Core Values vs. Common Sense:
Consequentialist Views Appear Less Rooted in Morality

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Abstract

When a speaker presents an opinion, an important factor in audiences’ reactions is whether the speaker seems to be basing her decision on ethical (as opposed to more pragmatic) concerns. We argue that, despite a consequentialist philosophical tradition that views utilitarian consequences as the basis for moral reasoning, lay perceivers think that speakers using arguments based on consequences do not construe the issue as a moral one. Four experiments show that, for both political views (including real State of the Union quotations) and organizational policies, consequentialist views are seen to express less moralization than deontological views, and even sometimes than views presented with no explicit justification. We also demonstrate that perceived moralization in turn affects speakers’ perceived commitment to the issue and authenticity. These findings shed light on lay conceptions of morality and have practical implications for people considering how to express moral opinions publicly.

Keywords: morality, ethics/morality, social cognition, consequentialism, deontology
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Imagine two people who strongly support same-sex marriage but give different reasons for their views. One explains, “It would not harm anyone, gay people would be happier, and society would benefit from their investment in families and communities.” The other says, “Marriage is a basic right that same-sex couples deserve equally, and denying them this right is unjust and unfair.” Both speakers support same-sex marriage, but they justify their respective positions using distinct ethical arguments, easily recognizable as consequentialist (focusing on increasing aggregate welfare; e.g., Mill, 1899) and deontological (focusing on rights and justice; e.g., Kant, 2002). In theory, both approaches represent moral arguments, based on conceptions of the ultimate good, each with long traditions in moral philosophy. Yet we propose that, if asked which speaker treats same-sex marriage as a moral issue, lay audiences would predominantly point to the one who argued based on rights, not utility. We argue that consequentialist reasoning strips an argument of moral resonance by giving it the appearance of pragmatism and common sense. If you support a policy because it increases everyone’s happiness, your position does not seem ethically based, but merely practical.

Why Study Perceived Moralization?

An individual is said to moralize an issue when she bases her attitudes about that issue on her moral convictions (Rozin, 1999; Skitka et al., 2005); perceived moralization thus refers to the perception that someone else sees an issue as morally relevant, regardless of whether the target supports or opposes it.

Speakers perceived to moralize an issue are treated differently than are those whose positions seem merely pragmatic (see review in Kreps & Monin, 2011). On the positive side, moralization implies commitment, integrity, and good faith; on the negative side, moralizers appear inflexible or self-righteous. There may be truth to these perceptions: Attitudes that individuals report relating to their “core moral values” lead to deeper commitment and
corresponding behaviors than other strongly-held attitudes, (Mullen & Skitka, 2006; Skitka & Mullen, 2002; Skitka et al., 2005). Thus, individuals delivering public messages – whether to the American public or to their friends at dinner - would benefit from understanding what will lead their audiences to perceive them as moralizers, or conversely what suggests they are not moralizing an issue -- and thus are less committed to it. Testing whether consequentialist views appear less moralized also speaks to lay perceptions of ethical theories. Philosophers put deontological and consequentialist theories on equal footing as legitimate ethical foundations; exploring lay inferences of moralization from different types of arguments could determine whether lay perceivers depart from this view. In doing so, we contribute to a growing literature comparing lay intuitions to ethical theory (e.g., Sinnott-Armstrong, 2008).

Why Would Consequentialist Positions Appear Less Moralized?

Consequentialist opinions may sound amoral for three reasons: they may appear less abstract, less deontological, or more prudential. First, they sound concrete: a focus on harm and benefits sounds less abstract than a deontological emphasis on global rules, and people believe that morality is generally abstract and high-level (e.g., Eyal & Liberman, 2010). Second, they can imply a lack of appreciation for the inviolability of certain deontological rules: the quantitative, aggregation-based tradeoffs involved in consequentialist calculations may seem taboo in domains considered sacred (Tetlock et al., 2000) and can even make a target appear to lack moral concerns (Bartels & Pizarro, 2011; Koenigs et al., 2007). Third, while consequentialist arguments are not merely prudential or opportunistic (being concerned with costs and benefits to the aggregate, not just to the speaker), their superficial resemblance to self-interested arguments causes confusion; even Mill (1899, p.50) noted that some of his detractors persisted in the misapprehension that utilitarianism is based on selfish gain.

In summary, we propose that even if consequentialist, societal harm-and-benefit arguments are legitimately ethical from a philosophical standpoint, they are not perceived as such by lay individuals who infer instead that consequentialist speakers must not be guided by general
abstract principles (less deontological), and who confuse a focus on costs and benefit to society with a selfish concern for one’s welfare (more prudential). For these reasons, we predict that speakers expressing consequentialist arguments will not be perceived to base their view on morality as much as speakers presenting deontological arguments for the exact same position.

**Overview of Studies and Summary of Predictions**

Four studies tested the effect of consequentialist justifications on perceptions of moralization. Studies 1a and 1b, using two different samples and four political issues, tested the effect of adding consequentialist justifications compared to giving no justification. Study 2 used quotations from actual presidential speeches to replicate these effects and to show that consequentialist statements are also viewed as less moralized than deontological ones. It also provided evidence that speakers perceived to moralize are also seen as more committed to their cause. Study 3 turned to an organizational context and demonstrated that even consequentialist statements accompanied by a principled consequentialist premise are seen as less moral than deontological ones; it also tested inferences of a target’s privately held reasons as a possible mechanism, and it replicated the finding that perceived moralization leads to perceived commitment.

Our central hypothesis was that consequentialist positions would appear less based on morality than decisions not justified by consequences—specifically, compared to deontological positions (Studies 2-3) and positions given no explicit justification (all studies). We predicted that, while the contrast between consequentialist and deontological decisions would be greatest, adding consequentialist arguments could sometimes even appear less moralized than providing no justification at all—by making it clear that a target’s reasons are consequentialist, whereas the absence of justification may imply deontological arguments.

**Study 1**

Studies 1a and 1b, using similar methods but different participant populations and vignette contexts, tested the effects of giving consequentialist arguments compared to no explicit
justification. Participants read about two hypothetical individuals stating their opinions about novel political issues, where one (control) gave his opinion with no justification, and the other presented a consequentialist justification. We predicted that adding consequentialist justifications would make an argument seem less moralized.

