Retailers frequently employ dynamic pricing to effectively match supply with demand. Some retailers such as Amazon change prices very frequently, whereas others, especially those in fashion retail, change prices less frequently. In such scenarios, customers face both a price risk, i.e., that product price may decrease, and a quantity risk, i.e., the product may not be available in the future. At any given time, customers must make a *buy now or wait* decision by suitably weighting their estimates of these risks with their own value for the product. As one expects, a firm tends to have more information about its supply and aggregate demand than its customers, and thus is better informed of the potential future product availability. This leads to a natural information provision question: *How can a firm communicate this information in a profitable manner?*

One option is for firms to incorporate availability information into their pricing decision and use prices to signal it. Unfortunately, this leads to unprofitable price distortions. Another option is to use an additional communication channel to signal the availability information, for instance, an e-tailer may place a message “Limited Stock” next to the product under consideration. In this paper, we follow this latter approach, and use a Bayesian Persuasion framework to model the information provisioning game. In this framework, the firm commits to its signaling mechanism a priori, before realization of the underlying uncertainty. Our goal is to characterize the optimal signaling mechanism and evaluate its value for the firm. In all our analysis, we focus on posted/public prices. Motivated by e-tail settings in which firms may possess detailed information about each customer, we extend our signaling mechanisms to include the case of *personalized information provisioning* by allowing the retailer to potentially provide different signals to different customers.

We find that public information provisioning has limited value in this setting. However, personalized information provisioning has significant value. Somewhat surprisingly, we find that personalized information provisioning has attributes very similar to personalized pricing. In fact, for many problem parameters, personalized information sharing can reap the entire benefits of personalized pricing when persuading customers to buy early. In this fashion, our work suggests that personalized strategic information provisioning has potential, especially in e-tail scenarios where firms have information on customer willingness-to-pay as well as product attributes (such as availability), but are restricted to posted price mechanisms.