-
The Experience
-
About Stanford GSB
About Our Degree Programs
-
-
The Programs
-
Full-Time Degree Programs
Non-Degree & Certificate Programs
-
-
Faculty & Research
-
Faculty
Faculty Research
Research Hub
Centers & Institutes
-
-
Insights
-
Topics
-
-
Alumni
-
Welcome, Alumni
-
-
Events
-
Admission Events & Information Sessions
-
Complexity and the Reform Process
Complexity and the Reform Process
November 24,2020Working Paper No. 3891
Decision makers called to evaluate and approve a reform, proposed by an interest group, a politician, or a bureaucracy, suffer from a double asymmetric information problem: about the competence of the proposer and the consequences of the proposal. Moreover, the ability of decision makers to evaluate proposals depends on the complexity of the legislative environment, itself a product of past reforms. We model the strategic interaction between reformers and decision makers as a function of legislative complexity, and study the dynamics of endogenous complexity and stability of reforms. Complexification-simplification cycles can occur on the equilibrium path, and expected long-run complexity may be higher when competence of reform proposers is lower. The results apply to regulatory reforms, legislative politics, and institutional design.