**Method**

**Participants and design.** For Study 1a, 135 students (82 female, M_{age} = 20.26) took part in a paid mass questionnaire session. For Study 1b, 103 participants (63 female, M_{age} = 40.17) recruited from a US online participant pool maintained by a US business school participated for a chance to win a gift certificate. We are unaware of published power analysis methods for mixed effect designs such as ours. Note that, because the key manipulation was within-participants, we had 135 and 103 observations per cell, for a total sample of 270 and 206 observations in Studies 1a and 1b. This seemed like a reasonable starting sample size for our initial studies.

Participants each read about two speakers discussing two different issues. Justification (consequentialist vs. none) was manipulated within participants; between participants, we varied which of the two issues was given a consequentialist justification.

**Procedure and stimuli.** In Study 1a, targets were state senators commenting on ballot measures to either fund a mobile health care unit for the homeless or increase funding for arts programs at low-income schools. In Study 1b, the targets were identified by their first names only and stated their opinions as part of “a conversation”: the issues were cutting taxes for low-income individuals and Greece’s recognition of the Republic of Macedonia. See Appendix 1.

All participants saw the issues in the same order (1a: mobile health care, then arts funding; 1b: tax cut, then Macedonia), but we counterbalanced which issue was given a consequentialist justification. For example, half of Study 1a participants read the no-justification mobile health care vignette then the consequentialist arts funding vignette, and the other half read the consequentialist mobile health care vignette followed by the no-justification arts funding vignette.
After a brief introduction (e.g., in 1a, “State Senator Lonnie Haskew was asked to comment on Measure G, which would increase funding for fine and performing arts programs at the state's 20% lowest-income elementary schools.”), each quotation began and ended with a strong statement of the target’s view; in the consequentialist conditions, the target also provided consequentialist arguments in between. For example, one of the senators in 1a said (with the part in brackets omitted from the no-justification condition): "I support Measure G because it is a change we ought to make. [The students would benefit from having more arts education, and all of society can benefit from the talented artists who would be more likely to emerge from these schools. For these reasons,] it would simply be wrong not to pass this measure."

**Measures.** Following each vignette, participants answered questions on scales from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). Eight items, presented together in an individually randomized order, each measured either perceived consequentialism or perceived moralization (see Table 1). A Principal Axis factor analysis with Promax rotation (Russell, 2002) for each study revealed two factors confirming our intended constructs; however, we omitted one item that had weak loadings in both studies. The resulting three-item consequentialism measure (1a: $\alpha = .89$; 1b: $\alpha = .88$) and four-item moralization measure (1a: $\alpha = .90$; 1b: $\alpha = .85$) were moderately correlated (1a: $r = -.27$, 95% CI = [-.37, -.15]; 1b: $r = -.15$ [-.28, -.02]).

Next, we measured perceived attitude strength\(^1\) and participants’ agreement with targets,\(^2\) from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). In Study 1a, the attitude strength measure comprised two items (“Measure G is an important issue to the senator,” “The senator has strong feelings about Measure G”; $r = .74$ [.68, .79]) and agreement three items (“I agree with the

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\(^1\) Including perceived attitude strength enabled us to establish the specificity of the effect: as predicted, justification did not affect perceived attitude strength, controlling for perceived moralization, in either study, whereas justification did affect moralization when controlling for attitude strength (1a: $b = -.76$ [-.98, -.54]; 1b: $b = -.28$ [-.54, -.02]). Thus, we do not discuss this measure any further.

\(^2\) We measured perceived agreement as a control variable, to examine whether the effects of justification on moralization might be driven by participants agreeing (or perhaps disagreeing) more with targets they perceived to moralize. As predicted, justification remained a predictor even when we controlled for agreement; full results are in the supplementary analyses.
senator on this issue,” “The senator's arguments would be convincing to me,” “The senator's arguments would be convincing to other people”; $\alpha = .78$). In Study 1b, attitude strength was one item (“This issue is an important issue to Alex [Brian]”) and agreement was two items (“I agree with Alex [Brian] on this issue”; “I find Alex [Brian] quite convincing on this issue”; $r = .50 [.40, .60]$). In Study 1b, the attitude strength and agreement items were embedded among and presented in a random order with items intended to measure possible downstream effects of moralization (liking and closed-mindedness). Results for these additional items are reported in the methodology file and supplementary analyses.

At the end of the study, participants indicated their political orientation from 1 (extremely conservative) to 7 (extremely liberal). We measured political orientation because our stimuli were political in nature, and to rule out the possibility that liberals and conservatives attribute different degrees of moralization to consequentialist targets (cf. Graham et al., 2008). We did not expect moderating effects of political orientation.

**Statistical methods.** Most statistical analyses in this paper used linear mixed effects models (Baayen, 2008), as recently advocated for use with repeated measures or multiple stimuli (Judd et al., 2012). Given the lack of agreement over the correct way to test significance for mixed model effects (Barr et al., 2013; Bates, 2006), and in line with recent recommendations (Cumming, 2014), we report 95% confidence intervals in square brackets but no p-values.³

Study 1 had two crossed within-participant factors: justification (none vs. consequentialist), and issue (1a: health care vs. arts funding; 1b: tax cut vs. Macedonia). Though we were not interested in those issues per se, we could not treat issue as random because it took only two values per study (Bates, 2010). Thus, our model was:

$$DV = \alpha_0 + \alpha_1\text{Justification} + \alpha_2\text{Issue} + \alpha_3\text{Justification}\times\text{Issue} + \mu_0 + \varepsilon$$

³ Analyses were performed using R (R Core Team, 2013), fa() and alpha() (from package psych; Revelle, 2013), and lmer() and confint() (from lme4; Bates et al., 2013). Models were fitted using restricted maximum likelihood.
where the $\alpha$ weights refer to fixed effects, $\mu_0$s refers to the random per-participant intercept, and $\varepsilon$ is a residual error term. We could not include random by-participant slopes because two data points per participant is not enough to estimate so many variance components (Barr et al., 2013). However, because issue did not interact with justification, except where noted, we present the effects of issue in the supplementary analysis. Where noted, we added other fixed factors, such as political orientation.

**Results**

**Moralization (main analysis).** In both studies, as predicted, the consequentialist target was perceived to moralize less than the control target: Study 1a, $b = -.70$ [-.93, -.46], $d = .49$; Study 1b, $b = -1.65$ [-2.02, -1.29], $d = .29$ (see Table 2 for means).

There were no main or interaction effects of political orientation in either study.

