over macrojustice more than they did in the policy condition, although the absolute prioritization of macrojustice was only marginally different across conditions (interaction between judgment type [microjustice vs. macrojustice] and condition: \( p = .002 \)). Furthermore, participants’ prioritization of both microjustice and macrojustice predicted choice.6

We note, however, that our evidence of mediation in this study was also affected by whether the microjustice and macrojustice questions came before or after making a choice. Specifically, we found support for both microjustice and macrojustice as mediators when participants made their choice first and then considered how much it was motivated by microjustice and macrojustice. However, when participants considered how much their decision would be motivated by those concerns before making a choice, we did not find evidence of mediation through either microjustice or macrojustice (see SM 1.3 for details of these analyses). The naturally occurring differences between policy and individual decisions may have been muted by participants considering the macrojustice and microjustice questions before making a choice. In other words, explicitly considering the hypothesized mechanism for the decisions prior to making a choice may have made

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6 Notably, in other studies where we tested Hypothesis 2—albeit with earlier, unvalidated measures of microjustice and macrojustice—we also found evidence of mediation through both microjustice and macrojustice (see Study 4 and Study S7 in SM 2.7) and of an association between microjustice, macrojustice, and choice (see Study S8 in SM 2.8).
the choices for each decision more alike. Indeed, the gap between policy and individual decisions itself, which is well-documented in our other experiments, was not significantly different when participants made their choice after the macrojustice and microjustice items. This attenuation of the gap may be particularly likely when participants consider macrojustice, which is typically less focal than microjustice (as evidenced by the mean levels of each) but more predictive of choice. We test this possibility directly—whether focusing participants on macrojustice concerns across conditions attenuates the policy–people gap—in Study 4.

We also found that the policy–people gap replicated overall even when policies and individual decisions had identical consequences. These results suggest that the mere notion that one is making a policy decision, as opposed to just a decision between two individuals, can be enough to create a discrepancy in choice and fairness between the two decision contexts. This result suggests that the policy–people gap cannot be explained by structural differences between the decisions, such as the number of people they affect and the identifiability of those people. Because the decisions had equivalent consequences, this gap also cannot be explained by previous accounts of discrepancies between the endorsement of broader principles and their implementation, such as decision-makers disagreeing with specific implementations of their principles (Dixon et al., 2007) or principles appearing to be less zero-sum than individual decisions (Ballinger & Crocker, 2020; Read & Loevenstein, 1995; Ritov & Zamir, 2014).

STUDY 4: AN INTERVENTION TO ALIGN CHOICES

In Study 4, we tested an intervention to align policy and individual choices (Hypothesis 3). The intervention had decision-makers learn about both macrojustice and microjustice standards of fairness and asked them to make decisions that prioritized the macrojustice standard. We predicted that asking decision-makers to focus on the macrojustice standard would affect individual decisions more than policy decisions because policy decisions are already motivated by macrojustice to a greater extent than individual decisions are. Because the intervention sought to manipulate the hypothesized mechanism underlying the gap between individual and policy decisions, it also allowed us to test Hypothesis 2 through moderation. Although the results of Study 3 implicate microjustice and macrojustice as potential mediators, they do not actually establish a causal relationship. Study 4 addressed this limitation, thus providing stronger evidence of the causal pathway between the type of decision, macrojustice, and microjustice, and decision-makers’ choices. We preregistered this study on AsPredicted.org (https://aspredicted.org/HIV_PJN).

Methods

Participants. We recruited online participants on Prolific Academic for a small monetary sum. We estimated the sample size we would require in order to be powered to detect a significant two-way interaction where the policy–people gap was attenuated by one-third. With effect sizes informed by our previous studies and pilots (i.e., $d = 0.9$ in the control condition vs. $d = 0.6$ in the intervention condition), we determined we would need 1,400 participants (where $\text{power} = 0.80$ and $\alpha = .05$). Since we required a large sample size, the only criteria for inclusion were that participants were based in the United States and had at least a college degree (so that they were familiar with college admissions). As indicated in our preregistration, we excluded participants who were not able to see a sample table of information (as in Study 3), failed one of five attention and comprehension checks, or who answered the three questions about macrojustice and microjustice in under 6 seconds. Two checks were about the scenario and the information presented; these were identical to Study 3’s checks. The remaining three checks sought to ensure that participants paid attention to the intervention and understood its content: “Were you asked to prioritize one of the views of fairness?” (“Yes, the micro view of fairness,” “Yes, the macro view of fairness,” or “No, I was simply asked to be conscious of them”), “Which of these best describes the micro view of fairness?” (“It is focused on the allocation of admission spots to individual applicants” or “It is focused on the overall allocation of admissions spots”), and “Which of these best describes the macro view of fairness?” (the same answer options were provided as in

