The Effects of Credit Default Swap Trading on Information Asymmetry in Syndicated Loans

The Effects of Credit Default Swap Trading on Information Asymmetry in Syndicated Loans

By
Dan Amiram, William H. Beaver, Wayne R. Landsman, Jianxin Zhao
Journal of Financial Economics. November
2017, Vol. 126, Issue 2, Pages 364-382

This study shows that initiation of credit default swap (CDS) trading for an entity’s debt increases the share of loans retained by loan syndicate lead arrangers and increases loan spread. These findings are consistent with CDS initiation reducing the effectiveness of a lead arranger’s stake in the loan to serve as a mechanism to address the adverse selection and moral hazard problems in the loan syndicate. Additional findings corroborate this interpretation by revealing a moderating effect for firms with greater transparency, for loans originated by a lead arranger with a strong reputation in this market, and for firms with relatively illiquid CDS markets.