Manufacturing Politics (B): Integrated Strategies

By Keith Krehbiel
1994 | Case No. P3B
In the wake of large-scale interest group politics,2 the U.S. Senate passed S.173- also known as the Baby Bell bill-on June 5, 1991. The final vote was somewhat surprisingly lopsided: 7 1-24. But while the RBOCs managed both to woo and wow the Senate in June, they were unable to budge the bill in the House throughout the remainder of the 102nd Congress (1991 and 1992). Telecommunications and Finance Subcommittee Chairman Ed Markey remained intent upon passing comprehensive telecommunications legislation or not passing anything at all. A congressionally common mixture of complex issues, intensely competing interests, conflicting information, and institutional obstacles conspired to produce a predictable result: a status quo outcome. So, the manufacturing constraint of the Modified Final Judgment remained intact, suggesting that while the RBOCs had won a major battle in the Senate, they were losing the war overall.
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