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7 For robustness, we also conducted our analyses including the 61 participants (4% of the sample) who answered the questions in under 6 seconds. All results were practically identical. For example, in the control condition, participants choosing between individuals chose the higher-scoring, higher-income option at a significantly higher rate (54.48% with these participants vs. 54.69% without them) than participants choosing between policies (29.11% vs. 28.92%; $p < .001$ for both).
Panel A. Text read by all participants

Guidance on undergraduate admissions decisions

The Office of the University President has developed the following guidance for making fair undergraduate admissions decisions. There are limited spots available at our university and an increasing number of qualified applicants competing for these spots. We know that it is difficult to decide which applicants to admit and that there are multiple perspectives on how to make fair admissions decisions.

People can have different views on what is fair. When it comes to admitting college applicants, we consider that there are two main views of what it means to admit applicants fairly. One perspective—the micro view—is focused on what is fair to the applicants themselves, whereas the other perspective—the macro view—is focused on what is fair for society.

The micro view is focused on the allocation of admissions spots to individual applicants. Under this view, admissions decisions are fair if they are based on the merits of the applicants being evaluated, such as their accomplishments and qualifications. Fairness is defined as the degree to which the admissions process involves recognizing applicants' merits and rewarding them in kind. This means that admissions officers should make admissions decisions that correspond to individual applicants' level of merit.

The macro view is focused on the overall allocation of admissions spots. Under this view, admissions decisions are fair if they lead to an ideal distribution of admitted students. Fairness is defined as the degree to which admissions decisions create an ideal distribution of college admission offers, for example, by creating equality across different groups, by accurately representing society as a whole, or by diversifying the current college landscape. This means that admissions officers should make admissions decisions that help accomplish an ideal allocation of admission spots in society.

Panel B. Text read only by Control participants

Guidance on undergraduate admissions decisions

We recognize that both of these standards are justifiable, but they are also imperfect.

This means that, as an admissions officer, you should simply be conscious of these two views as you make whatever admissions decisions you deem appropriate.

Panel C. Text read only by Macrojustice participants

Guidance on undergraduate admissions decisions

We recognize that both of these standards are justifiable, but they are also imperfect.

**Nonetheless, at our university, we prioritize the macro view.**

We believe that barriers continue to exist in society that prevent college admissions from reflecting the ideal of equal opportunity. Therefore, we seek to create a class of admitted students that is fair by taking into account what the admitted class should look like.

This means that, as an admissions officer, you should make admissions decisions that help accomplish a fair allocation of admission spots.

Notes: Participants in the control and macrojustice conditions read the introductory text (Panel A) before reading their condition-specific guidance (either Panel B or Panel C). After reading this information, participants made a decision about which individual applicant to admit or which admissions policy to select.
the preceding check). Our final sample comprised 1,346 participants ($M_{age} = 34.39, SD = 12.58; 48.66\%$ female).

**Procedure and materials.** We randomly assigned participants to a condition from a 2 (decision type: individual or policy) $\times$ 2 (intervention: control or macrojustice) between-subjects design. As in Studies 1 and 3, we asked all participants to imagine that they were the head of admissions at a four-year university and had to make decisions about which applicants to admit. In all conditions, we presented participants with the same table of information as in Study 1 and counterbalanced whether the higher-scoring, higher-income option or the lower-scoring, lower-income option was labeled “A” and appeared on the left.

The control and macrojustice versions of the individual and policy conditions were identical to the individual and policy conditions tested in Study 1 (without the within-subjects portion), except they also had participants read about macrojustice and microjustice views of fairness and receive guidance on how to make their decisions. Before seeing any information about the individual applicants or policies, participants were told that the “Office of the University President has developed guidance for making admissions decisions.” All participants then read a description of the macrojustice and microjustice views of fairness. Control participants were told that “both of these standards are justifiable, but they are also imperfect,” so they “should simply be conscious of these two views as they make whatever admissions decision they deem appropriate.” Macrojustice participants were told that “at our university, we prioritize the macro view” of fairness and that they “should make admissions decisions that help accomplish a fair allocation of admission spots.” We depict the full text of the control and macrojustice conditions in Figure 3.

After reading the guidance about how to make admissions decisions and examining the table of information about the applicants or policies, participants selected one of the two applicants or policies (forced choice: A or B), indicated which applicant or policy was the fairer one to select (forced choice: A or B), and reported how likely they were to pick either option on a scale of 1 (*much more likely to choose A*) to 7 (*much more likely to choose B*). They also reported how much their decision was motivated by concerns related to the macrojustice and microjustice views of fairness, using an abbreviated scale. Specifically, on a scale from 1 (*not at all*) to 7 (*extremely*), participants reported how much their decision was motivated by two macrojustice concerns (“creating equality” and “increasing diversity”) and one microjustice concern (“rewarding applicants for their accomplishments”). We averaged the macrojustice items into a composite (r = .82). Although these items were not validated (unlike those in Study 3), they tap into core aspects of microjustice and macrojustice and are similar to Study 3’s items. Participants also provided demographic information (age, gender, race or ethnicity, level of education, income, and political attitudes).

