

Wealthy Elites' Policy Preferences and Economic Inequality: The Case of Technology Entrepreneurs*

David E. Broockman[†] Gregory Ferenstein[‡] Neil Malhotra[§]

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Abstract

If wealthy businesspeople reliably support policies in their material self-interest, they can be expected to use their tremendous political influence to exacerbate inequality. We argue business elites in an industry can share distinctive values and predispositions which can override their self-interest. We demonstrate our argument with technology entrepreneurs, business elites with increasing wealth and political influence but who overwhelmingly support Democrats. To understand this puzzle, we conducted original surveys of elite technology entrepreneurs, elite partisan donors, and the public. We show that technology entrepreneurs' predispositions toward racial tolerance, non-authoritarianism, and cosmopolitanism align them with Democrats in supporting liberal redistributive, social, and globalistic policies. However, they generally oppose regulation—but also for reasons that extend beyond self-interest alone. Our findings provide a rare window into a wealthy elite's views that is both theoretically rich and politically relevant, providing nuance to expectations about the interplay between economic and political inequality.

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[†]Assistant Professor of Political Economy, Stanford Graduate School of Business.
dbroockman@stanford.edu.

[‡]Freelance Journalist. greg@gregferenstein.com.

[§]Edith M. Cornell Professor of Political Economy, Stanford Graduate School of Business.
neilm@stanford.edu.

The outsized influence economically powerful individuals and groups exert in the political process is one of the most significant and enduring foci of political science (e.g., Bachrach and Baratz 1962; Dahl 1961; Schattschneider 1960). Consistent with classic studies, recent research continues to express concern about a system “dominated by moneyed elites” (Hersh and Schaffner 2016, see also Carnes (2013)), finding that the preferences of economic elites and business interests have a much greater influence on the policy process than do the preferences of ordinary voters (Gilens 2012; Gilens and Page 2014, but see Schickler (2016)). Wealthy businesspeople are a centerpiece of many such analyses, which argue that these elites can use their individual wealth and their firms’ economic power to powerfully shape political outcomes (e.g., Mills 1956; Lindblom 1977). In particular, wealthy businesspeople’s outsized political influence is often argued to be a key driver of policies that exacerbate economic inequality (e.g., Bartels 2008).

To the extent this premise is true, reducing the political power of wealthy businesspeople could be a straightforward strategy for reducing inequality. However, wealthy businesspeople may not be monolithic in being driven by their material self-interest to support policies that exacerbate inequality. Although it is cliché to note that wealthy businesspeople are heterogeneous in their political preferences, less work has explored the origins or nature of that heterogeneity (Carnes 2013). As Page, Bartels and Seawright (2013) note, “the implications of unequal political influence depend heavily upon exactly what wealthy Americans actually want government to do” (p. 52), and we know surprisingly little about that question theoretically or empirically.¹

In this paper, we draw on theories of the role of self-interest in the literature on mass political behavior to argue that wealthy business elites’ values and predispositions can override their self-interest, leading them to support policies, politicians, and parties that one would not readily expect based on their material self-interest alone. Moreover, although it is obvious that individual wealthy liberals exist, we argue that business elites in an industry can systematically share distinctive patterns of values and predispositions that lead an industry as a whole to be a voice for

¹One important exception is Page, Bartels and Seawright’s (2013) survey of 83 wealthy individuals in Chicago.

policies that often run contrary to its self-interest. One implication of our argument is that wealthy businesspeople’s outsized political influence may have more nuanced implications for inequality, with these implications depending in part upon the predispositions shared by their industry.

To demonstrate our argument, we provide a rare window into the political thinking of an ascendant wealthy business elite: technology entrepreneurs. To do so, we rely on a unique survey we conducted of over 600 elite technology company leaders and founders. Whereas existing evidence in the literature on the political preferences of wealthy businesspeople relies to a great extent on historical case studies,² this survey allows us to focus on a contemporary and developing case where we can collect quantitative data that opens the black box of a wealthy elite’s political thinking. The companies our survey respondents founded and led have raised more than \$19.6 billion in venture capital investment; most are millionaires. To understand how technology entrepreneurs differ from the current elites of both parties and may seek to influence the parties (Schickler 2016), we also draw on a second original survey we conducted of over 1,100 elite partisan donors. Our respondents to this donor survey have contributed over \$17.2 million since 2008.

Technology entrepreneurs represent both a theoretically rich and extremely relevant case to understand wealthy businesspeople’s preferences around policies that impact inequality. Financial experts forecast that the technology industry will produce as many new millionaires as the financial industry going forward.³ A majority of the ten wealthiest Americans made their money in the technology industry;⁴ and the share of the top 400 wealthiest Americans each year who made their money primarily in the technology industry has tripled over the last several decades (see Figure

²There are only a few exceptions, such as Page, Bartels and Seawright’s (2013) survey mentioned earlier. Barber, Canes-Wrone and Thrower (2017) and Hill and Huber (2017) survey donors. We are not aware of any other surveys of the political views of the elite of a particular industry nor of other political surveys of wealthy Americans. Most survey research seeking to understand the wealthy’s political views identify their responses in mass public surveys with topcoded income questions that make identifying the truly wealthy difficult (for review, see Page, Bartels and Seawright 2013). Moreover, despite a great deal of research on the influence of wealthy business elites in finance and other fields, there is essentially no research on the political preferences or influence of the technology industry. For an account of the early organization of Silicon Valley business interests, see Saxenian (1989).

³“World Wealth Report,” *Capgemini*, <https://www.worldwealthreport.com/uswr/download>.

⁴As of 2017, these were Bill Gates from Microsoft, Jeff Bezos from Amazon, Mark Zuckerberg from Facebook, Larry Ellison from Oracle, and Larry Page and Sergey Brin from Google.

1a).⁵ Not only do technology entrepreneurs enjoy ballooning personal wealth, but their influence with and access to consumers and employees are also potential sources of tremendous political power. For example, the average American spends about a third of their waking hours using a computer or smartphone.⁶ The employee bases of the firms technology entrepreneurs found and lead is also increasing dramatically: over half of US job growth from 2013 to 2015 was from firms in just four digital service areas.⁷

Increasingly, technology entrepreneurs are using their personal wealth and firms' power to exercise political influence. For example, recent federal candidates have referred to Silicon Valley as a "political ATM"; the number of fundraisers sitting Presidents host in Northern California, home to Silicon Valley, is now greater than in more-populous Southern California.⁸

From one point of view, one would predict that a group of businesspeople with rising wealth and influence would only grow more successful in advancing policies that redound to their benefit and that exacerbate inequality. From this point of view, technology entrepreneurs' behavior represents a puzzle. They *are* increasingly loyal to a certain breed of politician—but not Republicans, whose support for lower regulation and especially for lower taxation would most serve their material interests. Instead, technology entrepreneurs are an increasingly reliable Democratic constituency. Campaign contributions to Democrats from technology industry employees and ultra-wealthy technology entrepreneurs alike have long exceeded contributions to Republicans.⁹

⁵We thank Adam Bonica for sharing the Forbes 400 data, which is described in Bonica and Rosenthal (2015). The list of Forbes 400 individuals coded as technology entrepreneurs and their source of wealth is in Online Appendix F.

⁶"AdReaction: Marketing in a multiscreen world," *MillwardBrown*, https://www.millwardbrown.com/adreaction/2014/report/Millward-Brown_AdReaction-2014_Global.pdf.

⁷"America's advanced industries: New trends," *Brookings*, <https://www.brookings.edu/research/americas-advanced-industries-new-trends/>.

⁸"Californias political ATM is now located closer to San Francisco than L.A.," *The Switch*, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/2014/09/10/californias-political-atm-is-now-located-closer-to-san-francisco-than-l-a/>.

⁹Figures 1b and 1c show trends in the share of contributions flowing to Democrats from, respectively, all individuals who work for technology companies and among just elite technology entrepreneurs who have ever been among the 400 wealthiest Americans in a given year. Figures 1d and 1e show that the total amounts these populations have given to Democrats have also skyrocketed. This is not an artifact of technology entrepreneurs giving to local candidates in Democratic-leaning states, as patterns are similar at the presidential level.


In terms of voting, Silicon Valley is one of the most strongly Democratic-leaning areas of the nation.¹⁰ Original survey data we present later in the paper indicates similarly overwhelming support for Democrats among a unique sample of elite technology entrepreneurs.

What explains this puzzle? Consistent with our argument, our original survey of this population shows that technology elites share a distinctive pattern of predispositions and values that correspond with liberal views in most policy domains—including strong cosmopolitanism that corresponds with support for immigration, free trade, and other policies that promote global equality; low authoritarianism that corresponds with liberal views on social issues that promote social equality; and racially tolerant views that correspond with strong support for redistributive policies that promote economic equality. Moreover, comparing technology entrepreneurs' views to the views of the elite political donors we surveyed, we find that technology entrepreneurs' views in these domains are typically much more liberal than Democratic citizens and about as liberal as Democratic donors—as are their values and predispositions related to these areas. For example, 82% of technology entrepreneurs indicate support for universal healthcare even if it means raising taxes, identical to the support level among our Democratic survey respondents. Indeed, contrary to popular commentary that suggests technology entrepreneurs are generally libertarian, they are actually less likely to agree with a description of libertarian philosophy than are Democratic citizens to do so. They are also most likely to identify areas like environmental protection, income inequality, and health care as extremely important to them personally. These patterns, for which we pre-registered predictions in a pre-analysis plan, are consistent with our argument that wealthy business elites' values and predispositions can be a powerful predictor of their political behavior even when it does not accord with their self-interest. Although it is not surprising to find that individual wealthy liberals exist, our results suggest that elites in this industry as a whole appear poised to be advocates for economic, social, and global equality in many domains.

¹⁰In the 2016 presidential election, Hillary Clinton won San Mateo and Santa Clara counties in California, home to Facebook, Google, and Apple, by overwhelming 57 and 52 percentage point margins, respectively, relative to a national margin of two percentage points.



Figure 1: Technology entrepreneurs' wealth is growing, and they are increasingly contributing it to Democrats.

(a)





(b)

(c)



(d)

(e)



But our findings are not as simple as demonstrating that technology entrepreneurs are liberal. We also show that technology entrepreneurs dramatically differ from Democratic Party conventional wisdom in one key policy area with important implications for economic inequality: regulation, especially of the labor market.¹¹ Technology entrepreneurs are much more skeptical of government regulation than other Democrats; even technology entrepreneurs who identify as Democrats are much more opposed to regulation than are other Democrats. Technology entrepreneurs also overwhelmingly hope to see labor unions' influence decline. Technology entrepreneurs' views on government regulation and labor much more closely resemble Republican donors and citizens' views than Democrats' views. However, we show that technology entrepreneurs' values and predispositions are also key to understanding their views even in this domain. In particular, we show that technology entrepreneurs' preferences are not a byproduct of being wealthy or educated. In addition, although self-interest surely plays some role in their views, we also present survey experiments that suggest technology entrepreneurs' skepticism of government regulation and control does not appear to be rooted in self-interest alone. Rather, their predispositions—in this case, positive predispositions towards markets and entrepreneurship—still appear important to understanding the sources of their policy preferences.

Our findings make two main contributions.

Substantively, they add nuance to our understanding of how rising income inequality will impact American politics. Insofar as technology entrepreneurs continue to attain greater economic success, they may gain power within and boost the fortunes of the Democratic Party, thus potentially serving as an unexpected source of support for liberal policies in many domains. At the same time, technology entrepreneurs' hostility to government regulation, especially of labor markets, and their extremely negative views towards unions appear likely to lead to high-profile conflicts

¹¹That technology entrepreneurs are different than other Democrats in a key policy area is also reassuring for our argument, as it would be wrong to assume that technology entrepreneurs are simply “following the leader” and adopting conventional Democratic views on every issue as their own (Lenz 2012) or strategically parroting the views of their customers.

within the Democratic Party coalition going forward. Theories of political development predict that as a powerful group gains influence within a party it can steer party ideologies and platforms toward its policy views and priorities (e.g., Schickler 2016). The elite Democratic donors we surveyed explicitly indicated they think exactly this is likely to occur, expressing confidence that technology entrepreneurs' power in the Democratic Party will increase. Paradoxically, the growing wealth and power of the technology industry thus may both undermine Democratic elected officials' support for labor unions and economic regulations that decrease inequality, while at the same time actually increasing Democratic elected officials' electoral fortunes and their support for many other policies that could enhance economic, social, and global equality.

Theoretically, although our findings are strictly descriptive, they demonstrate the promise of theories of mass political behavior for understanding the politics of economic elites, drawing together two of the most enduring research programs in political science. Theories based on self-interest would not likely predict the unique pattern of views and behavior of the ascendant economic elite we studied, yet theories from political behavior on the role of values and predispositions clearly elucidate these patterns. As an industry whose elites share distinctive patterns of views and predispositions grows in wealth, we would predict it to affect the composition of the wealthy and, in turn, the direction of the wealthy's political influence. And indeed, Democrats' growing support from the wealthy is due in large part to the increasing presence of technology entrepreneurs among the wealthy (Bonica and Rosenthal 2015). In this way, our findings provide importance nuance to expectations about the interplay between economic and political inequality.

In the pages that follow, we elaborate our argument and explain why technology entrepreneurs represent a theoretically informative and substantively significant test case. We then detail our original surveys. We next describe and test the predictions we pre-registered about these groups' political attitudes. We conclude by discussing the implications of our findings for theories of inequality and the future of American politics.

Theoretical Perspectives: Why Do Technology

Entrepreneurs Support Democrats?

History is replete with examples of wealthy businesspeople changing the course of American politics through their tremendous political influence. Classic examples include Wall Street bankers, railroad executives, manufacturing industry elites, and southern farming elites. These groups often exerted their influence by joining political parties friendly to their material interests and pushing these parties to support concentrated material benefits for their group, often while imposing distributed costs on society (Schattschneider 1942).¹²

Classic work on business power acknowledges that businesspeople vary in their political preferences, but typically focuses on variation in such material interests to understand variation in their preferences (e.g., Hacker and Pierson 2002). The view that self-interest is the main driver of how wealthy businesspeople choose their political loyalties is intuitive. It is also at odds with influential theories of mass political behavior, which indicate that material self-interest often plays a surprisingly limited role (e.g., Citrin and Green 1990; Sears and Funk 1991). More generally, public opinion research has found that the influence of material self-interest on public opinion has declined over time (Inglehart 1971), with citizens' views and choices also animated by a broader suite of social values and political predispositions that endure through adulthood and systematically vary across the population (e.g., Berinsky 2017; Hersh and Schaffner 2016; Hersh 2017; Tesler 2015).

We argue that these now-familiar forces in mass political behavior research can coexist with self-interest in shaping the political behavior of economic elites.¹³ Although this claim may seem surprising in light of some theories of business power, it has resonance in research that demon-

¹²For example, Page, Bartels and Seawright (2013) find much less support for government spending and regulation than among the general public in their sample of 83 wealthy families in greater Chicago.