**Perceived consequentialism.** Recall that perceived consequentialism and perceived moralization were negatively correlated in both studies (1a: $r = -.27$, 95% CI = [-.37, -.15]; 1b: $r = -.15$ [-.28, -.02]). Justification also affected perceived consequentialism. The consequentialist target was rated as more consequentialist than the control target in both studies: 1a ($M_{\text{cons}} = 4.84$, $SD_{\text{cons}} = 1.08; M_{\text{control}} = 2.95, SD_{\text{control}} = 1.22$), $b = 1.92$ [1.66, 2.18], $d = 1.06$; 1b ($M_{\text{cons}} = 4.59$, $SD_{\text{cons}} = 1.28; M_{\text{control}} = 2.94, SD_{\text{control}} = 1.47$), $b = 1.65$ [1.29, 2.02], $d = .79$. In Study 1b, this effect, while present for both issues, was stronger for the Macedonia issue ($M_{\text{cons}} = 4.95$, $SD_{\text{cons}} = 1.20; M_{\text{nojust}} = 2.46$, $SD_{\text{nojust}} = 1.16$; $b = 2.49$ [1.98, 3.01]) than for the tax cut ($M_{\text{cons}} = 4.13$, $SD_{\text{cons}} = 1.26; M_{\text{nojust}} = 3.31$, $SD_{\text{nojust}} = 1.57$; $b = .81$ [.30, 1.32]), interaction $b = 1.68$ [.96, 2.40].

**Discussion**

In Studies 1a and 1b, supporting our hypothesis, individuals who gave consequentialist justifications were perceived to moralize less than those who took the exact same position but gave no explicit justification—regardless of perceivers’ political orientation and their agreement with the target. Participants also thought the speakers of the consequentialist statements had more “concrete and factual reasons,” and based their opinions on “costs and benefits” and “a rational
analysis of the evidence,” three items that we aggregated into a measure of perceived consequentialism. It was less clear what inferences they drew about the no-justification speakers, and in particular if the statement that it was “simply the right thing to do” was interpreted as deontological (based on rules or duty). To clarify this, we include explicitly deontological statement in Study 2.

**Study 2**

Study 2 tested our hypothesis in the context of real political statements. Our aim was to establish that consequentialist justifications, as well as deontological duty-based ones, are used spontaneously in the real world, and that these naturally occurring exemplars have the same effects on observers as hypothetical ones. To test this possibility, we used a large number of quotations, pre-categorized by raters as expressing consequentialist, deontological, or no justification. We predicted that consequentialist statements would appear less moralized than both no justification (as in Study 1) and deontological justifications.

We also measured two additional interpersonal perceptions that could result from perceived moralization. Prior work on moralization (Kreps & Monin, 2011; Skitka et al., 2005) suggests that individuals who are judged to moralize an issue could be seen as less willing to compromise on that issue and as less flexible and more committed in their views. Thus, to the extent that consequentialism reduces perceived moralization, consequentialist targets could appear more flexible and more willing to compromise. This would suggest that consequentialist arguments could be a good way of diffusing tension in contentious conversations while still appearing well prepared. We tested these possibilities in this study, hypothesizing that consequentialist statements would make a speaker appear more flexible and more willing to compromise by reducing perceived moralization.

**Method**
Participants. Thirty-eight participants (29 female, $M_{age} = 35.53$) recruited from a US online participant pool maintained by a US business school participated in exchange for a gift certificate. We recruited a smaller number of participants because this was a within-subject design, with each participant rating 60 quotes, yielding 2,280 potential observations. Our sample size selection was consistent with simulation results by Judd and colleagues (2012, Figure 1), who show that in a design similar to this one, power does not increase much as the number of participants is increased beyond 30.

Procedure. To generate stimuli for the study, the first author read through Bill Clinton and George W. Bush’s annual State of the Union addresses and collected 60 quotations from each president. Each quotation took a position on a policy, and some also provided justifications. All references to Congress, specific years, or religious themes, and all uses of the words “morality,” and “ethics,” were removed. Some quotations gave multiple types of justifications; while interesting, the question of how observers respond to multiple different justification types was beyond the scope of this study, so we replaced parts of these quotations with ellipses.

To determine each quotation’s justification type, three moral philosophy doctoral students independently coded each quotation as consequentialist, deontological, or no-justification. The first author met with the coders to discuss quotations that they did not all independently code similarly; some disagreements were resolved, though agreement was never forced. The final, balanced set of stimuli (see Appendix 2) comprised 60 quotations: 10 from each president in each of the three categories according to unanimous coder agreement after discussion.

Participants were told that quotations came from different unnamed politicians’ speeches and were instructed to evaluate each independently. After reading each quotation in an individually randomized order, participants rated agreement (‘I agree with the speaker on this
issue”), perceived moralization (“This issue is a moral one for the speaker”), perceived consequentialism (“The speaker's position on this issue is based on costs and benefits”), and perceived effectiveness at compromising (“The speaker would be effective at finding compromises with others who disagree on this issue”) from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). An additional item measured flexibility vs. commitment: the question read, “Based on this quotation, what do you think the speaker is better at?” and the response scale ranged from 1 (“The speaker is better at recognizing when he/she is wrong, acknowledging mistakes, and changing course if needed”) to 7 (“The speaker is better at staying true to his/her message, being strong in his/her convictions, and never weakening his/her resolve”) with the midpoint labeled, “Equally good at both.” After reading and responding to all of the quotations, participants completed the 20-item Moral Foundations Questionnaire (Graham et al., 2008), an exploratory measure designed to examine, again, whether our effects depended on an individual’s conception of the foundation of morality; MFQ results are reported in supplementary analyses. Finally, among other demographic questions, we measured political orientation from 1 (extremely liberal) to 7 (extremely conservative).

Results

Statistical models included fixed effects for justification ($\alpha_1$), president ($\alpha_2$)—which was not of theoretical interest but, with only two values, was better treated as fixed (Bates, 2010)—and their interaction ($\alpha_3$); a random by-participant intercept ($\mu_{0s}$); and a random by-quotation intercept ($\mu_{0q}$): |

$$DV = \alpha_0 + \alpha_1\text{Justification} + \alpha_2\text{President} + \alpha_3J\times P + \mu_{0s} + \mu_{0q} + \epsilon.$$ 

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4 As in Studies 1a and 1b, the effects of justification remained when controlling for agreement; see supplementary analyses.

5 We also tried running models with maximal random effects (see Barr et al, 2013), including random by-participant slopes for president, quotation, and their interaction. However, perhaps because of the greater complexity from two different random factors (participant and quotation), several of these models failed to converge or resulted in non-positive covariance matrices. Thus, models presented for this study included intercepts only.
There was no president by justification interaction in any model; main effects of president are reported in the supplementary analyses.