**Results**

**Choice.** In the control condition, participants choosing between individuals chose the higher-scoring, higher-income option at a significantly higher rate (54.69%) than participants choosing between policies (28.92%; $\chi^2 [1, 716] = 48.32, p < .001$). In the macrojustice condition, participants choosing between individuals also chose the higher-scoring, higher-income option at a significantly higher rate (41.18%) than participants choosing between policies (26.90%; $\chi^2 [1, 630] = 14.10, p < .001$), but this difference was smaller than in the control condition. We depict these results in Figure 4.

Consistent with our preregistration, to test whether the macrojustice intervention significantly attenuated the gap between the individual and policy decisions, we conducted an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression$^8$ on the choice of applicant or policy ($1 = $ higher-scoring, higher-income option; $0 = $ lower-scoring, lower-income option), using decision type ($1 = $ individual, $0 = $ policy), intervention ($1 = $ macrojustice, $0 = $ control), and the decision type $\times$ intervention interaction as independent variables. The coefficient on decision type was significant ($b = 0.26, p < .001$), indicating that participants in the control condition who made a choice about individuals were significantly more likely to select the higher-scoring, higher-income option than participants who made a choice about policies (54.69% vs. 28.92%). The coefficient for the intervention was not significant ($b = -0.02, p = .597$), indicating that the policy decisions in the control and macrojustice conditions (28.92% vs. 26.90%) were not

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$^8$ Per the recommendations of Gomila (2021), we conducted an OLS regression, rather than a nonlinear regression, to estimate treatment effects on binary outcomes. Nevertheless, we repeated this analysis with a logistic regression and found the same pattern of results.
significantly different. The absence of an effect of the intervention on the policy decisions suggests that policy decisions are naturally motivated by macro-justice concerns. In contrast, we found a significant interaction of decision type × intervention ($b = -0.12, p = .027$), indicating that the intervention shifted choices significantly more for decisions about individuals (54.69% vs. 41.18%) than policies (28.92% vs. 26.90%). This result also indicates that the macrojustice intervention brought individual decisions closer in line with policy decisions.

**Likelihood.** As with choice, in the control condition, participants reported a greater likelihood of choosing the higher-scoring, higher-income option when choosing between individuals ($M = 4.24, SD = 1.95$) than between policies ($M = 3.11, SD = 1.89; t[714] = 7.81, p < .001$). In the macrojustice condition, participants also reported a greater likelihood of choosing the higher-scoring, higher-income option when choosing between individuals ($M = 3.78, SD = 2.02$) than between policies ($M = 3.11, SD = 1.97; t[628] = 4.19, p < .001$), but this difference was smaller than in the control condition. We conducted the same OLS regression as with choice, and we found the same pattern of results: a significant decision type coefficient ($b = 1.13, p < .001$), a null intervention coefficient ($b = -0.00, p = .997$), and a significant decision type × intervention coefficient ($b = -0.46, p = .033$).

**Fair choice.** As with choice, in the control condition, participants choosing between individuals indicated that the higher-scoring, higher-income option was the fair choice at a significantly higher rate (59.90%) than participants choosing between policies (27.11%; $\chi^2[1, 716] = 77.44, p < .001$). The control results were similar to those in the macrojustice condition (individual: 53.24% vs. policy: 28.28%; $\chi^2[1, 630] = 40.09, p < .001$), but the difference between the control and macrojustice conditions was not as pronounced as with choice. An OLS regression with the same format as the choice regression supports this pattern: a significant decision type coefficient ($b = 0.33, p < .001$), a null intervention coefficient ($b = 0.01, p = .759$), and a null decision type × intervention coefficient ($b = -0.08, p = .132$). The null interaction coefficient here suggests that the macrojustice intervention did not shift participants’ judgments about which choice was the fair one to make.

**Mediation analysis.** We also tested whether the data were consistent with the proposed causal model in which the effect of making an individual versus policy decision on choosing the higher-scoring, higher-income option was mediated by one’s macrojustice and microjustice concerns.
(Hypothesis 2; see Figure 1). Additionally, we tested whether having participants rely on the same standard of fairness would attenuate the difference between the individual versus policy decisions on choosing the higher-scoring, higher-income option. Assuming our proposed causal model, we conducted binary moderated mediation analysis, setting the choice of applicant or policy as the dependent variable (1 = higher-scoring, higher-income option, 0 = lower-scoring, lower-income option), the type of decision as the independent variable (1 = individual, 0 = policy), the macrojustice composite and the single microjustice item as simultaneous mediators, and the intervention as a moderator (1 = macro, 0 = control). We ran the model using the PROCESS Macro for SPSS (Model 8, Hayes, 2018), which allowed us to estimate the indirect effects using a percentile bootstrap estimation approach with 10,000 samples.