¹³Related observations have been made about minority groups in the mass public such as Asians, Jews, and middle-class blacks (Dawson 1995; Kuo, Malhotra and Mo 2017; Wald 2015).

strates the role of politicians' personal experiences and backgrounds in their policy positions (e.g., Carnes 2013; 2017) and in theories which stress the expressive utility individuals derive from political behavior (Gilens 2017; Hersh 2017; Hersh and Goldenberg 2016). To test our argument, we contribute to a small but growing literature that seeks to quantitatively study the political behavior of economic elites (Barber, Canes-Wrone and Thrower 2017; Hill and Huber 2017; Page, Bartels and Seawright 2013) using an original survey of technology entrepreneurs.¹⁴

Technology entrepreneurs are a substantively significant and theoretically informative case for our argument. Substantively, technology entrepreneurs are well-positioned to exert large and growing political influence in the United States for three reasons. First, technology entrepreneurs command a growing amount of personal wealth. Financial experts forecast as many new millionaires to emerge from the technology industry every year as from the financial industry;¹⁵ a majority of the top ten wealthiest Americans made their money in technology. These millionaires and billionaires can use the American system of campaign finance to exert tremendous political influence (Gilens and Page 2014). Second, millions of Americans work for companies technology entrepreneurs founded and run. Employers can powerfully influence their employees' political behavior through both subtle and more overt means, and that this leverage gives executives sway with officeholders. Third, the ubiquitous presence of technology products in Americans' lives gives technology entrepreneurs an unprecedented platform to influence and mobilize the American public. For example, in 2012, Google, Wikipedia, and other Internet companies asked visitors to their websites to contact Congress to oppose a pending bill, the Stop Online Piracy Act (SOPA), that would have made them liable for hosting copyright-infringing content. Congress received a deluge of opposition and support for the legislation cratered in both parties' caucuses the very same day.¹⁶


¹⁴A related but distinct literature has debated whether those with relatively high incomes in the general public have distinctive policy preferences (Enns 2015; Gilens 2009; Soroka and Wlezien 2008). However, this literature has faced a data availability challenge (Page, Bartels and Seawright 2013).

¹⁵"World Wealth Report," *Capgemini*, <https://www.worldwealthreport.com/uswr/download>.

¹⁶See, e.g., "SOPA protests shut down Web sites," *Washington Post*, https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2012/01/17/gIQA4WY16P_story.html.

Supporting this view of technology entrepreneurs’ political significance, in Figure 2 we show evidence from our survey of elite Democratic donors, described later, that finds that these Democratic elites expect technology entrepreneurs to be one of the groups most likely to have their influence in the Democratic Party increase and the least likely to have their influence in the Party decrease. Technology entrepreneurs also share tremendous self-interest in contemporary political outcomes.¹⁷ Technology companies are keenly aware of these interests; they have dramatically expanded their DC offices and public affairs units, while their spending on lobbying has doubled roughly every five years.¹⁸

Figure 2: Democratic donors’ forecasts of groups that will gain and lose influence in the party.



The high-stakes question of how these increasingly powerful businesspeople will choose to influence American politics is also theoretically significant. The theoretical puzzle posed by technol-

¹⁷For example, they and their firms pay significant sums of individual and corporate taxes which they have an incentive to reduce. Government regulation deeply constrains their business activities and growth potential, as examples such as Google, Uber, and Airbnb illustrate. The federal government also has the power to break up their firms using anti-trust laws.

¹⁸See, for example, “Industry Profile,” *OpenSecrets*, https://www.opensecrets.org/lobby/industry_profile.php?id=B13&year=2017, and “Tech giants get deeper into D.C. influence game,” *Politico*, <http://www.politico.com/story/2015/01/tech-lobby-apple-amazon-facebook-google-114468>.

ogy entrepreneurs' political behavior is that they overwhelmingly support Democrats even though, in most of these areas, the Republican Party's positions more closely align with technology entrepreneurs' self-interest.¹⁹ The stock market appears to agree: after Donald Trump unexpectedly won the 2016 Presidential election, technology stock prices jumped, outperforming those in other sectors for months afterwards.²⁰ Likewise, on issues that affect the technology industry specifically, Republican politicians are often closer in line with the technology industry's positions. For example, the 2012 JOBS Act, which dramatically loosened regulations on how technology startups could raise funds, received unanimous support from Republicans in Congress but opposition from many Congressional Democrats.²¹

In line with our theory, we hypothesized in a pre-analysis plan that technology entrepreneurs would share particular patterns of distinctive values and predispositions that could help explain why they nevertheless support Democrats. We expected that this would be due both to the types of people who self-select into the industry as well as the effects of their experiences within it.

Specifically, we first hypothesized that technology entrepreneurs would be low in authoritarianism, a predisposition that should incline them to be liberal on social issues. Historians have noted that the contemporary American technology industry emerged out of countercultural movements in the 1950s and 1960s and continues to attract individuals comfortable with questioning established social hierarchies and arrangements given the disruptive power of many technologies (Markoff 2005). Authoritarianism involves punitiveness towards those who differ from established norms and as a result has been found to robustly predict conservative attitudes on social issues such as abortion and gay rights (Hetherington and Weiler 2009; Stenner 2005; Peterson, Doty and Winter 1993). We predicted that those who self-select into becoming technology entrepreneurs would

¹⁹Although it is true that some regulation can serve businesspeople's self-interest, on the issues relevant to the technology industry we consider, regulation is usually clearly not in the industry's interest, and we find that technology elites oppose it.

²⁰"What's missing from Trump rally? Trump stocks," *Bloomberg*, <https://www.bloomberg.com/gadfly/articles/2017-05-01/what-s-missing-from-100-day-trump-rally-trump-stocks>.

²¹See House Roll Call 132 and Senate Recorded Vote 55 in the 112th Congress.

be very low in authoritarianism and, as a result, be very liberal on issues of social equality.

Second, we expected technology entrepreneurs to be highly cosmopolitan, following the work of Jackman and Vavreck (2011), who define cosmopolitans as people who embrace “things and people who are different,” and “whose conception of community is much more broad” (i.e., global) (p. 72). We expected those who self-select into the technology industry, which is highly racially diverse and globally integrated, to share this predisposition. Following Jackman and Vavreck (2011), we predicted and show that technology entrepreneurs share this predisposition and place comparatively high weight on the welfare of non-Americans across the globe. They are liberal on a variety of issues related to global equality, including concentrating on problems faced by those abroad, allowing greater immigration, and valuing the well-being of foreign workers who benefit from trade agreements even at the expense of American workers.²²

Third, we expected technology entrepreneurs to be low in racial resentment given the relatively high racial diversity of the educational settings where technology entrepreneurs receive their training and the geographic areas where they typically live. Those high in racial resentment are less likely to select into these experiences or to have this predisposition changed over time as a result of contact with outgroups. Research indicates that Americans’ attitudes towards taxing and spending are highly influenced by their views towards the racial minorities they see as beneficiaries of much of that spending (e.g., Gilens 1999, see also Schickler (2013)). We therefore expected technology entrepreneurs to be relatively friendly towards taxation and redistribution, in favor of reducing economic inequality.

With this said, we did not expect that technology entrepreneurs would simply look like liberal Democrats in every single domain; if they did, a simple alternative explanation for our findings could be that technology entrepreneurs were socialized as Democrats and then adopted the party’s view on every issue (Lenz 2012). A related alternative is that technology entrepreneurs know

²²See also “Ordering vinaloo or hunting for vension,” *The Upshot*, <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/28/upshot/ordering-vinaloo-or-hunting-for-venison-how-you-vote.html>.

that many of their customers are Democrats and so support Democratic policy positions to avoid offending their customers. But to the contrary, we also predicted that technology entrepreneurs would be more hostile than other Democrats towards government regulation. Their self-interest certainly favors these views in many cases, but we also expected them to have positive predispositions towards markets and entrepreneurs by virtue of their personal experiences and social identity as entrepreneurs that would make them skeptical of government constraining markets and entrepreneurs in these areas. Later, we present survey experiments that suggest these predispositions play an important role in informing technology entrepreneurs' views on regulation. Their resulting views in this domain qualifies their support for policies that could reduce inequality in other domains.

Pre-Analysis Plan

We developed these hypotheses based on pilot surveys we conducted of our sampling frame, described below. These pilot surveys contained early versions of our questionnaire and open-ended, qualitative questions we used to refine our hypotheses (Cramer-Walsh 2012). We then formally declared these hypotheses and the survey items we would use to test them in a pre-analysis plan.²³ This pre-analysis plan, which includes our full survey questionnaire, can be found in Online Appendix G. We finally tested these hypotheses on an independent sample of technology elites randomly drawn from the same sampling frame but who we had not previously interviewed.

A pre-analysis plan of this sort is distinct from those often used in field experiments (e.g., Casey, Glennerster and Miguel 2012), but has a similar motivation: it allowed us to state theoretical predictions and bind us to procedures for testing those predictions in advance of collecting the data that we used to test them. In this way, our pre-analysis plan is most similar to such plans in psychology, where pilot studies are conducted to form theoretical predictions which are then

²³URL removed for peer review. See pre-analysis plan in Online Appendix G.

pre-registered and independent samples are used to test those pre-registered predictions. This procedure ensures that we were able to inform our hypotheses based on qualitative responses from our population of interest while also precluding us from defining hypotheses or statistical tests *post hoc* (i.e., after observing the data we used to test them). The main goal of our pre-analysis plan was to *a priori* categorize the dependent variables, and make directional predictions for whether technology entrepreneurs should be more liberal than a set of baseline groups (e.g., Democratic citizens, highly educated Democrats, Republican donors).

Data

To test our predictions, we conducted an original survey of a unique sampling frame of elite technology entrepreneurs. To serve as comparisons to technology entrepreneurs, we also collected data on the political preferences of other key constituencies to which politicians are responsive: the elite donor base of each party as well as mass partisans. We describe each of these three surveys in this section.

We conducted all three of these surveys at the exact same time, the last week of February 2017. Nearly all the respondents to all three of our surveys completed their responses during that same week. This means we can rule out that any differences between the groups are due to reactions to different contemporaneous political events.

Survey of Technology Entrepreneurs

To gather the sampling frame for our survey, we relied on Crunchbase, a professionally run database of individuals in the technology industry. Crunchbase is a widely used resource in the technology industry. We gathered a random sample of all individuals listed as founders or CEOs of companies in Crunchbase in 2013, 8,499 individuals in all. We then manually searched for email addresses for these individuals. In most cases we were able to gather personal email addresses. As

described above, we conducted several small exploratory surveys of random subsamples of these individuals to formulate our hypotheses and register them in a pre-analysis plan. We next attempted to survey an independent group of 4,245 individuals in this frame to test our hypotheses. This survey received 691 responses, for a response rate of 16%.

To appraise survey respondents' representativeness of the sampling frame and for an objective measure of their companies' importance, we also gathered data from Crunchbase on the amount of venture capital funding these individuals' companies had raised. We were able to locate these data for 91.2% of the sampling frame and for 89.1% of respondents. Figure 3 compares the distribution of venture funding raised by the companies in the entire sampling frame to the companies of just our survey respondents, with the two panels either dropping the individuals we could not locate or recoding their values to zero. The company founded or led by the median respondent in the sampling frame and among our respondents raised over $\$10^6 = \$1,000,000$ in venture capital funding, with many respondents having raised substantially more.

Table 1 gives averages and illustrates the representativeness of our sample on several other dimensions. Our sample is also representative of the frame on whether the company is located in California. One dimension on which our sample is less representative is on whether the company shut down because it was acquired or went out of business. We suspect this is because the email addresses we found were likely to be out of date in these cases. If anything this means our sample slightly overrepresents those who founded successful businesses, who are the most substantively significant in the first place.

Some of our respondents were not US citizens and did not live in the US; the sampling frame included the founders of companies with a US presence but founded by non-US citizens who live in foreign countries.²⁴ We exclude these respondents from all subsequent analyses. As a result, Table 1 also provides these quantities just for the US citizen and resident responses, whose data we analyze. This group is if anything even more elite than the sampling frame.

²⁴The frame did not identify them as such.

Figure 3: Funding raised by companies sampling frame and respondents founded.




Table 1: Characteristics of companies founded by survey respondents and whole sampling frame.

	Mean Funding Raised	Mean log(Funding Raised + \$1)	Mean # Funding Rounds	In Calif.	Exit (IPO or Acquired)	Shut Down	Missing Funding Data	N
Whole Frame	\$19.0 million	5.69	2.39	31.1%	16.0%	9.5%	8.8%	8,499*
Respondents	\$25.7 million	6.08	2.82	32.4%	5.4%	2.3%	10.9%	691
US Respondents	\$28.3 million	6.15	2.92	35.3%	5.2%	2.2%	10.3%	603


*The entire sampling frame contained 8,499 individuals. For the survey data gathered for this paper, we emailed a random sample of 4,245 and received 691 responses, for a response rate of over 16%. The data in this table compares the respondents to the entire sampling frame.

Figure 4 presents further evidence that we successfully captured elite technology entrepreneurs. Questions on the survey indicate that the modal US respondent is a millionaire who founded and runs a company in the technology industry with approximately 100 employees.

Survey of Partisan Donor Bases

To compare the pressures technology entrepreneurs will place on politicians with the pressures politicians are currently experiencing from other key elite constituencies, we also conducted an original survey of partisan donors. We defined our donor sampling frame as follows. We began with data from Bonica (2013) on the names and addresses of all disclosed political donors in the

Figure 4: Self-reported respondent characteristics: elite technology entrepreneur survey.



US, updated for giving in the 2016 cycle. We then limited our sampling frame to all individuals who, since 2008, had given a disclosed donation to a candidate or committee affiliated with one party but, at any time since 1978, had never given a disclosed donation to a candidate or committee affiliated with the other party. Among this group who had given since 2008 and only to one party, we computed the total amount each individual had donated and took a random sample of 4,100 individuals who had given in the top 1% in terms of this amount. We repeated this process within each party, for a total of 8,200 large donors sampled, split by party. The average donor in this strata gave \$37,447 in disclosed donations from 2008-2016. We also took a random sample of 4,100 within each party who were in the remaining 99% of donors in terms of amount donated.

To recruit these donors to our survey, we sent them a letter in the mail at the address associated with their donations in the FEC data.²⁵ The letter directed donors to a website where they could enter a unique identifying code and record their responses. 1,152 of the 16,400 donors we sampled answered the survey, for a response rate of about 7%, which is slightly higher than similar incen-


²⁵This personal contact information is available for use for academic research.

tivized surveys of the mass public recruited to online surveys by mail (e.g., Broockman, Kalla and Sekhon 2017). Figure 5 and Table 2 compare the donor sampling frame and survey respondents on observable characteristics. Unsurprisingly, the largest donors were slightly less likely to respond to our survey, but our oversample recruited in anticipation of this meant that we still have hundreds of super-elite donors in each party in our data. In total, the respondents to our survey have donated over \$17.6 million to the political parties since 2008.

Table 2: Characteristics of partisan donors who responded to survey and in sampling frame.

	Donated Since 2008	# Donations Since 2008	Top 1% of Donors by Amount	Self-Reported Age	Self-Reported Millionaire?	N
Whole Frame (With Oversample)	\$19,002	32.8	50%	Unknown	Unknown	16,400
Respondents	\$14,967	55.0	43%	63	52%	1,152

Figure 5: Amount donated by partisan donor survey respondents and whole sampling frame.



Partisans in the Mass Public

To serve as a further comparison, we also gathered 1,636 survey responses from the mass public from Survey Sampling International. This large sample size means that we have reasonably sized subsamples of Americans who identify as Democrats and as Republicans, as well as college-educated Democrats specifically, who we show are not identical to technology entrepreneurs. We quota sampled to achieve benchmarks on education, gender, race, and party identification. Online Appendix C presents information on the representativeness of this sample, which is generally comparable to the U.S. Census and the American National Election Study.

Results

To measure relevant variables, we usually rely on indices we formed by averaging together multiple items. Combining multiple items into an index reduces measurement error and ensures that our results are not driven by idiosyncrasies particular to any item. We show the marginals for every item in Online Appendix A. To form each index, we rescale each each item to 0-1 (such that higher values represent a greater orientation toward the relevant construct), and then average these rescaled items together. This means all differences can also be interpreted as the average difference on the constituent rescaled items. Our pre-analysis plan, shown in Online Appendix G, pre-specified which items we would combine into each index. It also includes the questionnaire.

Throughout the paper we will report p -values on the numerical differences we discuss between populations on these measures.²⁶ However, given that the magnitude of most of these differences is extremely large and the differences are highly statistically significant, we focus on the substantive significance of the results. We exclude missing and don't know responses.