**Moralization (main analysis).** As predicted, consequentialist quotations were seen as less moralized than deontological ones, $b = -.74 [-1.04, -0.44], d = .68$. They were also seen as less moralized than no-justification quotations, $b = -.23 [-.50, .03] (90\% \text{ CI: } [-0.45, -0.01]), d = .39$. See Table 2.

**Perceived consequentialism.** Consequentialist quotations ($M = 4.67, SD = 1.70$) appeared more consequential (measured with one item: “The speaker's position on this issue is based on costs and benefits”) than deontological quotations ($M = 4.21, SD = 1.75$), $b = .46 [.14, .78], d = .38$. In contrast to Study 1, they did not differ on perceived consequentialism from no-justification quotations ($M = 4.47, SD = 1.77$), $b = .20 [-.12, .52], d = .20$. Unlike Studies 1a and 1b, perceived consequentialism was *positively* related to perceived moralization, $b = .20 [.16, .23]$.

**Political orientation.** Political orientation moderated the difference in moralization between consequentialist and deontological quotations, interaction $b = -.08 [-.15, -.01]$. Reassuringly, the difference was present at all levels of political orientation, though it was stronger for conservative participants (at PO = 7, contrast $b = -.98 [-.64, -1.31]$) than for liberal participants (at PO = 1, contrast $b = -.51 [-.18, -.84]$). Political orientation also had a main effect whereby conservatives gave lower moralization ratings overall, $b = -.14 [-.27, -.01]$.

**Interpersonal consequences.** Justification did not affect perceived willingness to compromise. By contrast, speakers of consequentialist quotations ($M = 4.35, SD = 1.40$) were seen as less committed/more flexible than speakers of deontological quotations ($M = 4.59, SD = 1.43$), $b = -.24 [-.49, -.003]$. There was no difference between consequentialist and no justification ($M = 4.53, SD = 1.51$). Perceived moralization, when added to the model, was positively related to commitment, $b = .18 [.14, .22]$, and the consequentialist vs. deontological comparison no
longer differed from zero, $b = -.12 [-.35, .12]$, consistent with mediation by perceived moralization.

**Discussion**

Study 2 confirmed our predictions using actual presidential quotes: consequentialist arguments were perceived as less moralized than statements presented with no justification, replicating Studies 1a and 1b, and than deontological arguments, extending our findings. One striking result of Study 2 is that our consequentialist statements, although clearly identified as such by trained philosophers, did not appear to lay participants to be more consequentialist than statements with no justification. And yet, as predicted, they were consistently perceived as less moralized (observed effect size $d = .39$, vs. $d$s of .49 and .29 in Studies 1a and 1b). The lack of difference on perceived consequentialism between these two types of items might result from the change from three items in Study 1 to a single-item measure in Study 2, or perhaps from the direct within-subject contrast effect with deontological quotations (absent in Study 1), or from the fact that participants could easily summon to mind familiar consequentialist justifications for familiar political issues when no other reason was volunteered. In addition, unlike Studies 1a and 1b, perceived consequentialism was positively, not negatively, related to perceived moralization. This pattern of effects suggests that something other than perceived consequentialism might be underlying the effects of consequentialist statements on perceived moralization. The high moralization ratings for deontological statements suggest that perceived deontology may be one such candidate—consequentialism may reduce moralization because it suggests lower deontology. We tested this possibility in Study 3.

Study 2 also demonstrated a downstream effect of perceived moralization on perceived commitment. Though we found no effect on willingness to compromise, we did find that the lower perceived moralization of consequentialist arguments made speakers appear more flexible and less committed to issues. This finding supports our contention that perceived moralization is a meaningful factor in interpersonal judgments and interactions, and that differences in
justification type can lead to such judgments. We again tested this effect on commitment, as well as additional downstream consequences, in Study 3.

Though representative of how consequentialist justifications are expressed in real life, the consequentialist statements used in Studies 1 and 2, by focusing on concrete consequences, might be contrasted to the abstract principles often mentioned explicitly in deontological statements (e.g., “To whom much is given, much is required”). One interpretation of our results so far could thus be that we consistently confounded consequentialism with a narrow presentation of cost/benefit analyses, and that consequentialism, properly presented, would appear just as moralized to observers as deontology. After all, consequentialist justifications are also based on a broad principle -- that one should do what produces the greatest good for the greatest number – but perhaps this is implied too subtly in our realistic statements. We thus designed Study 3 as a more stringent test of our hypothesis, by adding to consequentialist statements a very explicit statement of the broad moral principle underlying them. If our effects so far result from a (naturally-occurring) co-occurrence between deontology and explicit principle, we should no longer see a difference in perceived moralization between consequentialist and deontological statements once this explicit statement of principle is added. If, on the other hand, there is something that sounds inherently less moralized in consequentialist arguments, we should still observe a difference in moralization.

**Study 3**

Our studies thus far have shown that consequentialist justifications are perceived to reflect less moralization than both deontological justifications and no justification at all. Study 3 was designed to include a prudential, self-interested justification; to test whether our earlier effects resulted from the omission of an explicit consequentialist principle; to measure more precisely perceptions of different justifications, and to extend our findings to an additional context (organizations).
In addition to consequentialist and no-justification arguments (Study 1) and deontological arguments (Study 2), Study 3 included prudential justifications as a clearly non-moral comparison condition (according to most philosophical theories; Shaver, 2010). Furthermore, unlike in prior studies, we used consequentialist, deontological, and prudential arguments that included explicit statements of a broad underlying principle (e.g., consequentialist: “I believe our company’s guiding principle should be to increase the well-being of as many people as possible while inconveniencing as few people as possible”). This change enabled us to rule out the possibility that consequentialist statements seemed less moralized than deontological ones in Study 2 merely because observers did not realize that they were based on a broad abstract principle. Obtaining results in Study 3 that are similar to Study 2, in which the moral principle was more implicit—as is probably more realistic—would suggest that the abstractness and generality of different types of statements was not driving these effects.

Making the utilitarianism principle more explicit would potentially rule out this “hidden principle” (naturally-occurring) confound, but it would still not explain the psychological processes at work behind perceived moralization. One possible mechanism, perceived consequentialism, seems less promising after participants in Study 2 (unlike trained philosophers) did not perceive any difference on this dimension between consequentialist and no-justification statements, but they still saw consequentialist statements as less moralized. Thus, Study 3 tested two other possible mechanisms discussed in the Introduction: that utilitarian justifications highlight a speaker’s lack of deontological concerns, or that they evoke prudential self-interest.