Control participants making the individual decision, as compared to the policy one, were significantly more motivated by microjustice concerns ($b = 0.35, p = .002$), which were significantly associated with a higher likelihood of choosing the higher-scoring, higher-income option ($b = 0.84, p < .001$; control microjustice indirect effect = 0.30, 95% CI = [0.11, 0.50]). Unlike in Study 3, control participants making the individual decision, as compared to the policy decision, were also significantly less motivated by macrojustice concerns ($b = -0.81, p < .001$), which were associated with a lower likelihood of choosing the higher-scoring, higher-income option ($b = -0.87, p < .001$; control macrojustice indirect effect = 0.70, 95% CI = [0.47, 0.99]).

For macrojustice participants, the indirect effect of macrojustice was smaller than for the control participants, yet it still omitted zero (macro macrojustice indirect effect = 0.37, 95% CI = [0.12, 0.63]; index of moderated mediation = -.34, 95% CI = [-0.70, -0.01]). The indirect effect of microjustice was also smaller than for control participants, but it did not omit zero (macro microjustice indirect effect = -0.02, 95% CI = [-0.24, 0.20]; index of moderated mediation = -0.32, 95% CI = [-0.62, -0.04]). The indices of moderated mediation omitted zero, suggesting that the macro intervention attenuated the gap in choice between individual and policy decisions because it reduced—though it did not completely eliminate—the degree to which decision-makers’ standards of fairness shifted across the decision contexts. For completeness, in Table A1 of Appendix A, we also depict the correlations between decision type, choice, macrojustice, and microjustice, both overall and splitting the data based on the presence of the intervention.

Discussion

As in the previous studies, participants who made decisions about individuals favored the higher-scoring, higher-income applicant at a higher rate than participants who made decisions about policies. In support of Hypothesis 2, we found that the choice difference between the individual and policy decisions in the control condition was mediated by the degree to which participants were motivated by microjustice and macrojustice. We also found that this difference was attenuated when participants were asked to make decisions that helped accomplish their institution’s priority of a macrojustice standard of fairness, providing causal evidence for our theoretical model. Specifically, this led decision-makers choosing between individuals to select the lower-scoring, lower-income applicant at a higher rate, thus bringing choices about individuals closer in line with decisions about policies. Notably, the intervention did not shift policy decisions, which suggests that policy decisions were already naturally motivated by macrojustice concerns.

This study also provided support for Hypothesis 3 and, in doing so, showed the promise of a simple, face-valid intervention to align policy and individual choices. The intervention tested here simply had participants learn about macrojustice and microjustice and then asked them to prioritize the macrojustice standard of fairness. This was enough to reduce the policy–people gap by about half, so this intervention may be an attractive medium for organizations to improve the alignment between their selection policies and the individual decisions those policies intend to influence. That said, this intervention did not shift participants’ views about the fair choice to make, which is likely beyond the scope of a low-touch intervention like this one.

GENERAL DISCUSSION

The present research documents and explains a gap between organizational selection policies and individual selection decisions. Decision-makers choose policies that do not favor the same applicants that they choose when deciding between specific applicants. Instead, decision-makers are more likely to choose selection policies that favor lower-achieving, disadvantaged applicants over higher-achieving, advantaged applicants than they are to
select specific lower-achieving, disadvantaged applicants. We found this gap among 15 out of 16 preregistered studies, with samples of admissions officers responsible for making admissions decisions (Study 1), employees in technology occupations (Study 2), and lay people (Studies 3-4). We also found support for our theoretical account of the policy–people gap. We theorized that when people make (a) individual selection decisions, compared to policy decisions, they rely more on microjustice relative to macrojustice and that (b) a greater relative reliance on microjustice than macrojustice is associated with favoring higher-achieving, advantaged applicants over lower-achieving, disadvantaged ones. Studies 3 and 4 support this account, both through mediation analysis and by manipulating decision-makers’ reliance on macrojustice. Overall, our results strongly implicate a differential reliance on microjustice and macrojustice as explaining, at least in part, the policy–people gap.