Because the differences we discuss are usually sizable, much of the paper also focuses on visual

²⁶We use one-tailed tests because we specified all of our directional hypotheses in advance as part of the pre-analysis plan. In practice, this does not matter much since the t-statistics are generally very large.

presentation of the results. Online Appendix B presents regression models that formally test the relevant hypotheses laid out in our pre-analysis plan about differences between groups we discuss. The regression models regress the survey responses on dummy variables representing the relevant population subgroups, with technology founders set as the baseline category. This specification means that the constant provides the mean among technology elites. The other regression coefficients give the differences between the subgroups and technology elites and test the hypotheses that these differences are non-zero.

Technology Entrepreneurs' Political Values and Predispositions

First, the partisan orientations of the technology entrepreneurs in our sample reinforce the puzzle that motivates our paper: the technology entrepreneurs who responded to our survey lean heavily Democratic. 75.2% indicated that they supported Hillary Clinton in the 2016 Presidential election, versus only 8.8% who supported Donald Trump. 61.3% of technology entrepreneurs in our survey identify as Democrats versus only 14.1% who identify as Republicans.

Next, we demonstrate that technology entrepreneurs have very liberal underlying values and dispositions in most areas. Table 3 summarizes the items we used to measure each predisposition. Online Appendix G contains the full item wordings.

Figure 6 illustrates the results, showing averages for these values and predispositions among the entire public, just those in the public who identify as Democrats,²⁷ just those people in the public who identify as Democrats and have college degrees, just Democratic donors, just those in the public that identify as Republicans, just Republican donors, and, finally, the technology entrepreneurs. Figure 6 shows that technology entrepreneurs are very low in authoritarianism. They are the lowest on this scale of any group ($p < 0.01$ for all comparisons), including being 0.03 scale points less authoritarian than even Democratic donors. Next, they are very high on cosmopolitanism, only a bit lower than Democratic donors. They are between 0.09 and 0.34 scale points

²⁷We ask the standard ANES party identification question and include leaners as partisans.

Table 3: Summary of Survey Items in Each Predisposition Scale

<p>Authoritarianism Source: Feldman and Stenner (1997) child rearing questions.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Independence or Respect for Elders • Obedience or Self-Reliance • Curiosity or Good Manners • Being Considerate or Well Behaved 	<p>Racial Resentment Source: Kinder and Sanders (1996), abbreviated.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Blacks have gotten less than they deserve. • If blacks only tried harder, they would be better off.
<p>Markets and Entrepreneurs Below we summarize this disposition with a question about the contribution of entrepreneurs to the economy. See next section for survey experiments using additional measures of positive predispositions towards markets and entrepreneurs that operate even in policy domains beyond their self-interest.</p>	<p>Cosmopolitanism Source: Jackman and Vavreck (2011)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Consider self citizen of world. • Hold a passport. • Been to Europe. • Been to Canada or Mexico. • Been to Africa, Asia, or South America. • Gone to an Indian restaurant. • Eaten sushi.


higher on cosmopolitanism than the mass public subgroups ($p < 0.01$ for all comparisons). They are also 0.11 scale points lower on racial resentment than mass Democrats ($p < 0.01$), and not quite as low as Democratic donors. Finally, they have a very positive predisposition towards entrepreneurs and markets—a concept we discuss in more detail below—being similar to Republican donors (0.22 - 0.25 scale points higher than all mass public comparison groups, $p < 0.01$).

Technology Entrepreneurs’ Liberal Redistributive, Globalist, and Social Policy Preferences

Following prior research, we anticipated that a population with these values and predispositions would have liberal views on social issues (given their low authoritarianism), globalism (given their high cosmopolitanism), and redistribution (given their low racial resentment)—policy preferences that favor economic, social, and global equality.

In Table OA3 we replicate the bivariate relationships other research has found between these

Figure 6: Values and Predispositions



values and predispositions and these policy areas in our mass public sample (all relationships significant at $p < 0.01$). (There is little variation on these predispositions and values within the technology elite sample to analyze.) For instance, moving across the range of authoritarianism is associated with a 0.82 standard deviation change in attitudes on social attitudes. To be clear, we do not think these particular values and predispositions are the only determinants of individuals' policy attitudes. Nor do we believe we are the first to document these relationships; on the contrary, these relationships are well-documented in the literature and here we show that our measures are able to replicate these established relationships. For more evidence that these predispositions do exert influence on individuals' judgments about political figures and issues, see Tesler (2015).

To test whether technology entrepreneurs indeed have liberal views in the policy domains we predicted, we first show results for overall indices we formed by combining related survey items in

each of four policy areas. As before, our pre-analysis plan, given in Online Appendix G, specified the survey items we would combine into each index and gives the item wordings in the questionnaire. Also as before, we combine the items by rescaling each to 0-1 and then taking the average of these items, such that the most liberal possible pattern of responses across all items with a domain would yield a 1 and the most conservative a 0. Table 4 gives a summary of the items we use to form each of the four scales. Online Appendix A gives the marginal distribution on every item by group, organized by policy area, and shows that the results are similar for the individual items.


Table 4: Summary of Survey Items in Each Policy Scale

<p>Globalism</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Pay less attention to problems overseas and concentrate on problems at home. • In trade agreements, prioritize American jobs over foreign jobs. • Ideal immigration policy (scale with defined options). • Free trade agreements are a good thing. <p>Regulation</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Regulate Uber like taxis. • Regulate ‘gig’ workers like regular workers. • It is too hard to fire workers. • Government regulation of business does more harm than good. • Regulations on drones, self-driving cars, and internet companies (separate items). 	<p>Redistribution</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Support for universal healthcare, even if means raising taxes. • Support programs benefiting only poorest Americans. • Support taxes on those making >\$250k per year. • Support taxes on those making >\$1MM per year. • Increase federal spending on the poor. <p>Social Issues</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Same-sex marriage. • View on abortion (scale with defined options). • Gun control. • Death penalty.
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Figure 7 illustrates the results. First, on policies related to globalism, technology entrepreneurs are the most pro-globalism of any of the groups save for Democratic donors (0.14 to 0.36 scale points greater than the other groups, $p < 0.01$). For example, technology entrepreneurs are the most likely to say that trade policy should prioritize the wellbeing of those abroad instead of Ameri-

cans (with 44% agreeing), to disagree that we should pay less attention to problems overseas (with 53% disagreeing), and to support free trade agreements (87%). 56% favor *increasing* levels of immigration, essentially equal to Democratic donors and more than any other sample, including 15 points higher than Democratic citizens ($p < 0.01$). All these policy views militate in favor of greater global equality through the sharing of American prosperity with individuals currently abroad, as one would expect from cosmopolitans (Jackman and Vavreck 2011). Republican donors and citizens are the most anti-globalist (see Figure OA1).

Figure 7: Average of Policy Indices By Area



Next, and perhaps most surprisingly, technology entrepreneurs strongly support redistribution and taxation. They appear similar to Democratic citizens and donors on these items but are more liberal than independent citizens, Republican citizens, and Republican donors ($p < 0.01$ for all three comparisons). For example, nearly all technology entrepreneurs support increasing taxes on

those making over \$250,000 or \$1,000,000 per year (with 76% and 83% expressing some support for each, respectively, and a majority expressing “strong” support for both). 75% support federal spending on programs that benefit only the poor, and 59% think spending on such programs should be increased. 82% indicate support for universal healthcare even if it means raising taxes, with a majority again offering “strong” support for this proposition. Only small minorities of technology entrepreneurs want federal spending on the poor to decrease (6%) or say that the government should not make sure all Americans have health coverage (18%). Only 6% of technology entrepreneurs strongly disagree that the government should ensure universal healthcare coverage, the category into which a majority of Republican donors fall. (See Figure OA2.)

Technology entrepreneurs’ strong support for taxing the wealthy and redistribution may be surprising in light of popular accounts of technology entrepreneurs that depict them as libertarians.²⁸ However, Table 5 shows that technology entrepreneurs are actually unusually *unlikely* to agree with a description of libertarian philosophy we provided them. In fact, Democratic citizens are almost twice as likely to agree with this statement as technology entrepreneurs.

Table 5: Technology Entrepreneurs Do Not Agree with Libertarian Philosophy

	Technology Founders	Democratic Donors	Republican Donors	Democrats (Public)	Republicans (Public)
Agree With Libertarian Philosophy	23.5%	5.1%	68.4%	43.8%	62.5%

Notes: The surveys asked whether individuals agreed or disagreed with the statement “I would like to live in a society where government does nothing except provide national defense and police protection, so that people could be left alone to earn whatever they could.” This question wording is from Page, Bartels and Seawright (2013). Cell probabilities above give the percent that either somewhat or strongly agreed.

On social issues, technology entrepreneurs are again very liberal—as liberal as Democratic

²⁸See, e.g., “Rise of the techno-Libertarians: The 5 most socially destructive aspects of Silicon Valley,” *Salon*, http://www.salon.com/2015/04/12/rise_of_the techno_libertarians_the_5_most_socially_destructive_aspects_of_silicon_valley_partner/.

donors, and more liberal than Democratic citizens (0.19 scale points greater, $p < 0.01$). Technology entrepreneurs nearly universally support same-sex marriage (96%), favor gun control (82%), oppose the death penalty (67%), and view abortion as a matter of personal choice (79%) (see Figure OA3).

To summarizing our results so far, we find technology elites generally favor policies that would increase economic, social, and global equality. They express similar attitudes on taxation and redistribution as existing constituencies in the Democratic Party. In other words, technology entrepreneurs are not libertarians. On policies relating to social issues and globalization, they are further to the left than mass partisans in the Democratic Party, but are similar to elite donors. These results contrast with a view of wealthy business elites as reliably supporting policies and politicians that would benefit their material self-interest in a manner that would exacerbate inequality. Although it is no surprise that the small share of wealthy individuals who self-select into becoming Democratic donors are relatively liberal, one would not necessarily expect an entire industry's most successful entrepreneurs to look similar to this highly liberal population, especially on questions of redistribution and taxation. However, in line with our theoretical argument, technology entrepreneurs' views in this realm correspond well with their underlying values and predispositions. In support of this relationship, we showed that these patterns are not simply due to entrepreneurs being more educated. As shown in Figures 6 and 7, technology elites are distinct in their predispositions and policy views from educated Democrats in the mass public.

These patterns are also evident when examining technology entrepreneurs who identify as Democrats, who presumably might have the greatest influence on the party. As shown in Online Appendix E, Democratic-identifying technology elites look similar to Democratic donors on issues in the redistribution, social policy, and globalism domains.

With this said, our findings are not as simple as documenting that technology entrepreneurs are liberals; technology entrepreneurs' values and predispositions are not all in alignment with Democratic Party conventional wisdom. In the next section, we describe a set of attitudes and

beliefs that set technology elites clearly apart from other Democratic Party constituencies.

Why Technology Entrepreneurs Are More Hostile to Regulation

In this section we show that technology entrepreneurs do not share conventional Democratic views on regulation of product and labor markets, and are likely to push the Democratic Party to be more conservative in these areas. This finding is important for two reasons. First, it rules out two simple alternative explanations for the data we have presented so far: that technology entrepreneurs are socialized as Democrats and then adopt the party's views on every issue (Lenz 2012) or strategically match the views of their customer base to avoid offending their customers' political sensibilities. Second, it adds importance nuance to the influence technology entrepreneurs may exert on economic inequality; even as they represent an unexpected buttress to liberal redistributive policies, we show that on issues such as labor unions and labor market regulations, technology entrepreneurs are much more conservative.

Why are technology entrepreneurs more conservative in this domain? We consider multiple possible explanations. Using a variety of survey experiments, we find, in line with our broader argument, that these views appear to stem in part from their predispositions—in particular, their favorable predispositions towards markets and entrepreneurs and negative predisposition toward government control. As in other domains, we argue that these patterns may emerge due both to who chooses to become a technology entrepreneur in the first place (selection) and as a result of their experiences as entrepreneurs.

Technology Entrepreneurs Are Generally More Opposed to Regulation Than Other Democrats

As Figure 7 showed, for policies in the regulation domain technology entrepreneurs are indeed more conservative than even Republican citizens (by 0.15 scale points, $p < 0.01$) and most sim-

ilar to Republican donors (who are only 0.05 scale points higher). For example, technology entrepreneurs almost all believe it is too difficult to fire workers right now and that the government should make it easier to do so (82%), similar to Republican donors and citizens. However, majorities of Democratic donors and citizens believe the government should make it harder to fire workers (a 50 percentage point difference from technology entrepreneurs, $p < 0.01$). Consistent with this difference, 74% of technology entrepreneurs say they would like to see labor unions' influence decrease, versus only 18% of Democratic donors and 33% of Democratic citizens ($p < 0.01$ in both cases). Such differences are obviously relevant to economic inequality—although technology entrepreneurs support redistribution, they react negatively to government intervention into the functioning of markets and firms that may also help reduce economic inequality.

Relative to Democrats, technology entrepreneurs are also less likely to support regulation in product markets, such as on drones, self-driving cars, and Internet companies. They are also much more likely to believe that government regulation of business does more harm than good (for individual items see Figure OA4; differences between 17 and 19 percentage points relative to Democratic donors; $p < 0.01$ for all three items). For example, technology entrepreneurs believe the government should not strictly regulate Uber like taxis (70%), similar to Republicans. However, Democratic citizens and donors do not agree (30-32 percentage point differences, $p < 0.01$).

Typically, individuals' views on regulation and redistribution correlate strongly; those with liberal views in the taxation and spending economic policy domains tend to have liberal views on regulation. For example, in the mass public and donor samples, the correlations between our redistribution and regulation indices are $r = .35$ and $r = .63$, respectively.²⁹ However, stacking the technology and mass samples and estimating a regression of regulation attitudes on redistributive attitudes and a dummy for the technology sample reveals that technology entrepreneurs are 0.22

²⁹Our claim is not that this correlation is reversed within the technology sample, but that technology entrepreneurs are much more opposed to regulation than would be anticipated on the basis of their redistributive attitudes.

scale points (on the average rescaled 0-1 item) more opposed to regulation than one would expect on the basis of their views on redistribution ($t = 20.68, p < 0.01$). Online Appendix E also shows that similar differences in views on regulation are evident even when we compare technology entrepreneurs who identify as Democrats to Democratic donors and Democratic citizens.

To confirm that technology entrepreneurs indeed tend to support redistribution yet oppose regulation more than other Democrats, we also asked our samples to indicate which of four statements came closest to their views, with response options such as “The government should tightly regulate business, and should tax the wealthy to fund social programs,” “The government should *not* tightly regulate business, and should tax the wealthy to fund social programs,” and so on. Table 6 shows the results. Technology entrepreneurs are the only group to predominantly select the option “The government should *not* tightly regulate business, and should tax the wealthy to fund social programs,” with a majority selecting this option—nearly twice as many as any other group we surveyed.

Table 6: Technology Entrepreneurs Uniquely Support Redistribution but Oppose Regulation

	Technology Founders	Democratic Donors	Republican Donors	Democrats (Public)	Republicans (Public)
Do Regulate and Do Redistribute	17.8%	62.6%	2.8%	53.8%	28.80%
Don’t Regulate and Do Redistribute	62.1%	34.7%	20.9%	36.3%	34.5%
Do Regulate and Don’t Redistribute	2.5%	1.2%	1.6%	6.0%	9.3%
Don’t Regulate and Don’t Redistribute	17.6%	1.5%	74.7%	3.9%	27.4%

Notes: $\chi^2(15) = 1.2 * 10^3, p < .001$.

Why are technology entrepreneurs more likely to oppose regulation? We consider three explanations: a simple demographic explanation, for which we find no evidence; self-interest, for which we find some evidence; and the role of underlying predispositions towards markets and en-

trepreneurs, for which we find the strongest evidence. This pattern supports our broader argument that self-interest alone can offer an incomplete picture of wealthy businesspeople’s political views.