To test alternative mechanisms, Study 3 added separate measures of perceived consequentialist, deontological, and prudential reasoning, adapted from previous research (Tanner et al., 2007). These measures of perceived reasoning also addressed a flaw in our “consequentialism” measures in Studies 1 and 2, which did not specify whether the consequences were ones experienced by the speaker or by society as a whole (e.g., “The speaker’s position on this issue is based on costs and benefits”), and thus could have conflated prudential reasoning and
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Consequentialism. To correct this flaw in our new perceived justification items, we were careful to distinguish prudential from more broadly consequentialist reasoning in both our statements of principle and in our measures.

Study 3 thus included four justification conditions: principled consequentialist, principled deontological, principled prudential, and no justification. We predicted that, as in Study 2, consequentialist justifications would appear less moralized than deontological justifications—even with the addition of a clear moral principle—but more moralized than clearly amoral prudential justifications. Although we also included a no-justification condition for consistency with previous studies, we had less clear predictions about how it would compare with the three “principled” justifications; we suspected that the inclusion of a broad principle in the new consequentialist condition would likely make this condition appear more moralized, perhaps even more than no justification. However, the key comparison for this strong test of our hypothesis was the principled deontological condition, not the no-justification condition, which did not include a statement of principle.

Finally, as in Study 2, we tested potential downstream consequences of believing a target moralizes an issue. Using a more straightforward measure of commitment to the issue, we aimed to replicate the Study 2 finding that targets who are perceived to moralize are also perceived as more committed to the issue. Relatedly, we tested whether targets perceived to moralize are also perceived as more likely to have views that generalize beyond the specific issue at hand to related issues. We also measured perceived authenticity or dishonesty as another potential consequence. We expected statements perceived as moralized to be seen as more revealing of a person’s core values (e.g. Skitka & Mullen, 2002), particularly in business contexts in which moral statements are counternormative (Bird & Waters, 1989; Sonenshein, 2006); therefore, we predicted that targets perceived to moralize would also therefore be perceived as more authentic.

In summary, we predicted that despite the addition of an explicit statement of the principle of utilitarianism, consequentialist statements would still appear less moralized than
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Furthermore, based on the results of Study 2, we hypothesized that this effect would result either from the association between utilitarian justifications and self-interest, or from the inference that such arguments preclude the existence of any duty or rule-based reasons; thus, we made the prediction that consequentialist speakers would also appear to have more prudential justification and to have less deontological justification than deontological speakers.

Method

Participants and design. Four hundred and ninety-four Amazon Mechanical Turk workers participated for payment. Participants were all US-based, had a Mechanical Turk approval rate of 70% or higher, and had completed at most 100 HITs. We excluded data from 22 participants who did not respond correctly to an attention check (“Please select answer choice ‘not at all’”; see Oppenheimer et al., 2009). Thus, the final sample size for this study was 472 participants (234 female, 234 male, 4 declined to state; M_{age} = 30.50).

The design was a 4 (justification: none, principled prudential, principled consequentialist, principled deontological) x 2 (order of dependent measures: justification first or moralization first) x 6 (issue; random) between-subjects design.

Procedure and stimuli. Participants read and answered questions about a middle manager at a company considering one of six proposals (each participant saw only one proposal). The manager, identified as Andy, expressed strong support for the proposal and provided either no justification or an additional principled prudential, consequentialist, or deontological justification.

To confirm our justification manipulation, we turned again to our philosopher colleagues: we presented the 24 vignettes to one doctoral student and one postdoctoral scholar in moral philosophy, and asked them to rate the degree to which each statement expressed a consequentialist, deontological, and/or prudential argument (separate items), “as you think most philosophers understand these categories.” They also rated how clear and how typical each
statement was as an example of its predominant type. All ratings were from 1 (Not at all) to 5 (Very much). The raters’ responses across the five items were correlated at \( r = .97 \) and confirmed our intended manipulation (see Table 3).

**Measures.** Participants answered several questions following each vignette. Morialization was measured using the same four items as in Study 1 (\( \alpha = .88 \)). We used three items each, adapted from Tanner and colleagues’ (2007) measure of deontological and consequentialist reasoning, to measure perceived deontological (“The target would say he supported the proposal…” followed by “because it is consistent with principles one has to follow”; “because our company has a duty to behave that way”; “because doing otherwise would not be acceptable under any circumstances”; \( \alpha = .75 \)), consequentialist (“because it can be justified by its consequences to society as a whole”; “because its outcomes produce the best net value for society as a whole”; “because the positive outcomes outweigh the negative ones for society as a whole”; \( \alpha = .83 \)), and prudential justification (“because it can be justified by its consequences to our company’s bottom line”; “because its outcomes produce the best net value for our company’s bottom line”; “because the positive outcomes outweigh the negative ones for our company’s bottom line”; \( \alpha = .82 \)). The response scale ranged from 1 (Not at all) to 5 (Very much). The four moralization items and nine perceived reasoning items were presented in different randomized orders for each participant.

To address the possibility that presenting perceived reasoning before perceived moralization could artificially increase our effect size, we also manipulated whether the moralization measure or the perceived reasoning measures were presented first. We predicted that this order manipulation would not interact with justification.

Following the moralization and perceived reasoning measures, participants responded to nine items on potential downstream effects of perceived moralization. Three items each measured perceptions of Andy’s authenticity (“Andy’s explanation for his position seems dishonest,”
reverse scored; “Andy’s explanation for his position seems authentic”; “Andy did not express the real reasoning behind his views,” reverse scored), commitment (“Andy would invest a lot of effort to make this proposal happen”; “Andy would continue supporting this proposal in the long term”; “Andy is committed to supporting this proposal”), and the generality of his views about the issue at hand in the vignette (“I would expect Andy to fall on the same side of the issue in any situation involving [e.g., child labor]”; “Andy feels strongly about the broader issue of [child labor]”; “Andy might feel differently the next time a situation involving [child labor] comes up,” reverse scored) and. A Principal Axis factor analysis with Promax rotation (Russell, 2002) of these nine items mostly confirmed our intended measures, with the exception of the item, “Andy might feel differently the next time a situation involving [child labor] comes up,” which was omitted from analyses (see Table 4). The resulting composites were adequately reliable (authenticity, $\alpha = .71$; commitment, $\alpha = .78$; generality, $r = .50 [.43, .57]$) and moderately intercorrelated (see Table 5).