We also developed an intervention that helped align choices about policies and individuals. In Study 4 we had decision-makers learn about both macrojustice and microjustice standards of fairness and then make decisions that helped accomplish their institution’s priority of macrojustice. This simple, transparent intervention roughly halved the size of the policy–people gap, thus providing an easy way for organizations to try to align their selection policies and individual selection decisions. While the intervention did help align choices, it did not align decision-makers’ underlying views about fairness, so it may not be effective at helping mitigate conflict around how one should make these decisions. An alternative intervention might be more effective, but decision-makers’ views about the appropriate standard of fairness for each decision may also not be very flexible. However, it is encouraging that decision-makers are able to override these beliefs and choose consistently with the standards put forth by their organizations, especially in the case of organizations seeking to increase the representation of disadvantaged individuals in college and the workplace. This is particularly important because a series of fair individual decisions, in the microjustice sense, can lead to an aggregate result that is not seen as fair in the macrojustice sense.

Supplementary findings

We document the robustness of the policy–people gap across multiple supplementary studies. Specifically, we find that the policy–people gap replicates across a wide range of applicant profiles (Studies S1 and S3); when we describe policies more naturalistically (Study S3) or as rules (Study S6); and with different forms of advantage and disadvantage including gender (Studies 2 and S5), high school graduation rate (Study S3), and household income (all other studies). The gap also persists in both between- and within-subjects designs (Study 1) and when we compare both single and repeated decisions (Study S2). See Table A2 of Appendix A for the key findings of each study we conducted and see the supplementary materials for further detail on all studies and additional analyses.

We also conducted an internal meta-analysis of all preregistered studies that tested Hypothesis 1 in order to identify a precise effect size estimate, which can be a useful benchmark for future researchers examining factors that systematically influence selection decisions. A random-effects model, which included a total of 8,653 participants, revealed a significant effect size for decision type on choice (odds ratio = 2.46, 95% CI = [2.02, 3.00], z = 8.99, p < .001, Q(15) = 65.58, p < .001). This result shows that, overall, the odds of favoring the lower-achieving, disadvantaged option were 2.46 times higher when choosing policies than when choosing individuals; these are equivalent to the odds of favoring the higher-scoring, advantaged option when choosing individuals than when choosing policies.9

The effect size also reveals that the magnitude of the policy–people gap is relatively large. To contextualize its magnitude, we can compare it to research that has examined the selection of marginalized candidates. In eminent work on race and hiring decisions, Bertrand and Mullainathan (2004) found that the odds of an applicant with a White-sounding name receiving a call back was 1.55 times higher than of an applicant with a Black-sounding name. Another prominent example concerns the impact of blind auditions in remedying gender-biased hiring: the odds of a woman passing an orchestra audition was blind versus not blind (Goldin & Rouse, 2000). In the case of hiring for technology positions, the odds of hiring a woman were 1.05 times higher.

9 The magnitude of the policy–people gap was similar across the manuscript studies (odds ratio = 2.27, 95% CI = [1.48, 3.46], z = 3.79, p < .001, Q(3) = 14.79, p = .002; n = 2,058) and the supplementary studies (odds ratio = 2.54, 95% CI = [2.04, 3.17], z = 8.33, p < .001, Q(11) = 43.83, p < .001; n = 6,595).
when researchers prompted people to increase the number of candidates on their hiring shortlist versus when people relied on their original shortlist (Lucas, Berry, Giurge, & Chugh, 2021). The overall size of the policy–people gap we identify is large in relation to these examples. Curiously, the most pared down version of a policy decision we tested (in Study 3), where selecting a policy had identical consequences as choosing an individual, created a gap of a similar magnitude as these examples (odds ratio as choosing an individual, created a gap of a similar version of a policy decision we tested (in Study 3), to these examples. Curiously, the most pared down the policy gap because of the relatively large impact it has on people’s decisions about who to select.

Across our studies (specifically, Studies S2, S4–S7, and S10–S13), we also explored a range of alternative mechanisms for the policy–people gap and found limited support for them. For example, we did not find support that the policy–people gap could be explained as a conflict between what one wants to do and what one thinks one should do (Milkman et al., 2008), by differences in beliefs about the relationship between (dis)advantage and achievement across the decisions (Critcher & Dunning, 2013; O’Laughlin & Malle, 2002), or by differences in the degree to which the decisions are perceived as zero-sum (Ballinger & Crocker, 2020). In contrast, we not only found support for the role of microjustice and macrojustice in explaining the gap (Studies 3–4), but also for our broader theorizing that policy decisions are construed more abstractly than individual decisions. To test for potential differences in construal level, we examined participants’ textual explanations (n = 3,725) for why they selected the applicant and policy that they did (we have these data in Studies 2, S1, S3–S6, S10, S12, and S13). We used an online construal scoring tool (Humphreys, Isaac, & Wang, 2021) to measure the construal level reflected in participants’ responses. We found that participants’ explanations for their policy decisions reflected a more abstract construal than their explanations for individual decisions (see SM 4 for details).

