In this article we argue that people are motivated to evaluate both the universalistic and particularistic standing of their abilities. One’s universalistic standing is assessed by comparing with others who are similar to oneself on attributes related to the ability being assessed. One’s particularistic standing is assessed by comparing with reference others, those with whom one shares an identity or bond. In five studies we attempted to distinguish between these two types of evaluation. We manipulated reference closeness by varying the distinctiveness of a shared attribute. In Studies 1 and 2 we gave subjects the choice of comparing a test score with that of either a distinctively similar (reference) other or a nondistinctively similar (nonreference) other. Although the two choices provided equivalent universalistic information, subjects overwhelmingly preferred to compare with the distinctively similar other. Studies 3–5 provided evidence that subjects actually did identify more closely with distinctively similar others than with nondistinctively similar others.