A limitation of the collective choice approach to the study of resource allocation through political institutions is the absence of a method capable of providing predictions of behavior and outcomes over a range of choice problems. The prevailing approach is based on social choice theory and focuses on the stability of allocations when all alternatives are simultaneously compared and coalitions can be formed and broken costlessly.
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