Theoretical and Practical Contributions

Theoretically, this work identifies a novel gap between whom decision-makers select through their policies and through their specific selection decisions, and it provides a theoretical account for why this gap occurs. Decision-makers focus on what is fair to do across both policy and individual decisions, but they rely on different standards of fairness. This account provides a novel explanation for the known gaps between principles and their implementation, such as those concerning racial equality and diversity (e.g., Bell & Hartmann, 2007; Dixon et al., 2007; Smith & Mayorga-Gallo, 2017; Yogeeswaran & Dasgupta, 2014).

In contrast to existing work suggesting that decision-makers fail to think through the implementation of their principles (Bell & Hartmann, 2007; Smith & Mayorga-Gallo, 2017) or are influenced by temptation or cognitive blind spots when making isolated decisions (Bazerman & Tenbrunsel, 2011; Milkman et al., 2008), our account explains how policies and individual decisions can diverge, even when decision-makers do think carefully about their choices and choose what they think is right. The relatively more abstract nature of policies (and principles, more broadly) shifts how much decision-makers rely on different standards of fairness when deciding what is right. Our theoretical account advances our understanding of ethical decision-making, fairness, and preference reversals in addition to contributing to the limited psychological research to date that has examined how decision-makers think about and create policies (e.g., Evers, Inbar, Blanken, & Oosterwijk, 2016; Nakashima, Daniels, & Laurin, 2017; Ritov & Zamir, 2014). Our work reveals how and why a common organizational tool—a selection policy—can lead to discrepant decisions relative to the subordinate decisions that a policy intends to influence.

This work also highlights the importance of studying macrojustice and microjustice within organizational contexts and facilitates their future application by developing valid scales to measure them. While these concepts have been used to examine affirmative action policies (Bobocel, Son Hing, Holmval, & Zanna, 2002; Zdaniuk & Bobocel, 2011), to our knowledge, they have not been used to examine other organizational and public policy allocations (e.g., scarce medical resources, visas, and promotions). Indeed, it still appears true today, just as it was 30 years ago, that there is “a shortage of scholarship aimed at understanding how macro-level concerns (including societal-level inequalities) shape allocative processes within organizations and, conversely, how inequalities and injustices within organizations influence the broader society” (Baron & Cook, 1992: 196).

Though organizational scholars have long been focused on the construct of justice, those investigations have primarily focused on procedural and
distributive justice (for reviews, see Colquitt et al., 2001; Colquitt et al., 2013). These constructs have greatly furthered our collective understanding of a range of organizational outcomes, including job satisfaction (McFarlin & Sweeney, 1992), job performance (Colquitt, LePine, Piccolo, Zapata, & Rich, 2012), and support for organizations and institutions (e.g., Sunshine & Tyler, 2003). However, these forms of justice are less useful for understanding how people conceptualize fairness at varying levels (e.g., for society versus individuals). Even decisions that are judged to be procedurally and distributively fair may lead to distributions that are not judged to be fair at a macro level. For example, even though decision-makers might agree that college admissions procedures are made free of individual bias and based on accurate information (procedurally fair), as well as in line with applicants’ performance and effort (distributively fair), they may nevertheless judge the resulting distribution of admitted applicants to be unfair, per their macrojustice concerns.

To understand situations such as this one, macrojustice and its counterpart, microjustice, should be considered. Moreover, the constructs of macrojustice and microjustice may be particularly helpful to study situations in which systemic inequality and structural differences between groups (e.g., in skill-building opportunities, encouragement, or inclusion) create differences in merit, thereby creating a tension between what is fair to individuals (per a microjustice concern for merit) and in society or organizations (per several possible macrojustice concerns, like equality or diversity). We facilitate future efforts to leverage these constructs by presenting validated scales of microjustice and macrojustice within selection contexts.

Practically, we uncover insights that can help organizations improve the correspondence between their selection policies—a ubiquitous and necessary organizational tool—and the subordinate decisions they intend to influence. Understanding why these decisions diverge in college admissions and workplace hiring can help create interventions to bridge the gap and thus better accomplish organizational and societal goals, such as increasing diversity and reducing inequality. Mitigating the gaps in these contexts is particularly important because they represent key moments of social and economic stratification. To that end, we tested a theory-based intervention that asked decision-makers to rely on their organization’s macrojustice standard of fairness. This straightforward intervention reduced the policy–people gap by about half and led to a greater number of selection decisions favoring disadvantaged individuals. We hope this intervention and its underlying theory is of use to practitioners and scholars alike.