Results

We used mixed models in order to treat issue (six levels) as a random factor. Models included fixed effects for justification, order, and their interaction ($\alpha$’s), as well as random by-issue intercepts ($\mu_{\text{issue}}$):

$$DV = \alpha_0 + \alpha_1 \text{Justification} + \alpha_2 \text{Order} + \alpha_3 J \times O + \mu_{\text{issue}} + \varepsilon$$

We omitted by-issue slopes because models including these failed to converge.6

Order and justification did not interact in any of our models. Main effects of order are reported in the supplementary analyses.

Moralization. Supporting our main hypothesis, the principled consequentialist target was still perceived to moralize the issue less than the principled deontological target, $b = -.33 [-.65, -.65]$. Using only 6 different issues left little statistical power to test random slopes. Though we believe having 6 random issues is far preferable to the common practice of testing effects by manipulating the features of a single vignette (see Judd, Westfall, & Kenny, 2012), 6 is a small number when using statistical methods developed for designs that include dozens of random stimuli (e.g., words in psycholinguistics studies).
Furthermore, he was seen to moralize more than both the principled prudential target, \( b = 1.85 \ [1.52, 2.17], d = 1.31 \), and the no-justification target, \( b = .42 \ [.09, .74], d = .35 \) (see Table 2).

**Perceived justification (Table 6).**

**Perceived consequentialist justification.** The principled consequentialist target \( (M = 3.93, SD = .86) \) appeared more consequentialist than the principled prudential target \( (M = 2.84, SD = 1.30) \), \( F(1, 226.08) = 67.20, p < .001, b = 1.10 \ [.86, 1.34], d = .99 \); and somewhat more so than the no-justification target \( M = 3.70, SD = .91) \), \( b = .23 [-.01, .47] \ (90\% \ CI: [.03, .43]), d = .26 \). The principled consequentialist and principled deontological targets \( (M = 3.77, SD = .89) \) did not differ, \( b = .17 [-.07, .40], d = .18 \).

**Perceived deontological justification.** The principled consequentialist target \( (M = 3.53, SD = .87) \) appeared less deontological than the principled deontological target \( (M = 3.97, SD = .83) \), \( b = -.43 [-.66, -.20], d = -.52 \) and more so than the principled prudential target \( (M = 2.79, SD = 1.09) \), \( b = .77 [.54, 1.00], d = .76 \). The principled consequentialist target did not differ from the no-justification target \( (M = 3.50, SD = 1.05) \), \( b = .03 [-.20, .26], d = .03 \).

**Perceived prudential justification.** The principled consequentialist target \( (M = 3.14, SD = 1.06) \) appeared more prudential than the principled deontological target \( (M = 2.82, SD = 1.16), b = .30 [.03, .56], d = .29 \), and less so than the principled prudential target \( (M = 4.19, SD = .85) \), \( b = -1.06 [-1.32, -.79], d = -1.09 \), but no different from the no-justification target \( (M = 3.33, SD = 1.07) \), \( b = -.20 [-.46, .07], d = -.18 \).

**Additional tests for mediators of the consequentialist vs. deontological comparison.**

Finally, we wondered whether the effects of consequentialist vs. deontological moralization on perceived moralization could be explained by perceived justification. Given that deontological justifications are seen as more moralized than consequentialist ones, is this because deontological targets are assumed to differ in terms of how consequentialist, deontological, or prudential they are?
A potential mediator must be related to the independent variable (Baron & Kenny, 1986). Perceived consequentialism is therefore not a possible mediator, because consequentialist and deontological targets did not differ on perceived consequentialism. They did differ on perceived deontological and prudential reasoning, so either of these measures is a possible mediator. Also consistent with mediation, when either of these measures was added to the basic model predicting moralization, the effect of consequentialist vs. deontological justification was reduced (prudential, \( b = -.23 \ [-.55, .08 \]); deontological, \( b = -.04 \ [-.34, .25 \]) whereas the perceived justification measure in question remained predictive (prudential: \( b = -.29 \ [-.40, -.19 \]);
deontological, \( b = .65 \ [.55, .76 \]). When both perceived deontological and perceived prudential justification were added to the model, both remained predictive (prudential: \( b = -.29 \ [-.39, -.20 \]);
deontological: \( b = .65 \ [.55, .76 \]). Thus, confirming our predictions in light of the Study 2 results, it appears that consequentialist statements appeared less moralized than deontological ones because they were judged to reflect a less deontological approach to the issue and/or a more prudential one—but not because they were perceived by lay perceivers as reflecting consequentialism. We return to these findings in the study discussion.

**Downstream perceptions.**

**Commitment.** As predicted, and replicating Study 2, consequentialist targets appeared less committed (\( M = 5.82, SD = .95 \)) than deontological targets (\( M = 6.13, SD = .76 \), \( b = -.31 \ [-.54, -.09 \]). They did not differ from no-justification targets (\( M = 5.85, SD = .81 \), \( b = -.03 \ [-.26, .19 \]), or prudential targets (\( M = 5.76, SD = .98 \), \( b = .06 \ [-.16, .29 \). Perceived moralization, when added to the model, positively predicted perceived commitment, \( b = .21 \ [.15, .26 \]; the consequentialist vs. deontological comparison was reduced to \( b = -.26 \ [-.47, -.04 \). In addition, unexpectedly, consequentialist targets at a given level of perceived moralization appeared less committed than no-justification targets at the same level of perceived moralization, \( b = -.33 \ [-.57, -.09 \). Consequentialist targets still did not differ from prudential ones when controlling for moralization, \( b = -.13 \ [-.34, .09 \).
Generality. As predicted, consequentialist targets appeared to have less generalized views \((M = 5.57, SD = 1.01)\) than deontological targets \((M = 5.91, SD = .91)\), \(b = -.34 \ [-.64, -.04]\), and more generalized views than prudential targets \((M = 4.38, SD = 1.70)\), \(b = 1.19 \ [.89, 1.50]\); they did not differ from no-justification targets \((M = 5.61, SD = .98)\), \(b = -.04 \ [-.34, .27]\). Perceived moralization, when added to the model, positively predicted perceived generality, \(b = .52 \ [.45, .59]\), and the consequentialist vs. deontological difference \((b = -.17 \ [-.42, .08])\) and consequentialist vs. prudential difference \((b = .25 \ [-.03, .53]; 90\% \ CI: [.01, .48])\) were both reduced. Also, consequentialist targets at a given level of moralization appeared to have somewhat less general views than no-justification targets at the same level of perceived moralization, \(b = -.25 \ [-.50, 0.002] (90\% \ CI: [-.46, -.04]).\) Thus, as for the commitment measure, consequentialism had a negative direct effect but a positive indirect effect via increased moralization.