Demographics

First, are technology entrepreneurs’ views on regulation simply epiphenomenal to their high levels of wealth or education? In Figure 8 we show that on most issues technology entrepreneurs are similarly liberal to college-educated Democrats, Democratic citizens who report having over \$1 million in personal assets, and Democratic donors who report having over \$1 million in personal assets. However, these groups are also liberal on regulatory policies, whereas technology entrepreneurs are conservative (differences between 24-29 scale points, $p < 0.01$). It is therefore not the case that wealthy or highly educated liberals are generally hostile to regulation; something is different about technology entrepreneurs. The average age of technology entrepreneurs in our sample was 42 and the average age of Democratic citizens in our sample was 43, so differences in age cannot be responsible either.

Self-Interest

Another possible explanation for technology entrepreneurs’ opposition to regulation is self-interest. We conducted a simple survey experiment that provides some evidence consistent with this possibility. In our survey, we modified the standard agree-disagree survey question “Government regulation of business does more harm than good” to see whether technology entrepreneurs would be especially likely to agree if we changed the question to focus on the technology industry specifically (i.e., “Government regulation of the technology industry does more harm than good.”). Table 7 shows that technology entrepreneurs are at the midpoint of the scale in the standard form of the question (2.4 on a 1-4 scale, indistinguishable from the scale midpoint of 2.5), but that their agreement that regulation does more harm increases by 0.3 scale points to 2.7 when the technol-

Figure 8: Comparing Technology Entrepreneurs to Educated and Wealthy Democrats



ogy industry is the focus on the question. On the other hand, technology entrepreneurs are slightly more favorable to regulation of other industries, such as finance and pharmaceuticals, thinking that the goods of regulating these industries are more likely to outweigh the harms. This is suggestive that, unsurprisingly, group interests play some role in their views.

With this said, even this evidence consistent with self-interest is not definitive, as other Democrats without a self-interested stake in regulation of the technology industry are also more likely to think that regulating the technology industry is harmful. In fact, Democratic donors react even more strongly to the “technology industry” treatment than technology entrepreneurs, suggesting that there is a more general view among Americans that regulation of the technology industry is slightly more harmful than of other industries, and that technology entrepreneurs are not dissimilar in holding this view. As the bolded coefficients in the final column of Table 7 shows, the differ-

Table 7: Technology Entrepreneurs More Likely to Oppose Regulation of Technology, Less Likely to Oppose of Other Industries; But So Are Other Democrats

	DV = "Government regulation of [CATEGORY] does more harm than good." (1-4 scale)			
	Technology Entrepreneurs	Democratic Donors	Democratic Partisans	All Three Groups
<i>Treatments</i>				
"the technology industry"	0.28** (0.11)	0.46*** (0.07)	0.19** (0.09)	0.28** (0.11)
"the financial industry (such as banks)"	-0.50*** (0.11)	-0.32*** (0.08)	-0.20** (0.09)	-0.50*** (0.12)
"the pharmaceutical industry"	-0.37*** (0.11)	-0.08 (0.07)	-0.10 (0.08)	-0.37*** (0.11)
<i>Sample Dummies (Technology Entrepreneurs = Base Category)</i>				
Democratic Donors				-0.94*** (0.10)
Democrats (Mass Public)				-0.03 (0.10)
<i>Treatment X Sample Interactions</i>				
Technology x Democratic Donors				0.18 (0.14)
Technology x Democrats (Mass Public)				-0.09 (0.14)
Finance x Democratic Donors				0.19 (0.14)
Finance x Democrats (Mass Public)				0.30** (0.14)
Pharmaceuticals x Democratic Donors				0.29** (0.14)
Pharmaceuticals x Democrats (Mass Public)				0.27* (0.14)
Constant	2.61*** (0.08)	1.67*** (0.05)	2.58*** (0.06)	2.61*** (0.08)
Observations	439	846	817	2,102
R-squared	0.13	0.12	0.02	0.25

Standard errors in parentheses.

*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$ (two-tailed).

ences between the technology entrepreneurs' reaction to the treatment that focused on technology regulation is statistically indistinguishable from the reactions of other Democrats. If technology entrepreneurs' political views on regulation were motivated by self-interest alone, we would expect much more pronounced differences between their reactions to this survey experiment compared to other populations.³⁰

The Role of Predispositions

In policy areas beyond regulation, we argued that technology entrepreneurs' values and predispositions should lead them to be similarly if not more liberal than Democratic citizens and donors. By contrast, they are notably less liberal than Democrats on matters of regulation. However, in line with our broader argument about the importance of elites' values and predispositions, we also argue that technology entrepreneurs share predispositions and values that contribute to their hostility to regulation. We expected that individuals who self-select into becoming entrepreneurs would have more favorable predispositions towards entrepreneurs and markets on average, and that their experiences being entrepreneurs could further contribute to these views. For example, in one of our pilot surveys, technology entrepreneurs were more than twice as likely as the general public to indicate that they had "personal experiences where government regulation made it harder...to do business" (with 75% agreeing, versus 32% for the general public, $p < 0.01$).

Consistent with these expectations, we now show several examples of technology entrepreneurs having positive predispositions towards markets and entrepreneurs and negative predispositions towards government control, even on issues that do not directly implicate their self-interest. Together, this provides further evidence that self-interest alone is not sufficient to understand technology entrepreneurs' views—even in this area where their views happen to align with their self-interest more closely.

³⁰Government regulation is also often in businesspeople's self-interest, as it can create barriers to entry, facilitate the movement of ideas across firms, establish intellectual property rights, facilitate the development of technologies such as the Internet, etc. (Saxenian 1996).

Uber vs. Florists Survey Experiment

One salient example of a technology company that has faced the threat of regulation is Uber, specifically its practice of “surge pricing,” or raising fares at times of high demand. This practice has drawn the ire of regulators nationwide.³¹ Unsurprisingly, when we asked technology entrepreneurs whether they thought Uber surge pricing was fair, 93% said that they did. On the other hand, both Democrats and Republicans in the mass public were split, with only 43% and 51% of these groups agreeing that Uber’s surge pricing was fair, respectively (differences from technology entrepreneurs significant at $p < 0.01$). Surprisingly, a simple survey experiment we conducted suggests that technology entrepreneurs’ support for surge pricing does not appear to reflect the fact that Uber is a technology company. Half of each sample did not see a question about Uber’s surge pricing but instead a question from Shiller, Boycko and Korobov (1990) touching on the same underlying principle yet about a different industry: “On a holiday, when there is a great demand for flowers, sellers usually increase their prices. Do you think it is fair for them to raise their prices like this?” Figure 9 shows that technology entrepreneurs were just as likely to say this practice *was* fair (with 96% saying so), even though it has nothing to do with the technology industry. But a majority of both Democratic and Republican partisans, 61% and 58% respectively, still thought this was *not* fair (differences with technology entrepreneurs significant at $p < 0.01$). This contrast suggests an underlying difference in how technology entrepreneurs view markets, regardless of whether their industry is implicated.


Privately versus Publicly Administered Services

Second, technology entrepreneurs’ greater friendliness towards markets and companies relative to government extends to their views on redistributive policies. Our surveys asked about support for government spending on programs “where the government spends the money and runs the pro-


³¹See, e.g., “D.C. Council Argues Uber’s Future in Bizarre, Daylong Hearing,” *DCist*, http://dcist.com/2012/09/dc_council_argues_ubers_future_in_b.php.

Figure 9: Uber vs. Florists Survey Experiment

Uber surge pricing fair.



Florists raising prices on holidays fair.



gram” and “where the government spends the money but the private sector runs the program,” each on a 1-5 scale. Column 1 of Table 8 reports a regression with the outcome computed as the difference between support for government-run programs and private-sector run programs on indicators for each group. The baseline category is technology entrepreneurs. Technology entrepreneurs are 0.39 scale points more in favor of programs run by the private sector rather than government-run programs. They are essentially identical to Republicans citizens in this way and significantly different from Democratic donors ($p < 0.01$) and citizens ($p < 0.01$), who are more supportive of having the government run publicly funded programs. This underscores the unique pattern of

technology entrepreneurs’ preferences: although they strongly support taxation and redistribution, they have more positive views of markets and entrepreneurs, to the point that they would prefer the private sector to spend funds they support the government collecting in taxes.

Table 8: Relative to Democrats, Technology Entrepreneurs Prefer Private to Public Sector Management Generally

	Approval of Privately Run Programs (1-5) Minus Approval of Gov’t Run Social Programs (1-5)	Gov’t Does Good Job Running Social Programs (1-4)	Entrepreneurs Get Too Much Credit (1-4)	Prefer Growth Over Equality (0-1)
Democratic Donors	-1.73*** (0.10)	0.64*** (0.05)	0.43*** (0.05)	-0.43*** (0.03)
Democrats (Mass Public)	-0.62*** (0.10)	0.17*** (0.05)	0.76*** (0.05)	-0.36*** (0.03)
Republican Donors	1.16*** (0.13)	-0.89*** (0.07)	-0.06 (0.06)	0.17*** (0.04)
Republicans (Mass Public)	-0.05 (0.10)	-0.15*** (0.05)	0.76*** (0.05)	-0.09*** (0.03)
Constant (Base Category = Technology Entrepreneurs)	0.44*** (0.08)	2.19*** (0.04)	2.20*** (0.04)	0.80*** (0.02)
Observations	2,952	2,940	3,069	2,875
R-squared	0.22	0.21	0.13	0.17

Standard errors in parentheses.

*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Belief Government Programs Do a Good Job

The second column of Table 8 reports further evidence consistent with technology entrepreneurs being less trusting of non-market social programs than Democrats. We asked respondents whether they thought “the government generally does a good job of running social programs meant to help poor people.” Technology entrepreneurs were more likely to disagree than agree with this question, and scored below the scale midpoint of 2.5. Democrats were much more likely to believe that the government does a good job running programs than technology entrepreneurs.

Positive Views of Entrepreneurs

Not only do technology entrepreneurs have a more positive view of markets than of government, they also have a positive view of entrepreneurs. The third column of Table 8 shows a regression with the outcome of whether individuals agreed with the statement that “Entrepreneurs and other people with new ideas get too much credit these days; ordinary people who work hard are the backbone of this country.” Technology entrepreneurs tended to disagree with this question, again averaging below the scale’s midpoint and indicating that they believe entrepreneurs do not get too much credit. Republican donors are similar to technology entrepreneurs on this question, whereas Democrats are distinct.

Aversion to Slow Economic Growth

Consistent with these views, we asked our samples whether they thought “People’s income should be as equal as possible even if it slows down economic growth” or “Wide income disparities are acceptable if it means the economy grows faster.” Even though technology entrepreneurs were highly in favor of taxation and spending programs meant to alleviate inequality, they nevertheless expressed skepticism of “slow[ing] down economic growth,” with an overwhelming 80% of technology entrepreneurs selecting the latter option that tolerated inequality if it meant higher economic growth. That level of support is second only to the 97% agreement with this statement among Republican donors and is even greater than for Republican citizens ($p < 0.01$). Democratic donors and citizens, by contrast, tend to express a preference for the economy to grow slower if it means incomes are kept more equal (with only 45% and 37% of them, respectively, opting for higher growth and inequality).

Together, these questions and experiments support our argument that technology entrepreneurs are different from Democrats on issues related to government regulation and intervention in the economy, and that these differences appear to arise out of genuine values and predispositions they

apply more generally, not only when the interests of technology entrepreneurs are at stake.³² In Online Appendix E we show that these relationships and differences with other Democrats hold even when examining technology entrepreneurs who identify as Democrats.

Future work can clearly probe technology entrepreneurs' views in this area in greater depth, as well as the complicated relationship between their self-interest and predispositions in this area. Overall, however, what is clear is that technology entrepreneurs are more skeptical than Democrats of government intervention and control and feel much more positively towards markets and entrepreneurs. It appears to be for these reasons that they often break with Democrats' conventional wisdom on matters of regulation.

Discussion

In a time of rising inequality, one of the most theoretically influential and publicly relevant areas of political science research concerns how wealthy businesspeople influence politics. Research firmly establishes that wealthy businesspeople can exert outsized influence through a variety of mechanisms, but we know surprisingly little about what wealthy businesspeople want government to do and why. In this paper, we drew on theories of political behavior to argue that wealthy businesspeople in an industry may share values and predispositions that lead them to support policies, politicians, and parties one would not predict on the basis of their self-interest alone. Although it is obvious that individual wealthy liberals exist, our analysis shows that an entire industry may actually use its influence to support economic, social, and global equality in a variety of ways.

Our argument makes sense of the puzzle that wealthy individuals at the forefront of one of the most significant and ascendant business sectors, the technology industry, overwhelmingly support Democrats with their donations and votes. As we discussed, this support for Democrats holds among wealthy technology employees, the elite technology entrepreneurs in our sample, and the

³²As expected, relationships between the three variables we used as outcomes in Table 8 correlate with opposition to regulation more generally. We report these relationships in Table OA4.

ultrawealthy Americans in the Forbes 400 who are from the technology industry. Far from representing lipservice or transactional donations in service of access, titans of Silicon Valley including the founders and leaders of Facebook, LinkedIn, YCombinator, and Zynga have made their support for Democrats clear, with these individuals publicly indicating they “committ[ed] \$20M to help Democrats in the 2016 election” (Moskovitz, co-founder of Facebook),³³ “endorsing Hillary Clinton for president,” calling Donald Trump “a real threat to the safety of women, minorities, and immigrants” (Altman, YCombinator),³⁴ and saying that they want to reinvent the Democratic party’s campaign infrastrucutre to help it win more elections but also be more pro-business (Pincus, Zynga and Hoffman, LinkedIn).³⁵

From the point of view that wealthy businesspeople typically work to advance policies that redound to their benefit and exacerbate inequality, technology entrepreneurs’ reliable support for Democrats represents a puzzle. To shed light on this puzzle, we conducted among the first large scale surveys of wealthy businesspeople’s political views in any industry. This unique survey allowed us to test key predictions of our broader argument. Our findings were by no means obvious. We showed that technology entrepreneurs are not simply economic conservatives and social liberals. Further, they are not identical to other wealthy and educated Democrats, and also are not libertarians, as popular accounts often claim. Rather, technology entrepreneurs share a unique set of predispositions that correspond with liberal policy preferences in many domains, including taxation and government spending.

These patterns may help explain initially puzzling political decisions of technology industry titans to support liberal causes even when their firms’ interests are on the line. For example, Salesforce CEO Marc Benioff cancelled the company’s events and travel to Indiana after it passed a law

³³“Compelled to act,” *Medium*, <https://medium.com/@moskov/compelled-to-act-1413930041e>

³⁴“The 2016 Election,” <http://blog.samaltman.com/the-2016-election>.

³⁵“2 tech billionaires are trying to start a third political party that’s ‘pro-buiness, ‘pro-planet’ – here’s how it works,” *Business Insider*, <http://www.businessinsider.com/reid-hoffman-mark-pincus-wtf-2017-7>.

allowing discrimination against LGBT people,³⁶ while Facebook’s co-founder Mark Zuckerberg founded an immigration reform group, FWD.us, that advocates for immigration reform that would benefit undocumented immigrants, not only the high-skilled immigrants most relevant to his firm.³⁷

Our argument also helped illuminate why technology entrepreneurs are unlike Democrats in one key policy domain—government regulation. We showed that technology entrepreneurs’ positive predispositions towards markets and entrepreneurs sets them apart from other Democrats, even when comparing Democratic citizens and donors to the technology entrepreneurs who explicitly identify as Democrats. Going forward, these differences are likely to create significant conflicts within the Democratic Party coalition. Figure 2 showed that elite Democratic donors think that labor unions are the most likely to lose influence within the Democratic Party in the coming years. Technology entrepreneurs—who donors thought were among the most likely to gain influence—would appear to welcome any such decline in labor unions’ political influence. Figure 10 shows that substantial majorities of technology entrepreneurs would like to see labor unions have less influence, in the case of both private sector (76%) and public sector (72%) unions, making technology entrepreneurs most similar to extremely anti-union Republican donors. How technology entrepreneurs, labor unions, and the Democratic Party interact in the coming years will prove illuminating for theories of partisan change and party coalitions. Our work provides a baseline at the beginning of these processes that future research will be able to exploit, a resource that has proven tremendously valuable in the context of other historical periods (Schickler 2016). For now, our argument would tentatively suggest that struggles over Democratic party ideology’s views toward regulating product and labor markets will take center stage (Noel 2014). Indeed, if technology entrepreneurs are successful at altering Democratic ideology in the regulatory domain, this could potentially produce a classic case of “conflict extension” to Democratic citizens, reshaping the


³⁶“Salesforce CEO Benioff Takes Stand Against Indiana Anti-Gay Law,” *Recode*, <https://www.recode.net/2015/3/26/11560746/salesforce-ceo-benioff-takes-stand-against-indiana-anti-gay-law>.