**Limitations and Future Directions**

While this research found support for the proposed hypotheses, it did so with several limitations. One limitation is that we relied on vignette studies to document the policy–people gap. While this approach allowed us to control the differences between the policy and individual decisions, it is low in external validity compared to, for example, examining policy and individual decisions in situ. However, additional recall studies with college admissions officers (Study S15) and management faculty (Study S14) revealed that the vignettes we used across studies accurately reflect real trade-offs that actual decision-makers face. Relatedly, we restricted our operationalization of policies to fit within this research approach. We held constant the information between policy and individual decisions in order to cleanly compare them. This afforded us careful experimental control at the expense of external validity. Nevertheless, we are encouraged by the results of Studies S2 and S3, where the policy–people gap replicates with richer, more naturalistic implementations of individuals and policies. Future work should examine the policy–people gap in more naturalistic settings with more externally valid stimuli.

A second limitation is that our studies did not directly test or measure differences in construal level, only differences in the reliance on microjustice and macrojustice. However, the exploratory analysis of participants’ explanations for their choices (see the Supplementary Findings section) is consistent with our theorizing. This is a promising preliminary finding, but more research is necessary to test whether construal level is indeed implicated, as we theorize. Investigating this question would not only test our theoretical account but also potentially shed light on a current debate about the effects of construal level on fairness and values (Alper, 2020).

Another limitation is that our studies rely on only a subset of possible macrojustice and microjustice principles. Therefore, while we propose that macrojustice and microjustice standards of fairness underlie the policy–people gap, it is possible that only egalitarian principles of macrojustice and meritocratic principles of microjustice underlie the gap, rather than macrojustice and microjustice as a whole. This ambiguity exists in our studies, as well as in other investigations of
fairness standards that rely on specific operationalizations (e.g., distributive justice is frequently operationalized as an equity principle; Colquitt, 2001), because meritocratic and (sometimes) egalitarian considerations are the relevant ones in most workplace contexts. Future research examining macrojustice and microjustice should consider contexts in which macrojustice and microjustice align with other principles (e.g., where microjustice aligns with need, as may be the case in aid and helping decisions). Studying microjustice and macrojustice across a broader range of contexts has the potential to further clarify their role in the policy–people gap and in other decision-making contexts.

One avenue for future research into the policy–people gap is to understand how personal characteristics influence it. Across our studies, we collected a number of individual-level demographic factors, namely, gender, age, race, income, education, and political attitudes. The policy–people gap was not clearly moderated by any of these factors except education. For example, for college admissions decisions that highlighted socioeconomic disadvantage and advantage, highly educated decision-makers were more likely to favor the higher-scoring, advantaged person when choosing between individuals, leading to a larger policy–people gap. We encourage future researchers to further examine how and why personal characteristics influence the policy–people gap.

CONCLUSION

This paper provides robust evidence for a policy–people gap, whereby decision-makers favor different individuals when making decisions about policies versus decisions about specific individuals. Specifically, decision-makers select policies that favor lower-achieving, disadvantaged individuals, but when selecting specific individuals, they favor higher-achieving, advantaged ones. This gap occurs because policy decisions shift the standards of fairness that motivate decision-makers’ choices. However, the gap between decision-makers’ policy and individual choices can be attenuated by asking decision-makers to be consistent with their organization’s standard of fairness. Overall, this paper helps us understand why individual selection decisions diverge from espoused organizational policies and suggests one way to close this gap, therefore helping to increase the representation of disadvantaged groups in organizations.

REFERENCES


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Emma E. Levine (Emma.Levine@chicagobooth.edu) is an associate professor of behavioral science and the Charles E. Merrill faculty scholar at the University of Chicago Booth School of Business. She studies the psychology of altruism, trust, and ethical dilemmas. She holds a PhD from The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania.
APPENDIX A: ADDITIONAL FIGURES AND TABLES

FIGURE A1
Forest Plot of Internal Meta-Analysis on Choice (Studies 1–4, S1–S8, S10–S13)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Study</th>
<th>Odds Ratio (95% CI)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>4.07 (2.18, 7.60)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.64 (1.07, 2.50)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>1.56 (1.18, 2.06)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>2.97 (2.17, 4.05)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S1</td>
<td>3.66 (3.04, 4.41)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S2</td>
<td>2.52 (1.94, 3.26)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S3</td>
<td>5.20 (3.53, 7.65)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S4</td>
<td>2.69 (1.80, 4.01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S5</td>
<td>1.67 (1.17, 2.38)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S6</td>
<td>2.99 (1.97, 4.54)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S7</td>
<td>1.69 (1.05, 2.71)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S8</td>
<td>1.81 (1.08, 3.03)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S10</td>
<td>3.05 (1.88, 4.95)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S11</td>
<td>3.02 (1.67, 5.46)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S12</td>
<td>1.37 (0.86, 2.17)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S13</td>
<td>2.50 (1.54, 4.05)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall (I-squared = 77.1%)</td>
<td>2.46 (2.02, 3.00)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Odds ratios indicate the odds of favoring the lower-achieving, disadvantaged option when choosing policies versus when choosing individuals. Squares show effect-size estimates (odds ratios). Error bars show 95% confidence intervals (CIs). The diamond represents the meta-analytic effect size estimate and 95% CI. Weights are from a random-effects model.
### TABLE A1
Correlations between Key Independent and Dependent Variables (Studies 3–4)