Perceived authenticity. As predicted, consequentialist targets appeared less authentic \((M = 5.58, SD = 1.21)\) than deontological targets \((M = 5.93, SD = .99)\), \(b = -.33 \ [-.63, -.04]\); more authentic than no-justification targets \((M = 4.45, SD = 1.11)\), \(b = 1.13 \ [.83, 1.43]\); and somewhat more authentic than prudential targets \((M = 5.30, SD = 1.34)\), \(b = .27 \ [-.03, .57] (90\% \ CI: [.02, .52])\). Perceived moralization, when added to the model, positively predicted perceived authenticity, \(b = .27 \ [.19, .35]\). In addition, all of the main effects were reduced, consistent with mediation by moralization: consequentialist vs. deontological comparison, \(b = -.25 \ [-.53, .03] (90\% \ CI: [-.49, -.02]); \) consequentialist vs. no-justification comparison, \(b = 1.00 \ [.72, 1.29]\); consequentialist vs. prudential comparison, \(b = -.25 \ [-.58, .06].\)

Discussion

In Study 3, despite being reminded of the general underlying principle of consequentialism, participants once again saw consequentialist arguments as expressing less moralization than deontological ones. Also, targets using a prudential and thus transparently non-moral justification appeared to moralize less than consequentialist targets.
To provide a conservative comparison to deontological justifications by equating the obviousness of a broad moral premise, we added a statement of principle to our consequentialist justifications in Study 3. As a result, principled consequentialist justifications appeared more moralized than no justification, whereas the sparser consequentialist arguments used in earlier studies appeared less moralized than no justification. While this reversal, as well as the smaller difference between deontological and consequentialist statements ($d = .34$ rather than $\.68$ in Study 2), suggests that differences in generality or abstraction may have partially driven the effects of previous studies, the fact that a difference remains supports our contention that consequentialism per se appears less moralized.

While our predictions center on the effects of consequentialist arguments, observers clearly go beyond the actual argument presented in their inferences about speakers, and this study’s perceived reasoning results suggest that it is these further inferences that drive the effects of these arguments on moralization. Though our philosopher colleagues confirmed that our principled deontological targets did not express any consequentialist reasoning, participants inferred that these targets privately held consequentialist reasons for their views just as strongly as the consequentialist targets. Yet, the deontological managers still appeared to moralize the issue more. Thus, consequentialist arguments reduce perceived moralization because of what they signal about a speaker’s genuine reasoning about the issue: an absence of deontological, duty-based reasons, or a focus on self-interest, or both.

Finally, as in Study 2, deontological speakers appeared more committed to the issue than consequentialist speakers as a result of their greater perceived moralization. Consequentialist speakers also appeared to hold less broad and generalized attitudes than deontological speakers, and more generalized attitudes than prudential speakers, as a result of differences in perceived moralization. Our predictions for another downstream measure, perceived authenticity, were also confirmed: consequentialist speakers appeared less authentic than deontological speakers, and more so than prudential ones. Expressing a moralized view may be seen as a revelation of oneself.
and one’s personal values, particularly in a business context in which such arguments are counternormative (Bird & Waters, 1989; Sonenshein, 2006). Altogether, these findings support the notion that perceptions of moralization have important and multifaceted downstream consequences on interpersonal perception, and suggest that speakers can use an arsenal of utilitarian facts to appear more flexible, but when it comes to communicating conviction, commitment, and authenticity, less is more.

**General Discussion**

Basing a recommendation on its consequences (a favored style of moral reasoning in Western industrialized cultures: see Haidt et al., 1994) implies to observers that one is basing it less on moral convictions. Across our studies, consequentialist reasoning, based on aggregate costs and benefits, was consistently associated with lower perceived moralization compared to duty- and rights-based reasoning. In fact, unless they included an explicit moral principle (Study 3), such arguments were consistently judged to reflect moralization even less than giving no justification at all (Studies 1a, 1b, and 2). This effect appears to be driven by judgments that consequentialist statements reveal a lack of appreciation for the sacred, non-commensurable nature of the issue (i.e., less deontological reasoning; see Tanner et al., 2007) or that they smack of self-interest (more prudential reasoning).

These findings suggest that people can use consequentialist arguments to manage others’ perceptions of their moralization and these perceptions’ downstream consequences (see review in Kreps & Monin, 2011). We found that targets perceived to moralize are also judged to be more committed to their views and less flexible, a finding that resonates with prior literature (Skitka et al., 2005). Managers in organizations face especially substantial pressure not to moralize, precisely because they so value flexibility (Bird & Waters, 1989). Prior research also suggests that targets perceived to moralize could also appear to claim moral superiority (Monin, 2007; Sabini & Silver, 1982). Our findings in Study 3 suggest, however, that individuals who use moral arguments—perhaps especially in the contexts in which these arguments are particularly
unusual—may be rewarded with perceptions of increased authenticity (cf. Srivastva, 1989); speakers trying to appear authentic should therefore resist the temptation to cite welfare consequences, but cite deontological principles instead. Our findings thus have relevance to anyone choosing how to express a strong opinion—especially to leaders who must publicly justify recommendations about what actions to take.

**Issues for future research**

**Consequentialism and first-person moral conviction**

These results raise the question of whether people use the presence of consequentialist justification to infer, not only others’ moralization, but their own moralization as well: perhaps, when asked whether they see an issue as a moral one, people conclude that their views are more based on moral values the less they can bring to mind consequences. Research focusing on a first-person perspective could test this possibility. Self-reported moral conviction has been linked to powerful downstream effects (e.g. Mullen & Skitka, 2006; Skitka et al., 2005); discovering that this moral conviction is related to a consequentialist basis would shed light on the psychology behind these self-reports, and could suggest a situational manipulation of moral conviction, creating exciting methodological possibilities for a literature that has often had to rely on pre-existing variance.