³⁷“Uniting behind immigration reform,” *fwd.us*, https://www.fwd.us/about_reform..


contours of mass opinion in this domain (Layman et al. 2010).

Figure 10: Technology Entrepreneurs Welcome The Decline of Labor Unions' Influence

Would like to see **public** labor unions have...



Would like to see **private** labor unions have...



Such a reconfiguration of the Democratic Party coalition may have mixed implications for inequality. On the one hand, technology entrepreneurs seem poised to reinforce pressure from Democratic donors to move the party leftward on many issues related to economic, social, and global equality. At the same time, technology entrepreneurs stand opposed to many government interventions in markets, such as government support for labor unions, worker protections, and consumer protections. These policies have long been a staple of the Democratic Party's ideological answer to inequality. To the extent technology entrepreneurs gain influence relative to current

Democratic Party donors, the net impact on inequality is therefore more subtle than at first glance.

What does our theory and data indicate about wealthy business elites in other industries? Our theoretical argument readily allows that technology entrepreneurs hold different patterns of views than business elites in other industries. Indeed, this is what our theory would predict: business elites in a different industry who face similar economic incentives but have different political predispositions should have different views and behavior. This paper focused on testing our theoretical predictions using variation within the case of technology entrepreneurs and between technology entrepreneurs, donors, and voters. Although ours is the first survey of its kind in any industry, we are optimistic that our work will open up a research agenda that examines variation across industries, and we would welcome further research that did so.

As with all descriptive work, one limitation of our analysis is that we are not able to definitively establish the causal dynamics underpinning the relationships we demonstrated. Although the underlying political behavior theories we drew from have been carefully tested elsewhere (e.g., Tesler 2015), we would welcome future research that more firmly establishes the causal relationships and mechanisms underpinning the relationships we demonstrated. Nevertheless, it is striking that an analysis of technology entrepreneurs' self-interest would likely make many incorrect predictions about their views in many domains and overall behavior, whereas shared group predispositions and values fit the data well. In this way, our work joins other research in highlighting how careful description of theoretically relevant group's opinions and behavior can speak to enduring questions about politics (e.g., Hersh and Goldenberg 2016; Hersh and Malina 2017; Hersh and Nall 2016).

We should, however, stress that our argument is not that wealthy businesspeople's self-interest never matters. For example, as in many other industries, technology firm PACs give to both parties, likely as a means of gaining access to legislators to argue for policies relevant to their firms. Future work can and should explore how wealthy businesspeople navigate conflicts between their self-interest and predispositions, where such conflicts exist. For example, we might expect technology entrepreneurs to be more likely to take action on issues where their self-interest is implicated than

when it is not, and on issues where their self-interest is visible, tangible, and clear—patterns observed among the mass public (Citrin and Green 1990; Green and Cowden 1992). For example, the Silicon Valley Leadership Group, a lobbying organization of Silicon Valley companies, unsurprisingly tends to focus on policy areas of most clear economic relevance to these companies.³⁸

What we show is that this is not the entire story. For example, when we asked technology entrepreneurs on one of our preliminary surveys to pick three policy areas that were most important to them, they were even more likely than the general public to select areas related to public goods provision, such as education, the environment, public infrastructure, and health care. They were, if anything, *less* likely to prioritize taxes (see Online Appendix D).³⁹ In this way, as in the mass public, although self-interest is clearly relevant to understanding technology entrepreneurs' political behavior, an analysis based on their self-interest alone misses significant patterns and nuance. On a theoretical level, appreciating such patterns holds important insights into how changes in *who* benefits from economic inequality—what industry those with growing wealth come from, and what these individuals value—can influence how government will be pressured to respond.

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³⁸"Policy Areas," *Silicon Valley Leadership Group*, <http://svlg.org/policy-areas>.

³⁹Consistent with this, in a recent gathering of Silicon Valley founders interested in becoming more involved in politics, the invitation described "No matter what issue you care about" to prospective attendees as "immigration, climate, civil rights, women, etc." without mentioning economic issues that would be of the greatest relevance to Silicon Valley's material self-interest (see "Silicon Valley Action Conference," <http://www.siliconvalleyaction.org/agenda/>).

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Online Appendix


A Marginals on Every Item

Figure OA1: Globalism Item Marginals




Figure OA2: Redistribution Item Marginals


Increase federal spending on the poor.




Support programs benefiting only poorest Americans.



Increase taxes on those making >\$250k per year.



Increase taxes on those making >\$1MM per year.



Support for universal healthcare, even if means raising taxes.






Figure OA3: Social Issues Item Marginals


Same-sex marriage.



Death penalty.



Gun control.



View on abortion.






Figure OA4: Regulation Item Marginals

(a)


Regulate Uber like taxis.




Regulate gig workers like regular workers.



It is too hard to fire workers.




Government regulation of business does more harm than good.




(b)


Regulations on drones should...



Regulations on self-driving cars should...



Regulations on how internet companies store data should...



B Regression Tables

B.1 Formal Tests of Hypotheses

We present two sets of regressions of each area, in accordance with our pre-analysis plan, so that we can compare technology entrepreneurs with both citizens within each party and citizens within each party who are educated. This helps establish that technology entrepreneurs' views are not epiphenominal to their high educational attainment.

In all regressions, the base category is technology entrepreneurs. This means the constant can be interpreted as the mean for technology entrepreneurs and the other coefficients can be interpreted as the differences between technology entrepreneurs and other groups.

B.2 Relationships Between Predispositions and Policy Preferences Among the Mass Public

Table OA1: Formal Test of Differences in Policy Preferences Across Groups**(a) Separating Mass Public by Party**

	Regulation	Redistribution	Globalism	Social Issues
Democratic Donors	-0.29*** (0.01)	0.13*** (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	0.08*** (0.01)
Republican Donors	0.05*** (0.02)	-0.30*** (0.02)	-0.30*** (0.02)	-0.51*** (0.02)
Democratic Citizens	-0.24*** (0.01)	0.02 (0.01)	-0.17*** (0.01)	-0.19*** (0.01)
Republican Citizens	-0.15*** (0.01)	-0.15*** (0.01)	-0.34*** (0.01)	-0.48*** (0.01)
Independent Citizens	-0.19*** (0.03)	-0.09*** (0.03)	-0.25*** (0.03)	-0.32*** (0.03)
Constant (Base Category = Technology Entrepreneurs)	0.60*** (0.01)	0.78*** (0.01)	0.62*** (0.01)	0.83*** (0.01)
Observations	3,193	3,083	3,049	3,042
R-squared	0.25	0.35	0.27	0.53

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

(b) Separating Mass Public by Party and Education

	Regulation	Redistribution	Globalism	Social Issues
Democratic Donors	-0.29*** (0.01)	0.13*** (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	0.08*** (0.01)
Republican Donors	0.05*** (0.02)	-0.30*** (0.02)	-0.30*** (0.02)	-0.51*** (0.02)
College-Educated Democratic Citizens	-0.26*** (0.02)	0.03* (0.02)	-0.14*** (0.02)	-0.13*** (0.02)
College-Educated Republican Citizens	-0.12*** (0.02)	-0.17*** (0.02)	-0.29*** (0.02)	-0.44*** (0.02)
College-Educated Independent Citizens	-0.23*** (0.03)	-0.14*** (0.04)	-0.26*** (0.04)	-0.30*** (0.06)
No College Democratic Citizens	-0.24*** (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	-0.18*** (0.02)	-0.21*** (0.02)
No College Republican Citizens	-0.16*** (0.01)	-0.14*** (0.01)	-0.36*** (0.01)	-0.49*** (0.01)
No College Independent Citizens	-0.19*** (0.03)	-0.06** (0.03)	-0.26*** (0.04)	-0.34*** (0.04)
Constant (Base Category = Technology Entrepreneurs)	0.60*** (0.01)	0.78*** (0.01)	0.62*** (0.01)	0.83*** (0.01)
Observations	3,080	3,005	2,978	2,979
R-squared	0.26	0.35	0.28	0.54

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table OA2: Formal Test of Differences In Predispositions and Values Across Groups**(a) Separating Mass Public by Party**

	Value of Entrepreneurs	Racial Resentment	Cosmopolitanism	Authoritarianism
Democratic Donors	-0.14*** (0.02)	0.12*** (0.01)	0.08*** (0.02)	-0.03** (0.01)
Republican Donors	0.02 (0.02)	-0.35*** (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.28*** (0.02)
Democratic Citizens	-0.25*** (0.02)	-0.11*** (0.02)	-0.22*** (0.02)	-0.40*** (0.02)
Republican Citizens	-0.25*** (0.02)	-0.38*** (0.02)	-0.27*** (0.02)	-0.50*** (0.02)
Independent Citizens	-0.22*** (0.03)	-0.23*** (0.03)	-0.28*** (0.03)	-0.46*** (0.04)
Constant (Base Category = Technology Entrepreneurs)	0.60*** (0.01)	0.72*** (0.01)	0.59*** (0.02)	0.88*** (0.01)
Observations	3,139	2,991	3,382	3,018
R-squared	0.13	0.39	0.19	0.35

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

(b) Separating Mass Public by Party and Education

	Value of Entrepreneurs	Racial Resentment	Cosmopolitanism	Authoritarianism
Democratic Donors	-0.14*** (0.02)	0.12*** (0.01)	0.08*** (0.02)	-0.03** (0.01)
Republican Donors	0.02 (0.02)	-0.35*** (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.28*** (0.02)
College-Educated Democratic Citizens	-0.20*** (0.02)	-0.09*** (0.02)	-0.09*** (0.02)	-0.31*** (0.02)
College-Educated Republican Citizens	-0.21*** (0.02)	-0.37*** (0.02)	-0.14*** (0.02)	-0.49*** (0.02)
College-Educated Independent Citizens	-0.25*** (0.06)	-0.28*** (0.04)	-0.11** (0.05)	-0.34*** (0.07)
No College Democratic Citizens	-0.27*** (0.02)	-0.12*** (0.02)	-0.24*** (0.02)	-0.43*** (0.02)
No College Republican Citizens	-0.28*** (0.02)	-0.39*** (0.02)	-0.30*** (0.02)	-0.51*** (0.02)
No College Independent Citizens	-0.23*** (0.04)	-0.21*** (0.04)	-0.34*** (0.03)	-0.50*** (0.05)
Constant (Base Category = Technology Entrepreneurs)	0.60*** (0.01)	0.72*** (0.01)	0.59*** (0.02)	0.88*** (0.01)
Observations	3,034	2,933	3,244	2,955
R-squared	0.14	0.39	0.20	0.35

Table OA3: Replication of Relationships Between Policy Preferences and Predispositions Documented in Other Studies — Mass Public Only

Regulation	Redistribution	Globalism	Social Issues	Regulation
Racial Resentment	0.10*** (0.02)			
Cosmopolitanism		0.25*** (0.02)		
Authoritarianism			0.26*** (0.03)	
Value of Entrepreneurship				0.25*** (0.02)
Constant	0.37*** (0.01)	0.59*** (0.01)	0.28*** (0.01)	0.40*** (0.01)
Observations	1,602	1,552	1,567	1,558
R-squared	0.02	0.14	0.06	0.09

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table OA4: Attitudes Towards Markets and Entrepreneurs Predict Opposition to Regulation Among the Mass Public

Dependent Variable = Opposition to Regulation			
Preferences for Private Sector to Deliver Services	0.10*** (0.01)		
Government Does Good Job Running Social Programs		-0.12*** (0.02)	
Entrepreneurs Get Too Much Credit			-0.10*** (0.02)
Constant	0.40*** (0.01)	0.93*** (0.08)	0.89*** (0.09)
Observations	1,560	1,554	1,602
R-squared	0.04	0.03	0.02

Standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

C Representativeness of Mass Public Sample

Table OA5: Descriptive Statistics of SSI Sample, American Community Survey, and American National Election Study

	SSI	2015 ACS	2016 ANES
Education			
Less than High School	3.9%	12.9%	9.0%
High School/Some College/Associate's	68.3	59.0	55.2
Bachelor's Degree	16.8	17.9	22.6
Graduate Degree	11.0	10.1	13.3
Gender			
Male	47.1%	49.4%	47.5%
Female	52.9	50.6	52.5
Race			
White	69.3%	73.1%	67.6%
Black	11.9	12.7	10.2
Hispanic	10.6	—	14.4
Asian	5.7	5.4	2.6
Other	2.5	8.9	5.3
Age			
18-29	24.9%	21.7	16.7%
30-49	36.9	33.6	32.2
50-64	23.4	25.4	26.0
65+	14.8	19.2	25.0

Note: Education categories collapsed for comparability across surveys. 2015 ACS considers Hispanic to be separate variable from race/ethnicity.

D Issue Importance Question on Pilot Survey

On one of our pilot surveys, we asked the mass public and technology entrepreneurs to “Please select up to three issues below that are extremely important to you personally. (If none are extremely important to you personally, you can select none.)” The issues and the percent of each sample that selected each is given below. This was a relatively small pilot survey, with $N = 371$ for all citizens, $N = 182$ for Democratic citizens, $N = 119$ for Republican citizens, and $N = 53$ for technology entrepreneurs. This means that for technology entrepreneurs the typical standard error for the items below is approximately 5%. The Table is sorted in descending order of importance for technology entrepreneurs.

Issue	Mass Public	Democrats	Republicans	Technology Entrepreneurs
Education	30%	36%	30%	45%
Environment/Climate Change	15%	19%	8%	38%
Health care	33%	41%	24%	34%
Guns	16%	14%	19%	24%
Gap between the rich and poor	14%	19%	8%	21%
Infrastructure	6%	6%	7%	17%
Federal budget deficit	13%	7%	20%	15%
Taxes	16%	17%	18%	13%
Net neutrality	2%	3%	1%	13%
Immigration	19%	13%	30%	9%
Unemployment	13%	12%	8%	8%
Race relations	10%	10%	10%	8%
Government transparency	9%	6%	10%	8%
Terrorism	28%	18%	44%	6%
Crime	15%	15%	17%	6%
Foreign Affairs	2%	4%	0%	6%
Abortion	11%	9%	15%	6%
LGBT rights	8%	10%	5%	6%
Poverty	14%	13%	8%	6%
Wars in the Middle East	4%	2%	8%	4%
Oil and fuel prices	7%	8%	4%	2%

E Comparing Democratic Technology Entrepreneurs to Other Groups

One implication of our argument is that technology entrepreneurs may begin to influence the direction of the Democratic Party, especially on matters of regulation. Consistent with this, we showed in Figure 2 that elite Democratic donors see technology entrepreneurs as the group in the party least likely to lose influence and second most likely to gain influence. However, this influence may primarily stem from *technology entrepreneurs who identify as Democrats*' influence on the Party, whereas technology entrepreneurs who do not identify as Democrats may not influence the Party as much. Where, then, do technology entrepreneurs who identify as Democrats stand on matters of regulation and in terms of their predispositions relevant to regulation?


We note that we did not pre-register these comparisons; they were suggested to us on the basis of a discussion draft of the paper.

Figure OA5 replicates the comparisons to groups of Democrats in Figure 7 but including a group of just technology entrepreneurs who identify as Democrats. It is not surprising that technology entrepreneurs who identify as Democrats are slightly more liberal than the group as a whole. The key finding is that technology entrepreneurs who identify as Democrats remain less supportive of regulation than existing Democratic constituencies.