**Panel A. Study 3**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Decision Type</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Choice</td>
<td>0.11**</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Microjustice</td>
<td>0.13**</td>
<td>0.33***</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Macrojustice</td>
<td>-0.06†</td>
<td>-0.67***</td>
<td>-0.21***</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Panel B. Study 4**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>1a</th>
<th>1b</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Decision Type</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1a. When Macro = Control</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1b. When Macro = Intervention</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Choice</td>
<td>0.21***</td>
<td>0.26***</td>
<td>0.15***</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Microjustice</td>
<td>0.05*</td>
<td>0.12**</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
<td>-0.49***</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Macrojustice</td>
<td>-0.17***</td>
<td>-0.22***</td>
<td>-0.11**</td>
<td>-0.60***</td>
<td>-0.31***</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Notes:**
- n = 802 (Study 3) and n = 1346 (Study 4). Decision type was coded “1” for the individual condition and “0” for the policy condition. Choice was coded “1” when selecting the higher-scoring, advantaged option and “0” when selecting the lower-scoring, disadvantaged option. Rows/Columns 1a and 1b of Panel B depict correlations between decision type and the other variables for each of the macro conditions (control and intervention).
- † p < .10
- * p < .05
- ** p < .01
- *** p < .001

### TABLE A2
Overview of Studies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Study</th>
<th>n</th>
<th>Main Finding or Purpose</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>190</td>
<td>Admissions officers favored higher-scoring, advantaged applicants over lower-scoring, disadvantaged applicants more often when selecting individual applicants than selecting policies.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2*</td>
<td>360</td>
<td>Tech employees favored higher-scoring, male applicants over lower-scoring, female applicants more often when selecting individuals to interview than when selecting interview policies.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>802</td>
<td>The policy–people gap established in Studies 1 and 2 replicated and was driven by reduced microjustice concerns when making policy decisions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>1,346</td>
<td>The policy–people gap was attenuated when decision-makers were asked to prioritize the macrojustice standard of fairness.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S1</td>
<td>2,016</td>
<td>The policy–people gap replicated with 24 out of 25 different combinations of applicant profiles.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S2</td>
<td>1,009</td>
<td>The policy–people gap replicated when participants made multiple individual decisions versus a policy decision followed by multiple decisions to fine-tune the policy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S3</td>
<td>603</td>
<td>The policy–people gap replicated describing policies broadly or specifically, as well as when the dis/advantage information concerned household income or high school graduation rates.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S4</td>
<td>807</td>
<td>The feature of policies that most affected choice was the framing of a decision as one about policies; less influential was the number of individuals affected and their identifiability.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S5*</td>
<td>859</td>
<td>The feature of policies that most affected choice was the framing of a decision as one about policies; less influential was the number of individuals affected.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S6</td>
<td>593</td>
<td>The policy–people gap replicated when policies were described as “rules.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S7</td>
<td>283</td>
<td>The policy–people gap replicated when policies had identical consequences as individual decisions and was driven by greater macrojustice concerns when making policy decisions. This study relied on preliminary macrojustice and microjustice scales.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S8</td>
<td>240</td>
<td>An initial (failed) development of macrojustice and microjustice scales. Making a policy versus individual decision did not influence these scales.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S9</td>
<td>149</td>
<td>We developed macrojustice and microjustice scales that correspond to those constructs and are moderately distinct from other related constructs (i.e., procedural and distributive justice).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S10</td>
<td>595</td>
<td>An intervention that highlighted the adversity that applicants have faced attenuated the policy–people gap.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S11</td>
<td>595</td>
<td>Instructing participants to rely on specific values when choosing individuals and to rely on objective information when choosing policies narrowed the policy–people gap.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Study</td>
<td>n</td>
<td>Main Finding or Purpose</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S12</td>
<td>298</td>
<td>We explored several alternative explanations of the policy–people gap.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S13</td>
<td>287</td>
<td>We explored several alternative explanations of the policy–people gap.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S14*</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>Management faculty report facing trade-offs between job candidates’ achievements and circumstances. Their focus on a macrojustice standard of fairness predicts their selection of a disadvantaged candidate over a candidate with slightly better objective metrics of achievement.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S15</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>Admissions officers report facing trade-offs between college applicants’ achievements and circumstances.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. All studies except S14 and S15 were preregistered.

* The context for Studies 2, S5, and S14 was workplace hiring. The context for all other studies was college admissions.