**The pragmatics of moral justification**

In Study 3, participants went beyond targets’ stated arguments in judging their privately held reasons, in interesting ways. In particular, though our manipulation was clearly validated by expert judges, our lay perceivers judged deontological and consequentialist targets as equally consequentialist. In addition to shedding light on what may be driving our effects—the mechanism likely involves perceptions of private deontological or prudential reasoning, not consequentialism—these findings have an intriguing semantic implication: they suggest that deontological reasons may be perceived as semantically stronger than consequentialist ones, such that expressing only deontological reasons is consistent with privately having both types, but
expressing only consequentialist reasons is not (the Gricean maxim of quantity; e.g. Davis, 2013). Future research should explore this intriguing possibility.

**Conclusion**

Despite a tradition of consequentialism in moral philosophy, lay audiences see arguments based on harm and welfare consequences as reflecting less moralization, suggesting a lay perception of the moral domain that diverges from the traditional philosophical definition. On a practical level, the findings suggest that people can manage the degree of moralization they convey by choosing how they explain their views: even when taking a stand on a contentious political issue, expressing a consequentialist view leads observers to infer less moralization. When you argue that an action is right because everyone benefits from it, it doesn’t sound like ethics; it just sounds like common sense.

**References**


Consequentialist justifications and moralization


**Table 1**

*Pattern Matrix, Principal Axis Factor Analysis with Promax Rotation of Moralization and Consequentialism Items, Studies 1a and 1b*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Study</th>
<th>Factor 1</th>
<th>Factor 2</th>
<th>Factor 1</th>
<th>Factor 2</th>
<th>Scale</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1a</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1b</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- [The senator's] attitude about [Measure C] is tied to core moral values and beliefs.  
  - .91 .12 .88 .10 Moralization
- [The senator] feels a sense of moral conviction when thinking about [Measure C].  
  - .83 .01 .89 .12 Moralization
- [Measure C] is a moral issue for [the senator].  
  - .82 -.07 .90 .02 Moralization
- Morality is irrelevant to [the senator’s] attitude about [Measure C].*  
  - .79 .03 .45 -.17 Moralization
- [The senator’s] opinion about [Measure C] is based on a rational analysis of the evidence.  
  - .06 .93 .12 .88 Consequentialism
- The reasons for [the senator’s] opinion about [Measure C] are concrete and factual.  
  - .14 .93 .08 .91 Consequentialism
- [The senator’s] opinion about [Measure C] is based on costs and benefits.  
  - -.11 .76 .01 .80 Consequentialism
- [The senator’s] position on [Measure C] is mostly a matter of principle, not facts.*  
  - -.14 .63 -.32 .37 Not Included
Table 2

Means (and Standard Deviations) of Moralization Ratings by Condition, Studies 1-3

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1a</th>
<th>1b</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Consequentialist:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>no principle</td>
<td>4.61 (1.21)</td>
<td>4.58 (1.14)</td>
<td>4.53 (1.57)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>principled</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>5.68 (.99)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No justification</td>
<td>5.31 (1.21)</td>
<td>5.02 (1.29)</td>
<td>4.77 (1.60)</td>
<td>5.26 (1.38)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deontological</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>5.27 (1.46)</td>
<td>6.01 (.96)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prudential</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3.84 (1.73)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 3

*Mean (and Standard Deviation of) philosopher pre-ratings of Study 3 materials*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Justification</th>
<th>Consequentialist rating</th>
<th>Deontological rating</th>
<th>Prudential rating</th>
<th>Clarity</th>
<th>Typicality</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Consequentialist</td>
<td>5.00 (0.00)</td>
<td>1.00 (0.00)</td>
<td>1.58 (0.51)</td>
<td>4.75 (0.45)</td>
<td>4.67 (0.78)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deontological</td>
<td>1.00 (0.00)</td>
<td>5.00 (0.00)</td>
<td>1.00 (0.00)</td>
<td>4.75 (0.045)</td>
<td>4.92 (0.29)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prudential</td>
<td>2.00 (0.74)</td>
<td>1.00 (0.00)</td>
<td>5.00 (0.00)</td>
<td>4.92 (0.29)</td>
<td>5.00 (0.00)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No justification</td>
<td>1.00 (0.00)</td>
<td>1.00 (0.00)</td>
<td>1.00 (0.00)</td>
<td>1.00 (0.00)</td>
<td>1.00 (0.00)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 4

**Pattern Matrix, Principal Axis Factor Analysis with Promax Rotation of Downstream Perception Items, Study 3**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Factor 1</th>
<th>Factor 2</th>
<th>Factor 3</th>
<th>Subscale</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Andy did not express the real reasoning behind his views.</td>
<td>.71</td>
<td>-.01</td>
<td>.24</td>
<td>Authenticity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Andy’s explanation for his position seems dishonest.</td>
<td>.84</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>Authenticity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Andy’s explanation for his position seems authentic.</td>
<td>-.60</td>
<td>.14</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>Authenticity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Andy would invest a lot of effort to make this proposal happen.</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.81</td>
<td>-.09</td>
<td>Commitment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Andy is committed to supporting this proposal.</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>.80</td>
<td>-.05</td>
<td>Commitment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Andy would continue supporting this proposal in the long term.</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>.58</td>
<td>.24</td>
<td>Commitment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I would expect Andy to fall on the same side of the issue in any situation involving [child labor].</td>
<td>.13</td>
<td>-.06</td>
<td>.91</td>
<td>Generality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Andy feels strongly about the broader issue of [child labor].</td>
<td>-.15</td>
<td>.10</td>
<td>.52</td>
<td>Generality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Andy might feel differently the next time a situation involving [child labor] comes up.</td>
<td>.37</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>-.31</td>
<td>Not included</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 5

_Pearson Correlations and 95% Confidence Intervals of Downstream Perception Measures, Study 3_

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Authenticity</th>
<th>Commitment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Commitment</td>
<td>.44 [.36, .51]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Generality</td>
<td>.36 [.27, .43]</td>
<td>.49 [.42, .55]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 6

*Mean (and Standard Deviation) perceived reasoning ratings, Study 3*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Justification condition</th>
<th>Perceived consequentialist</th>
<th>Perceived deontological</th>
<th>Perceived prudential</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Consequentialist</td>
<td>3.93 (.86)</td>
<td>3.53 (.87)</td>
<td>3.14 (1.06)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deontological</td>
<td>3.77 (.89)</td>
<td>3.97 (.83)</td>
<td>2.82 (1.16)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prudential</td>
<td>2.84 (1.30)</td>
<td>2.79 (1.09)</td>
<td>4.19 (.85)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No justification</td>
<td>3.70 (.91)</td>
<td>3.50 (1.05)</td>
<td>3.33 (1.07)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>