Next, Table OA6 replicates Table 8 in the text, but limiting the technology sample to technology entrepreneurs who identify as Democrats. Relative to Democratic donors, we still find that technology entrepreneurs who identify as Democrats are more supportive of running social programs privately, less likely to think government does a good job running social programs, less likely to think entrepreneurs get too much credit, and more likely to prefer growth over equality.

Finally, Table OA7 replicates Figure 9 from the text, showing that Democratic technology entrepreneurs are similarly indifferent as the entire technology entrepreneur sample to whether the industry at hand is a tech company or not. They are similarly likely to agree rising prices is fair in

Figure OA5: Comparing Democratic-Identifying Technology Entrepreneurs to Other Groups



both cases.

Table OA6: Relative to Democrats, Technology Entrepreneurs *Who Identify As Democrats* Prefer Private to Public Sector Management Generally

	Approval of Privately Run Programs (1-5) Minus Approval of Gov't Run Social Programs (1-5)	Gov't Does Good Job Running Social Programs (1-4)	Entrepreneurs Get Too Much Credit (1-4)	Prefer Growth Over Equality (0-1)
Democratic Donors	-1.32*** (0.13)	0.36*** (0.07)	0.40*** (0.07)	-0.39*** (0.04)
Democrats (Mass Public)	-0.21 (0.13)	-0.11 (0.07)	0.73*** (0.07)	-0.32*** (0.04)
Republican Donors	1.57*** (0.16)	-1.17*** (0.08)	-0.08 (0.08)	0.21*** (0.05)
Republicans (Mass Public)	0.37*** (0.13)	-0.43*** (0.07)	0.73*** (0.07)	-0.05 (0.04)
Constant (Base Category = <i>Democratic Tech. Entrepreneurs</i>)	0.03 (0.12)	2.48*** (0.06)	2.23*** (0.06)	0.77*** (0.03)
Observations	2,742	2,744	2,801	2,680
R-squared	0.23	0.23	0.11	0.16

Standard errors in parentheses.

*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table OA7: Uber vs. Florists Survey Experiment - Including Democratic Technology Entrepreneurs

	Raising Prices Is Fair For...	
	Uber	Florists
Republican Citizens	51%	42%
Republican Donors	79%	95%
Democratic Citizens	43%	38%
Democratic Donors	65%	79%
All Technology Entrepreneurs	94%	96%
Democratic Technology Entrepreneurs	91%	95%

F Forbes 400 Individuals Coded as In Technology

In Figure 1a in the main text, we show the share of the top 400 wealthiest Americans each year who made their money primarily in the technology industry has increased over time. The Forbes 400 data was shared with us by Adam Bonica, and is described in Bonica and Rosenthal (2015). We coded whether each member of the Forbes 400's primary source of wealth was a technology company or not. The list of Forbes 400 individuals coded as technology entrepreneurs and their source of wealth is below, as noted in Footnote 5. Note that this is **not** a list of the respondents to our survey; it is a list of Forbes 400 individuals we coded as having made their money primarily in the technology industry Bonica and Rosenthal (2015).

Table OA8: Forbes 400 Individuals Coded as In Technology

Name	Source
Richard L Adams	Uunet
Paul Gardner Allen	Microsoft
Alan Ashton	Wordperfect
Steven Anthony Ballmer	Microsoft
Bruce Bastian	Wordperfect
Andreas Von Bechtolsheim	Google
Marc Benioff	Salesforce.Com
Jeffrey P Bezos	Amazon.Com
Michael Birck	Tellabs Inc.
Sergey Brin	Google
Gary Burrell	Navigation Equipment
Steve Case	America Online
Jomei Chang	Software
Pehong Chen	Broadvision
Aubrey Chernick	Software
James H Clark	Netscape
Mark Cuban	Broadcast.Com
Weili Dai	Semiconductors
Jack Dangermond	Mapping Software
Robert Davidson	Software
Michael Dell	Computers
Bharat Desai	Syntel
Robert J Desantis	Ariba
Jack Dorsey	Square, Twitter

Continues on next page...

Table OA9: Forbes 400 Individuals Coded as In Technology, Continued

David M Doyle	Quest Software
David A Duffield	Peoplesoft Inc.
Fred Farhad Ebrahimi	Quark Inc.
Lawrence J Ellison	Oracle Corp.
Marcy Ewing	Internet
David Filo	Yahoo! Inc.
Louis Jr Gerstner	Ibm
Tim Gill	Quark Inc.
Robert D Glaser	Realnetworks
James Goodnight	Software
Norman Hascoe	Semiconductor Materials
Bill Harris Hayden	Compuadd
William R Hewlett	Hewlett-Packard Co.
Reid Hoffman	Linkedin
Irwin Mark Jacobs	Qualcomm
Naveen Jain	Microsoft
Steven P Jobs	Apple Computer
Min Kao	Navigation Equipment
Peter Jr Karmanos	Compuware
Jeong H Kim	Yurie Systems
Timothy Koogle	Yahoo! Inc.
Omid Kordestani	Google
Keith J Krach	Ariba
Scott Kriens	Juniper Networks
Raymond J Lane	Oracle Corp.
Eric Lefkofsky	Groupon
Ted Leonsis	America Online
Robert Levine	Cabletron Systems
John Little	Portal Software
Pamela M Lopker	Software
Roger M Marino	Data Storage
Paul A Maritz	Microsoft
Armas Clifford Jr Markkula	Apple Computer
Andrew Mckelvey	Monster.Com
Scott G Mcnealy	Sun Microsystems
C Edward Mcvaney	J.D. Edwards & Co.
Thomas J Meredith	Dell Computer
Robert N Miner	Oracle Corp.
John Jay Moores	Software
John P Morgridge	Cisco Systems Inc.
Dustin Moskovitz	Facebook
Elon Musk	Tesla Motors
Nathan Myhrvold	Microsoft
William Neukom	Microsoft
Henry T Nicholas	Broadcom
Raymond J Noorda	Novell, Inc.

Continues on next page...

Table OA10: Forbes 400 Individuals Coded as In Technology, Continued

Robert N Noyce	Intel Corp., Investments
Scott Oki	Microsoft
Kenneth Harry Olsen	Digital Equipment Corp.
Pierre Omidyar	Ebay
David Packard	Hewlett-Packard Co.
Larry E Page	Google
Max Martin Palevsky	Computers
Bob Parsons	Web Hosting
Neal Patterson	Health It
Ross H Perot	Electronic Data Systems
Robert Pittman	America Online
Barry Porter	Global Crossing
Laurene Powell Jobs	Apple, Disney
Frank Pritt	Attachmate Corp.
Jeffrey Raikes	Msft
Kavitark Ram Shriram	Venture Capital, Google
Gregory Reyes	Brocade Communications
John Sall	Software
Henry Samuel	Broadcom
Eduardo Saverin	Facebook
Michael Saylor	Software
Eric Schmidt	Google
Thomas Secunda	Bloomberg Lp
Jon Shirley	Microsoft
Kavitark Ram Shriram	Google
Sanjiv Sidhu	Software
Thomas M Siebel	Siebel Systems Inc.
Charles Simonyi	Microsoft
Pradeep Sindhu	Juniper Networks
Jeffrey Skoll	Ebay
David Sun	Kingston Technology
Sehat Sutardja	Semiconductors
Sirjang Lal Tandon	Tandon Corp.
Peter Thiel	Facebook
Alan N Trefler	Pegasystems, Inc.
John Tu	Kingston Technology
Romesh T Wadhvani	Software
Todd Wagner	Broadcast.Com
Theodore W Waitt	Gateway 2000
Lorraine C Wang	Wang Laboratories
Graham Weston	Web Hosting
Margaret Whitman	Ebay
Jerry Yang	Yahoo
Robert F Young	Internet
Charles Zegar	Bloomberg Lp
Mark Zuckerberg	Facebook
Monte Zweben	Bluemartini.Com (Internet Software)

G Pre-Analysis Plan and Questionnaire

The subsequent pages contain our pre-analysis plan and the survey questionnaire.

Pre-Analysis Plan for “The Political Preferences of the Technology Elite”

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Introduction

This pre-analysis plan will be filed before the collection of the mass and elite survey samples for our paper that will analyze the political preferences of the technology elite. This pre-analysis plan describes our predictions about the political preferences of the US technology elite and how we will test these predictions.

Before writing this pre-analysis plan we have already conducted several preliminary surveys with a variety of closed-ended and open-ended questions, which were themselves informed by a series of preliminary qualitative interviews. We used these to form our hypotheses. We are now

filing this PAP prior to the collection of our main survey sample, which we will use to test our hypotheses.

We have access to a sampling frame of technology elites. To collect the preliminary open-ended and closed-ended surveys, we took random samples of names from our sampling frame. For the paper we will take another random sample from this same frame, excluding the people we have sampled previously. This ensures that the data presented in the paper to validate our hypotheses is statistically independent from the data we have collected to form our hypotheses.

We are describing our predictions in advance in this PAP to indicate that the arguments we plan to make in the paper will not be post hoc but were indeed ex ante specified. That is, we wish to indicate that our theory was not developed in order to explain spurious patterns in the data we have not yet collected. (It is possible we will make other ex post exploratory arguments in the paper based on inductive learning from the data, but we will indicate when we are doing so. We wanted to note in advance which of our arguments were indeed developed ex ante.) As shown below, our theoretical argument essentially places various survey variables into buckets, and this PAP pre-commits us to placing certain variables in certain buckets, and making directional predictions about how various subpopulations will respond to items within those buckets.

Theoretical Predictions

In this section we describe the theoretical arguments we plan to make in the paper.

One motivation for our paper is that we believe the influence and power of the US technology elite in US politics is likely to grow dramatically. In the paper we will present some data (not described in this PAP) about why we believe this is likely to be the case. We further expect that much of this influence will manifest within the Democratic party, by shaping who wins Democratic nominations and to whom existing Democratic elected officials are responsive. As a result, many of our predictions concern how liberal or conservative we believe technology elites are within particular issue areas *relative to* the existing groups that especially constrain Democratic party officials: Democratic voters and college-educated Democratic voters.

We have four main predictions about the political preferences of the technology elite.

First, we expect that US technology elites are more hostile to regulation of technology companies and of the labor market than Democrats. We believe self-interest, ideology, and attitudes towards entrepreneurs help explain their preferences. Ideologically, technology elites are more likely to ideologically believe in the benefits of free markets. Relatedly, they are more likely to credit entrepreneurs for the success of the country. These beliefs may arise from being especially likely to witness the benefits of free markets and entrepreneurship and being less likely to witness the costs. Last, they have a self-interest in less regulation of their industry, although self-interest alone does not explain their views in this area.

Second, we expect that US technology elites are more supportive of redistribution and especially of taxation than Republican voters; this is part of why we do not expect them to become a core Republican constituency. However, they are less supportive of government-run programs and would prefer that the government fund programs run by the private sector. This puts them at odds with core Democratic constituencies. We argue that their racial liberalism partly explains their support for taxation and redistribution; unlike many Americans, they are not averse to government aid to minorities, and therefore look more like educated people in other countries than typical Americans on taxation and redistribution (see Alesina and Glaeser 2001). Their lack of racial resentment may stem from their high levels of education and exposure to diversity. However, their belief in free markets leads them to be more supportive of private administration of government-funded programs.

Third, we expect US technology elites to be more supportive than Democrats of “neoliberal” economic policies (i.e., policies that promote globalization) that are often perceived as transferring wealth from middle class Americans to the wider world: free trade, immigration, and American involvement in the world. This is another reason why they are unlikely to become a core Republican constituency. We argue that US technology elites support these policies because they are highly cosmopolitan; they identify with people beyond US borders and give weight to their wellbeing. We plan to draw on work by Vavreck and Appiah in defining cosmopolitanism.

Fourth, we expect that US technology elites are highly socially liberal, another reason why they are unlikely to become a Republican constituency. They are socially liberal because they are not authoritarian. We speculate that they are low in authoritarianism because non-authoritarians would be more likely to select into the technology industry (being more curious, etc.).

In summary, our theory predicts that the kind of individuals who self-select into the technology industry and the experiences they have in the industry once there lead them to be more likely to have certain political predispositions and policy preferences. These preferences are not libertarian; rather, they typically align with the Democratic party. Given that the technology elite also largely lives in Democratic areas, it is therefore likely that they will seek and gain more influence in the Democratic party than the Republican party. However, they differ from many Democrats in several important areas: they are more hostile to regulation of labor markets and of government administration of social programs; they are strong supporters of neoliberal policies; and, they may want to move the Democratic party even further to the left on social issues. As a result, the stage is set for high-profile disagreement between the technology elite and core Democratic constituencies.

Statistical Predictions

In this section we specify how to map our theoretical predictions above into empirical predictions about the survey questions we have written, which are provided in the appendix.

This section is organized into five main categories within which we place the survey questions. Within each we make two kinds of predictions/plan to conduct two kinds of analyses:

The first type of analysis in each category corresponds to our descriptive claims. For these analyses we will compare the mean values of survey items and indices across subgroups. This analysis type lays out predictions for the average responses by subgroup to our “dependent variables.” We will divide respondents into subgroups in two ways: First, we classify respondents into four subgroups: (1) technology elites; (2) Democrats in the mass sample; (3) Republicans in the mass sample; (4) Independents in the mass sample. Second, in the second classification scheme, we classify respondents into seven subgroups: (1) technology elites; (2) college-educated (a four year degree or more) Democrats in the mass sample; (3) non-college-educated Democrats in the mass sample; (4) college-educated Republicans in the mass sample; (5) non-college-educated Democrats in the mass sample; (6) college-educated Independents in the mass sample; (7) non-college-educated Independents in the mass sample. The goal of this second classification is to show that technology elites are distinct from Democrats for whom they share SES status. We always set technology elites as a baseline category so we can compare the other groups to them.

The second type of analysis corresponds to our explanations for these descriptive patterns. This analysis type lays out predictions for the relationship between general dispositions and specific policy attitudes, which will be estimated among the mass sample. We call these general predispositions “independent variables” below. Specifically, we have four main predictions: (1) views on the value of entrepreneurs should predict attitudes about government regulation; (2) racial resentment should predict attitudes on taxes, spending, and redistribution; (3) cosmopolitanism should predict attitudes on neoliberal economic policies such as trade and immigration; (4) authoritarianism should predict attitudes on social issues. Linking to the first set of analyses, we predict technology elites will be high on perceiving value of entrepreneurs and cosmopolitanism, and be low on racial resentment and authoritarianism. Together, our claims that these independent variables predict the dependent variables above and that technologists have distinctive values of these independent variables will support our theories about why technologists have the distinctive values of the dependent variables.

For all survey items, we plan on recoding them to lie between 0 and 1 and analyze them as continuous variables. We will code variables such that 1 indicates support for the type of policy consistent with the theoretical construct (support for regulation, support for redistribution, support for neoliberal economic policies, liberal responses on social issues).

When we analyze the data, we will stack responses from two separate datasets: (1) the technology elite sample; and (2) a mass sample.

Although we present regression specifications below, the main body of the final paper may present the data in the form of graphs, tables, or other formats that make the conclusions more

easily accessible to readers. However, we will still conduct these regressions as our formal tests of our hypotheses and report them in an Appendix if we make the claims they correspond to.

We may also in the future collect a sample of Democratic party donors. If we do so, Democratic Party donors will be considered an equivalent group to “college-educated Democrats” in the analyses above.

Regulation

Outcome Variables

- A. We asked 7 questions about regulation where we expect 1) technology elites to look similar to (or more conservative than) Republicans with respect to their distaste of regulation and 2) more conservative than Democrats (included college-educated Democrats): q2.2, q2.3, q2.4, q2.5.4 (drones), q2.5.6 (self-driving cars), q2.5.8 (how internet companies handle people’s data), q2.6, 2.7, 2.8, and 2.9. We also plan to construct an additive scale of the items except 2.9.
- B. We also asked 8 questions about regulation of non-tech industries. We do not have strong predictions for these questions: all items in q2.5 except for those mentioned above.

Independent Variables

- C. We asked one question about attitudes towards the value of entrepreneurs: q2.9.

Statistical Predictions

1. We will estimate two OLS regression models with robust standard errors:

$$Y_i = \alpha + \beta_1 D_i + \beta_2 R_i + \beta_3 I_i + \varepsilon_i$$

where Y_i is the outcome variable, D_i is an indicator for Democrats in the mass sample, R_i is an indicator for Republicans in the mass sample, and I_i is an indicator for Independents in the mass sample.

We predict that technology elites will be more conservative than Democrats on the regulation items in sections A, B, and C listed above: $\beta_j < 0$.

2. In addition, we will estimate:

$$Y_i = \alpha + \beta_1 CD_i + \beta_2 NCD_i + \beta_3 CR_i + \beta_4 NCR_i + \beta_5 CI_i + \beta_6 NCI_i + \varepsilon_i$$

where Y_i is the outcome variable, CD_i is an indicator for college-educated Democrats in the mass sample, NCD_i is an indicator for non-college-educated Democrats in the mass sample, CR_i is an indicator for college-educated Republicans in the mass sample, NCR_i is an indicator for

non-college-educated Republicans in the mass sample, CI_i is an indicator for college-educated Independents in the mass sample, and NCI_i is an indicator for non-college-educated Independents in the mass sample.

We predict that technology elites will be more conservative than college-educated Democrats on regulation items in sections A, B, and C listed above: $\beta_1 < 0$.

We predict that technology elites will be more conservative than non-college-educated Democrats on regulation items in sections A, B, and C listed above: $\beta_2 < 0$.

3. We predict that in the mass sample that attitudes about the value of entrepreneurship are positively related to regulation attitudes.

We will estimate a model of the form:

$$Y_i = \alpha + \beta_1 E_i + \varepsilon_i$$

Where Y_i represents a pro-regulation attitude, and E_i is a pro-entrepreneurship attitude. We predict that $\beta_1 > 0$ in the main sample. Since technology elites are high on E_i , this can help explain their anti-regulation attitudes.

Redistribution

Outcome Variables

- A. We asked 11 questions about spending where we expect technology elites to look fairly similar to Democrats (and college-educated Democrats) with respect to their preference for spending (particularly on the poor) and more liberal than Republicans: q3.1.1, q3.1.2, q3.1.3, q3.1.4, q3.1.5, q3.1.6, q3.1.7, q3.1.8, q3.1.10, q3.2.1, q3.2.2. We also plan on constructing an additive index of these 11 items.
- B. We also asked 4 questions about spending on categories that might not be strongly supported by tech elites: defense spending and farm subsidies. We do not have strong predictions for these questions and serve to test whether respondents are not just straight lining responses: q3.1.9, q3.1.11, q3.2.3, q3.5
- C. We also predict that tech elites will be more likely than Democrats (and college-educated Democrats) to support spending programs where the private sector and not the government administers to program: q3.3.2, q3.6
- D. We also predict that tech elites will be less likely than Democrats (and college-educated Democrats) to support spending programs where the government administers the program: q3.3.1
- E. We do not have strong predictions on the tax base preferences of these groups but believe the results will be descriptively interesting: q3.4 questions.

Independent Variables

F. We predict that on the racial resentment items (which we will combine into an additive scale), technology elites should provide as resentful or less resentful responses than Democrats and less resentful answers than Republicans: q3.8.1, q3.8.2

Statistical Predictions

1. We estimate an OLS regression model of the form:

$$Y_i = \alpha + \beta_1 D_i + \beta_2 R_i + \beta_3 I_i + \varepsilon_i$$

where Y_i is the outcome variable, D_i is an indicator for Democrats in the mass sample, R_i is an indicator for Republicans in the mass sample, and I_i is an indicator for Independents in the mass sample.

We predict that technology elites will be more liberal than Republicans on the spending items in sections A listed above: $\beta_2 > 0$.

We predict that technology elites will be more conservative than Democrats on the spending items in section C: $\beta_1 > 0$

We predict that technology elites will be more conservative than Democrats on the spending items in section D: $\beta_1 < 0$

We predict that technology elites will be more liberal than Republicans on the items in section F listed above: $\beta_2 > 0$.

2. In addition, we will estimate:

$$Y_i = \alpha + \beta_1 CD_i + \beta_2 NCD_i + \beta_3 CR_i + \beta_4 NCR_i + \beta_5 CI_i + \beta_6 NCI_i + \varepsilon_i$$

where Y_i is the outcome variable, CD_i is an indicator for college-educated Democrats in the mass sample, NCD_i is an indicator for non-college-educated Democrats in the mass sample, CR_i is an indicator for college-educated Republicans in the mass sample, NCR_i is an indicator for non-college-educated Republicans in the mass sample, CI_i is an indicator for college-educated Independents in the mass sample, and NCI_i is an indicator for non-college-educated Independents in the mass sample.

We predict that technology elites will be more liberal than college-educated Republicans on spending items in sections A listed above: $\beta_3 > 0$.

We predict that technology elites will be more liberal than non-college-educated Republicans on spending items in sections A listed above: $\beta_4 > 0$.

We predict that technology elites will be more liberal than college-educated Republicans on items in sections F listed above: $\beta_3 > 0$.

We predict that technology elites will be more liberal than non-college-educated Republicans on items in sections F listed above: $\beta_4 > 0$.

We predict that technology elites will be more conservative than college-educated Democrats on the spending items in section C: $\beta_1 > 0$

We predict that technology elites will be more conservative than college-educated Democrats on the spending items in section D: $\beta_1 < 0$

We predict that technology elites will be more conservative than non-college-educated Democrats on the spending items in section C: $\beta_2 > 0$

We predict that technology elites will be more conservative than non-college-educated Democrats on the spending items in section D: $\beta_2 < 0$

3. We predict that in the mass sample that racial resentment is negatively related to redistribution attitudes.

We estimate a model of the form:

$$Y_i = \alpha + \beta_1 RR_i + \varepsilon_i$$

Where Y_i represents a pro-redistribution attitude, and RR_i is an attitude indicating racial resentment. We predict that $\beta_1 < 0$ in the main sample. Since technology elites are low on RR_i , this can help explain their pro-redistribution attitudes.

Neoliberal Policies

Outcome Variables

We asked 4 questions about neo-liberal economic attitudes related to globalization where we expect technology elites to look more neo-liberal than Democrats (and college-educated Democrats) and Republicans (and college-educated Republicans): q4.1, q4.2, q4.3, q4.4. We plan on combining these 4 questions into an additive index.

Independent Variables

We asked 7 questions about people's levels of cosmopolitanism, which we will convert into an additive scale: q4.6, q4.7.1, q4.7.2, q4.7.3, q4.7.4, q4.7.5, q70. We expect technology elites to be more cosmopolitan than Democrats (and college-educated Democrats) and Republicans (and college-educated Republicans).

Statistical Predictions

1. We estimate the OLS regression model:

$$Y_i = \alpha + \beta_1 D_i + \beta_2 R_i + \beta_3 I_i + \varepsilon_i$$

where Y_i is the outcome variable, D_i is an indicator for Democrats in the mass sample, R_i is an indicator for Republicans in the mass sample, and I_i is an indicator for Independents in the mass sample.

We predict that technology elites will express more neo-liberal economic attitudes than Democrats or Republicans: $\beta_1 > 0$ and $\beta_2 > 0$

2. We predict that technology elites will be more cosmopolitan than Democrats or Republicans: $\beta_1 > 0$ and $\beta_2 > 0$

3. We also estimate:

$$Y_i = \alpha + \beta_1 CD_i + \beta_2 NCD_i + \beta_3 CR_i + \beta_4 NCR_i + \beta_5 CI_i + \beta_6 NCI_i + \varepsilon_i$$

where Y_i is the outcome variable, CD_i is an indicator for college-educated Democrats in the mass sample, NCD_i is an indicator for non-college-educated Democrats in the mass sample, CR_i is an indicator for college-educated Republicans in the mass sample, NCR_i is an indicator for non-college-educated Republicans in the mass sample, CI_i is an indicator for college-educated Independents in the mass sample, and NCI_i is an indicator for non-college-educated Independents in the mass sample.

We predict that technology elites will express more neo-liberal economic attitudes than college-educated Democrats or Republicans: $\beta_1 > 0$ and $\beta_3 > 0$

We predict that technology elites will express more neo-liberal economic attitudes than non-college-educated Democrats or Republicans: $\beta_2 > 0$ and $\beta_4 > 0$

We predict that technology elites will be more cosmopolitan than college-educated Democrats or Republicans: $\beta_1 > 0$ and $\beta_3 > 0$

We predict that technology elites will be more cosmopolitan than neo-liberal economic attitudes than non-college-educated Democrats or Republicans: $\beta_2 > 0$ and $\beta_4 > 0$

4. We predict that in the mass sample that support for neo-liberal economic attitudes are positively related to cosmopolitanism.

We estimate a model of the form:

$$Y_i = \alpha + \beta_1 C_i + \varepsilon_i$$

Where Y_i represents a neo-liberal economic attitude, and C_i is the cosmopolitanism scale. We predict that $\beta_1 > 0$ in the main sample. Since technology elites are high on C_i , this can help explain their neo-liberal attitudes.

Social Issues

Outcome Variables

We asked 4 questions about social issues where we expect technology elites to be more liberal than Democrats (and college-educated Democrats) and Republicans (and college-educated Republicans): q5.1, q5.2, q5.3, q5.4. We plan on combining these 4 questions into an additive index.

Independent Variables

We asked 4 questions about people's levels of authoritarianism, which we will convert into an additive scale: q5.5.1, q5.5.2, q5.5.3, q5.5.4. We expect technology elites to be less authoritarian than Democrats (and college-educated Democrats) and Republicans (and college-educated Republicans).

Statistical Predictions

1. We will estimate the following model:

$$Y_i = \alpha + \beta_1 D_i + \beta_2 R_i + \beta_3 I_i + \varepsilon_i$$

where Y_i is the outcome variable, D_i is an indicator for Democrats in the mass sample, R_i is an indicator for Republicans in the mass sample, and I_i is an indicator for Independents in the mass sample.

We predict that technology elites will be express more socially liberal attitudes than Democrats or Republicans: $\beta_1 > 0$ and $\beta_2 > 0$

We predict that technology elites will be less authoritarian than Democrats or Republicans: $\beta_1 > 0$ and $\beta_2 > 0$

2. We also estimate:

$$Y_i = \alpha + \beta_1 CD_i + \beta_2 NCD_i + \beta_3 CR_i + \beta_4 NCR_i + \beta_5 CI_i + \beta_6 NCI_i + \varepsilon_i$$

where Y_i is the outcome variable, CD_i is an indicator for college-educated Democrats in the mass sample, NCD_i is an indicator for non-college-educated Democrats in the mass sample, CR_i is an indicator for college-educated Republicans in the mass sample, NCR_i is an indicator for non-college-educated Republicans in the mass sample, CI_i is an indicator for college-educated Independents in the mass sample, and NCI_i is an indicator for non-college-educated Independents in the mass sample.

We predict that technology elites will be express socially liberal attitudes than college-educated Democrats or Republicans: $\beta_1 > 0$ and $\beta_3 > 0$

We predict that technology elites will be express more socially liberal attitudes than non-college-educated Democrats or Republicans: $\beta_2 > 0$ and $\beta_4 > 0$

We predict that technology elites will be less authoritarian than college-educated Democrats or Republicans: $\beta_1 < 0$ and $\beta_3 > 0$

We predict that technology elites will be less authoritarian than non-college-educated Democrats or Republicans: $\beta_2 < 0$ and $\beta_4 < 0$

3. We predict that in the mass sample that social attitudes are negatively related to authoritarianism.

We estimate a model of the form:

$$Y_i = \alpha + \beta_1 A_i + \varepsilon_i$$

Where Y_i represents an attitude on a social issue, and A_i represents authoritarianism. We predict that $\beta_1 < 0$ in the main sample, or that authoritarianism is negatively correlated with socially liberal attitudes. Since technology elites are low on A_i , this can help explain their anti-regulation attitudes.

Misc.

We also have other items in which we expect certain patterns of responses for technology elites compared to Democrats and Republicans (as well as college and non-college-educated partisans).

These items broadly fall within the redistribution and regulation categories and we intend to marshal to support the ideas above but using different analytic strategies than above.

- Respondents will only be shown one of q2.7 and 2.8. We plan to show that technology elites respond similarly to this question about the fairness of sellers raising prices in response to demand regardless of whether Uber or a non-technology seller is listed as the example. We will use this to argue that self-interest or group identification with other technology elites alone cannot explain their views towards regulation.
- By contrast, q6.8 is a question wording experiment where we will sometimes insert a technology company and sometimes insert a non-technology company. We expect to find technology elites are more friendly toward tax breaks for technology companies. We expect this to show that self-interest and/or group identification with the technology industry does explain *some* of the technology elites' views.
- Likewise, on q2.9, we will randomly assign whether technology elites are asked about regulation of “business” “the technology business” “the pharmaceutical business” or “the financial business (such as banks)”. We expect them to both a) be generally less supportive of regulation than Democrats and also b) among the tech elite, especially unsupportive of regulation of the technology business.
- On q3.7, our other predictions lead us to predict that technology elites will be more likely than members of any group in the mass public to accept inequality.
- On q6.1, we predict that technology elites should uniquely answer that “The government should NOT tightly regulate business, and should tax the wealthy to fund social programs.” In contrast, Democrats and both college and non-college-educated democrats should answer: “The government should tightly regulate business, and should tax the wealthy to fund social programs.” Conversely, Republicans and both college and non-college-educated Republicans should answer: “The government should NOT tightly regulate business, and should NOT tax the wealthy to fund social programs.”
- On q6.2 and q6.3, technology elites should look more similar to Republicans (both education groups) on attitudes toward labor unions than Democrats (both education groups).
- On q6.6, we expect technology elites to not agree with the statement (i.e., not simply be libertarians).

Appendix: Survey Items

The survey items appear below. Note that the coded values were generated automatically by Qualtrics and do not indicate how we will code the values for analysis. See above for details on how we will code the values for analysis.

Q2.2 Some cities are currently debating how to best regulate ride-hailing services like Uber or Lyft. Which of these statements comes closer to your own views?

- These services should be required to follow the same rules and regulations as taxis--it is important that everyone follow the same rules when it comes to things like pricing, insurance, and disability access (1)
- These services should not be required to follow the same rules and regulations as taxis--it is important to let companies be innovative (2)

Q2.3 Some technology companies allow workers to set their own hours and do as few or many jobs as they want -- so-called "gig" workers. However, the companies do not provide workers the benefits or protections of traditional jobs. These "gig" workers often do odd jobs like delivering groceries or putting together furniture on demand. Supporters of this "gig" model say people should be able to set their own hours and work as many as they need, and that flexibility in hiring helps the economy. Opponents say this model exploits workers, and that it's better when people should have a set schedule, a predictable number of hours, and the benefits and protections associated with being a full-time worker. Some opponents want to pass laws that would require companies to treat "gig" workers like traditional workers. Which of these statements comes closer to your own views?

- Companies should be allowed to hire workers for "gig" jobs with flexible hours but no benefits (1)
- Companies should be required to treat "gig" workers just like regular workers, and give them benefits if they work enough hours (2)

Q2.4 Which of these statements comes closer to your own views?

- It's too easy to fire workers; the government should be more involved because people need job security. (2)
- It's too hard to fire workers; the government should get out of the way so that money isn't wasted. (1)

Q2.5 Do you think government regulation of business should increase, stay the same, or decrease in the following areas?

	Increase (1)	Stay the same (2)	Decrease (3)
Drones (small remote-controlled flying aircraft) (1)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
New medicines and medical devices (2)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Self-driving cars (3)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Wall Street and big investment banks (4)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
How internet companies handle people's data (5)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Health insurance companies (6)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Oil and gas drilling and refining (7)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Commercial air travel (8)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Restaurants and food safety (9)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Tobacco and cigarettes (10)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
e-cigarettes and "vape" devices (11)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Q2.6 Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: "Government regulation of business usually does more harm than good."

- Strongly agree (1)
- Somewhat agree (2)
- Somewhat disagree (3)
- Strongly disagree (4)

Display This Question:

If Uber grand is equal to flowers

Q2.7 On a holiday, when there is a great demand for flowers, sellers usually increase their prices. Do you think it is fair for them to raise their prices like this?

- Yes, it is fair (1)
- No, it is not fair (2)

Display This Question:

If ubergrand Is Equal to uber

Q2.8 On a holiday, when there is a great demand for Uber rides, Uber usually increases the price of a ride. Do you think it is fair for them to raise their prices like this?

- Yes, it is fair (1)
- No, it is not fair (2)

Q2.9 Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: "Entrepreneurs and other people with new ideas get too much credit these days; ordinary people who work hard are the backbone of this country."

- Strongly Agree (1)
- Somewhat Agree (2)
- Somewhat Disagree (3)
- Strongly Disagree (4)

Q2.11 If you'd like to explain or qualify any of your choices in this section, you can use this space to do so. (optional)

Q3.1 Do you think federal government spending on each of the below should be increased, decreased, or stay the same?

	Increased (1)	Stay the same (2)	Decreased (3)
Aid to the poor (1)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Improving public infrastructure (2)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Scientific research (3)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Aid to education (4)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Job programs (5)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Environmental protection (6)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Food Stamps (7)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Social security (8)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Defense spending (9)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Economic aid to other nations (10)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Farm subsidies (11)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Q3.2 The federal government collects tax money and spends it on many different types of programs. How much do you support spending money on government programs that...

	A great deal (11)	A lot (12)	A moderate amount (13)	A little (14)	Not at all (15)
Benefit all Americans (1)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Benefit only the poorest Americans (2)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Benefit certain groups of Americans that the government chooses like farmers, veterans, etc. (3)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Q3.3 The federal government collects tax money and spends it on many different types of programs. How much do you support spending money on government programs...

	A great deal (11)	A lot (12)	A moderate amount (13)	A little (14)	Not at all (15)
Where the government spends the money and runs the program (1)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Where the government spends the money but the private sector runs the program (2)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Q3.4 The federal government collects tax money from many different sources. How much do you support raising tax money through...

	A great deal (11)	A lot (12)	A moderate amount (13)	A little (14)	Not at all (15)
Income taxes on people who earn over \$1 million per year (1)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Income taxes on people who earn over \$250,000 per year (2)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Income taxes everyone making over \$40,000 pays, but where the wealthy still pay more as a percentage (3)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Sales tax everyone pays - including the poor - when they buy goods and services (4)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Q3.5 Do you agree or disagree with this statement: "The government should make sure that every American has health care coverage, even if it means raising taxes to pay for it."

- Strongly agree (11)
- Somewhat agree (12)
- Somewhat disagree (14)
- Strongly disagree (15)

Q3.6 Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: "The government generally does a good job of running social programs meant to help poor people."

- Strongly agree (1)
- Somewhat agree (2)
- Somewhat disagree (3)
- Strongly disagree (4)

Q3.7 Which of these statements comes closer to your own views?

- People's income should be as equal as possible even if it slows down economic growth (1)
- Wide income disparities are acceptable if it means the economy grows faster (2)

Q3.8 Do you agree or disagree with the statements below?

	Strongly agree (11)	Somewhat agree (12)	Somewhat disagree (14)	Strongly disagree (15)
Over the past few years, blacks have gotten less than they deserve. (1)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
It's really a matter of some people not trying hard enough; if black people would only try harder they could be just as well-off as whites. (2)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Q3.9 If you'd like to explain or qualify any of your choices in this section, you can use this space to do so. (optional)

Q4.1 Do you agree or disagree with this statement: "We should pay less attention to the problems overseas and concentrate on problems here at home."

- Strongly agree (11)
- Somewhat agree (12)
- Somewhat disagree (14)
- Strongly disagree (15)

Q4.2 Which of these statements comes closer to your own views?

- We should protect American jobs even if it means reducing the standard of living of people living overseas. (1)
- We should improve the standard of living of people living overseas even if it means losing some American jobs. (2)

Q4.3 In general, do you think that free trade agreements like NAFTA and the policies of the World Trade Organization have been a good thing or a bad thing?

- Good thing (1)
- Bad thing (2)

Q4.4 When it comes to people from less-developed countries immigrating to the United States, which one of the following do you think the government should do?

- Let anyone come who wants to (1)
- Let more people come than we do today, but not everyone (2)
- Keep letting in the same number of people as we do today (5)
- Let fewer people come than we do today (3)
- Prohibit people coming here from other countries (4)

Q4.5 If you'd like to explain or qualify any of your choices in this section, you can use this space to do so. (optional)

Q70 Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: "I consider myself a citizen of the world."

- Strongly agree (11)
- Somewhat agree (12)
- Somewhat disagree (14)
- Strongly disagree (15)

Q4.6 Do you currently hold a passport?

- Yes (1)
- No (2)

Q4.7 We are interested in the kinds of things people do for recreation. In the last 10 years, have you... (check all that apply)

- Been to Europe? (1)
- Been to Canada or Mexico? (2)
- Been to Asia, Africa, or South America? (3)
- Gone to an Indian restaurant? (4)
- Eaten Sushi? (5)

Q5.1 Do you support or oppose allowing gays and lesbians to marry legally?

- Strongly support (1)
- Somewhat support (2)
- Somewhat oppose (3)
- Strongly oppose (4)

Q5.2 Are you in favor of the death penalty for a person convicted of murder?

- In favor (1)
- Not in favor (2)

Q5.3 What do you think is more important--to protect the right of Americans to own guns, or to control gun ownership?

- Protect the right of Americans to own guns (1)
- Control gun ownership (2)

Q5.4 There has been some discussion about abortion during recent years. Which one of the opinions on this page best agrees with your view?

- By law, abortion should never be permitted. (4)
- The law should permit abortion only in case of rape, incest, or when the woman's life is in danger. (5)
- The law should permit abortion for reasons other than rape, incest, or danger to the woman's life, but only after the need for the abortion has been clearly established. (6)
- By law, a woman should always be able to obtain an abortion as a matter of personal choice. (8)

Q5.5 Although there are a number of qualities that people feel that children should have, every person thinks that some are more important than others. These are pairs of desirable qualities. Please tell me which one you think is more important for a child to have:

	1 (1)	2 (2)
Independence:Respect for Elders (1)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Obedience:Self-Reliance (2)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Curiosity:Good Manners (3)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Being Considerate:Well Behaved (4)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Q5.6 If you'd like to explain or qualify any of your choices, you can use this space to do so. (optional)

Q6.1 Which of these statements comes closest to your own views?

- The government should tightly regulate business, and should tax the wealthy to fund social programs (1)
- The government should NOT tightly regulate business, and should tax the wealthy to fund social programs (2)
- The government should tightly regulate business, and should NOT tax the wealthy to fund social programs (3)
- The government should NOT tightly regulate business, and should NOT tax the wealthy to fund social programs (4)

Display This Question:

If laborgrand Is Equal to private

Q6.2 Would you, personally, like to see private sector labor unions (unions of employees of private companies) in the United States have more influence than they do today or have less influence than they do today?

- More influence (1)
- Less influence (3)

Display This Question:

If laborgrand Is Equal to public

Q6.3 Would you, personally, like to see public sector labor unions (unions of employees of government workers) in the United States have more influence than they do today or have less influence than they do today?

- More influence (1)
- Less influence (3)

Q6.6 Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: "I would like to live in a society where government does nothing except provide national defense and police protection, so that people could be left alone to earn whatever they could."

- Strongly agree (1)
- Somewhat agree (2)
- Somewhat disagree (3)
- Strongly disagree (4)

Q6.7 Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: "If all police were forced to use body cameras to videotape their interactions with citizens, then nearly all of the racial issues with policing would go away."

- Strongly agree (1)
- Somewhat agree (2)
- Somewhat disagree (3)
- Strongly disagree (4)

Q6.8 Some people support tax breaks for $\{e://Field/taxbreakrand\}$, arguing that it would stimulate economic growth and innovation. Others believe these these tax breaks would just help the wealthy get wealthier. Which of these statements comes closer to your own views?

- Reduce taxes for $\{e://Field/taxbreakrand\}$ so they can create jobs and products that help society (4)
- Do not give $\{e://Field/taxbreakrand\}$ special tax treatment (5)

Q6.9 If you'd like to explain or qualify any of your choices, you can use this space to do so. (optional)

Q7.2 Generally speaking, do you consider yourself to be a Democrat, a Republican, or something else?

- Democrat (1)
- Republican (2)
- Something else (3)

Display This Question:

If Generally speaking, do you consider yourself to be a Democrat, a Republican, or something else? Democrat Is Selected

Q7.3 Do you consider yourself to be a strong Democrat or a not strong Democrat?

- Strong Democrat (1)
- Not strong Democrat (2)

Display This Question:

If Generally speaking, do you consider yourself to be a Democrat, a Republican, or something else? Republican Is Selected

Q7.4 Do you consider yourself to be a strong Republican or a not strong Republican?

- Strong Republican (1)
- Not strong Republican (2)

Display This Question:

If Generally speaking, do you consider yourself to be a Democrat, a Republican, or something else? Something else Is Selected

Q7.5 Do you lean closer to the Democratic Party or the Republican Party?

- Democratic Party (1)
- Republican Party (2)
- Neither / Independent (3)
- Another party (4) _____

Q7.6 We hear a lot of talk these days about liberals and conservatives. Here is a seven-point scale on which the political views people might hold are arranged from extremely liberal to extremely conservative. Where would you place yourself on this scale?

- Extremely liberal (1)
- Somewhat liberal (2)
- Slightly liberal (3)
- Moderate; Middle-of-the-road (4)
- Slightly conservative (5)
- Somewhat conservative (6)
- Extremely conservative (7)
- I don't think of myself in those terms (8)

Display This Question:

If I don't think of myself in those terms Is Selected

Q7.7 What word would you use to describe your political ideology?

Q7.8 If the Presidential election were held today between Democrat Hillary Clinton and Republican Donald Trump, for whom would you vote?

- Hillary Clinton (1)
- Donald Trump (2)
- Other: (3) _____
- I would not vote (4)

Q7.9 Do you happen to recall for how many years a United States Senator is elected? That is, how many years are there in one full term for a U.S. Senator?

Q8.1 Have you previously started or run a business?

- Yes (1)
- No (3)

Q8.2 Are you a member of a labor union?

- Yes, a labor union at a private company (1)
- Yes, a labor union for government employees (2)
- No (3)

Q8.3 Do you work or have you worked in the technology industry?

- Yes (1)
- No (2)

Q8.4 In your career so far, what is the maximum number of people who have worked under you?

- 1 - 10 (1)
- 11 - 100 (2)
- 101 - 1000 (3)
- 1000+ (4)

Q8.5 Do you work as an independent contractor (and not a salaried employee) for a technology company?

- Yes (1)
- No (2)

Q8.6 What is the most senior position you have held before or hold now?

- CEO / Founder (1)
- Top-level executive (e.g., CFO, COO, CTO) (2)
- Vice president (3)
- Manager (4)
- Entry Level (5)

Q9.1 Finally, we have some questions about your background.

Q9.2 Are you a United States citizen?

- Yes (1)
- No (2)

Display This Question:

If Are you an American citizen? No Is Selected

Q9.3 Do you live in the United States?

- Yes (1)
- No (2)

Q9.4 Which of the following best describes your race/ethnicity?

- White (1)
- Asian (2)
- Black (3)
- Hispanic or Latino/a (4)
- Other (5)

Q9.5 What year were you born in?

- 1999 (4)
- 1998 (5)
- 1997 (6)
- 1996 (7)
- 1995 (8)
- 1994 (9)
- 1993 (10)
- 1992 (11)
- 1991 (12)
- 1990 (13)
- 1989 (14)
- 1988 (15)
- 1987 (16)
- 1986 (17)
- 1985 (18)
- 1984 (19)
- 1983 (20)
- 1982 (21)
- 1981 (22)
- 1980 (23)
- 1979 (24)
- 1978 (25)
- 1977 (26)
- 1976 (27)
- 1975 (28)
- 1974 (29)
- 1973 (30)
- 1972 (31)
- 1971 (32)
- 1970 (33)
- 1969 (34)
- 1968 (35)
- 1967 (36)
- 1966 (37)
- 1965 (38)
- 1964 (39)
- 1963 (40)
- 1962 (41)
- 1961 (42)

- 1960 (43)
- 1959 (44)
- 1958 (45)
- 1957 (46)
- 1956 (47)
- 1955 (48)
- 1954 (49)
- 1953 (50)
- 1952 (51)
- 1951 (52)
- 1950 (53)
- 1949 (54)
- 1948 (55)
- 1947 (56)
- 1946 (57)
- 1945 (58)
- 1944 (59)
- 1943 (60)
- 1942 (61)
- 1941 (62)
- 1940 (63)
- 1939 (64)
- 1938 (65)
- 1937 (66)
- 1936 (67)
- 1935 (68)
- 1934 (69)
- 1933 (70)
- 1932 (71)
- 1931 (72)
- 1930 (73)
- 1929 (74)
- 1928 (75)
- 1927 (76)
- 1926 (77)
- 1925 (78)
- 1924 (79)
- 1923 (80)
- 1922 (81)
- 1921 (82)

- 1920 (83)
- 1919 (84)
- 1918 (85)
- 1917 (86)
- 1916 (87)
- 1915 (88)

Q9.6 What is your gender?

- Male (1)
- Female (2)
- Other (3)

Q9.7 What is your 5-digit zip code?

Q9.8 What was your household income in 2015?

- Less than \$25,000 (1)
- \$25,000-\$49,999 (2)
- \$50,000-\$74,999 (3)
- \$75,000-\$99,999 (4)
- \$100,000-\$249,000 (5)
- \$250,000-\$1 million (6)
- More than \$1 million (7)

Q9.9 Are you a millionaire? That is, is your net worth over \$1,000,000?

- Yes (1)
- No (2)

Q9.10 What is the highest level of education that you have completed?

- Less than high school (1)
- High school diploma (2)
- Associates degree (3)
- Bachelors degree (4)
- Graduate degree (5)

Display This Question:

If What is the highest level of education that you have completed? Bachelors degree Is Selected

Or What is the highest level of education that you have completed? Associates degree Is Selected

Or What is the highest level of education that you have completed? Graduate degree Is Selected

Q9.11 Please type the name of the college you attended in the box below:

Q9.12 Please type any comments about the survey here. (optional)

Q104 Consider the issue of immigration and American values. Which of these statements best reflects your opinion?

- A growing number of newcomers from Mexico THREATENS American values (1)
- A growing number of newcomers from Mexico STRENGTHENS American values (2)

Q105 Now consider what kind of influence American immigration would have on Mexican culture. Do you think American immigration into Mexico would threaten or strengthen the values that Mexicans cherish?

- American immigration into Mexico would THREATEN their culture (1)
- American immigration into Mexico would STRENGTHEN their culture (2)

Q71 In your opinion, how important is it that whites work together to change laws that are unfair to whites?

- Extremely important (11)
- Very important (12)
- Moderately important (13)
- Slightly important (14)
- Not at all important (15)

Q72 How important is being white to your identity?

- Extremely important (11)
- Very important (12)
- Moderately important (13)
- Slightly important (14)
- Not at all important (15)

Q107 Over the next 20 years, which of these groups do you think is going to have more influence with Democratic elected officials, less influence with them, or about the same amount of influence with them?

	More influence (1)	About the same amount of influence (2)	Less influence (3)
Technology entrepreneurs (4)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Small businesses (5)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Big businesses (6)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Labor unions (7)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
LGBT people and organizations (8)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Big banks (9)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Civil rights organizations (3)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
African-Americans (2)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Latinos (1)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>