Economics Seminars: Faculty Seminars: Stanford GSB

Economics Seminars

The GSB Economics Seminar is held on Wednesdays at 3:45-5pm, unless otherwise indicated. Should you have any questions please contact our seminar organizer Renee Bowen or Nicolas Lambert.

Meet the Speaker

Please select the link above to view the schedule or email Miriam Torres for an appointment.
Click here for Google Calendar.

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Spring 2012	Speaker	Title	Time/Place
April 4	Ariel Rubinstein University of Tel Aviv	A Model of Persuasion with a Bounded Rational Agent	3:45-5:00 PM C102
April 11	Arthur Robson Simon Fraser University	The Evolution of Theory of Mind	3:45-5:00 PM B400
April 18	Navin Kartik Columbia University	Effective Communication in Cheap-Talk Games	3:45-5:00 PM C102
April 25	Ennio Stacchetti NYU	Agency Models with Frequent Actions: A Quadratic Approximation Method	3:45-5:00 PM B400
May 2	Dilip Abreu Princeton University	An Algorithm for Two Player Repeated Games with Perfect Monitoring	3:45-5:00 PM B400
May 9	Andrew Postlewaite University of Pennsylvania	Matching with Incomplete Information joint with Qingmin Liu, George Mailath, and Larry Samuelson	3:45-5:00 PM SE107
May 16	Alfred Galichon Ecole Polytechnique		3:30-4:35 PM SE107
May 23	Pierre Yared Columbia Business School	Political Distortions and Endogenous Turnover	3:45-5:00 PM SE107

Winter 2012	Speaker	Title	Time/Place
January 13	Gabriel Carroll MIT	A Quantitative Approach to Incentives: Application to Voting Rules Abstract	12:00-1:15 PM E102
January 18	Treb Allen Yale University	Information Frictions in Trade	12:00-1:15 PM G102
January 20	Michal Fabinger Harvard University	Trade and Interdependence in a Spatially Complex World Appendix	12:00-1:15 PM G102
January 25	David Berger Yale University	Countercyclical Restructuring and Jobless Recoveries	12:00-1:15 PM M104
January 26	Anant Nyshadham Yale University	Learning about Comparative Advantages in Entrepreneurship: Evidence from Thailand	12:00-1:15 PM C102
January 27	Jonas Hjort UC Berkeley	Ethnic Divisions and Production in Firms	12:00-1:15 PM M104
January 30	Michael Sinkinson Harvard University	Pricing and Entry Incentives with Exclusive Contracts: Evidence from Smartphones	12:00-1:15 PM M104
February 1	Takuo Sugaya Princeton University	Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Private Monitoring	12:00-1:15 PM M104
February 3	Aislinn Bohren UCSD	Stochastic Games in Continuous Time: Persistent Actions in Long-Run Relationships	12:00-1:15 PM G102
February 6	Paulo Somaini Stanford University	Spatial Competition and Interdependent Costs in Highway Procurement	12:00-1:15 PM M109
February 8	Joel David UCLA	The Aggregate Implications of Mergers and Acquisitions	12:00-1:15 PM E102
February 10	Michael Powell MIT	Productivity and Credibility in Industry Equilibrium	12:00-1:15 PM SE107
March 5	Dean Karlan Yale University	You Can Pick Your Friends, But You Need to Watch Them: Loan Screening and Enforcement in a Referrals Field Experiment	12:00 - 1:15 PM SE107
March 7	Sergiu Hart The Hebrew University of Jerusalem joint with Finance	Comparing and Measuring Risks An Operational Measures of Riskiness A Wealth-Requirement Axiomatization of Riskiness Comparing Risks by Acceptance and Rejection	12:00-1:30 PM M104
March 12	Meredith Fowlie UC Berkeley	Designing Markets for Pollution When Damages Vary Across Sources: What are the Gains from Differentiation? Appendices	12:00 - 1:30 PM M105
March 14	Vasiliki Skreta NYU	Transparency and Commitment (abstract)	3:45-5:00 PM B400

Autumn 2011	Speaker	Title	Time/Place
October 5	Alessandro Pavan Northwestern University	Price Discrimination in Many-to-Many Matching Markets	3:45-5:00 PM W104
October 12	Lones Smith University of Wisconsin	The Economics of Counterfeiting	3:45-5:00 PM W104
October 19	Scott Kominers University of Chicago	Stability and Competitive Equilibrium in Matching Markets with Transfers	3:45-5:00 PM W104
October 26	Sander Heinsalu Yale University	Universal Type Spaces with Unawareness	3:45-5:00 PM W104
November 2	Eduardo Perez Ecole Polytechnique (France)	Complicating to Persuade?	3:45-5:00 PM W104
November 9	Federico Echenique California Institute of Technology	Complexity: Revealed Preference and Equilibrium Paper 1 and Paper 2	3:45-5:00 PM W104
November 16	Mehmet Ekmekci Kellogg School of Management	Reputation in the Long-Run with Imperfect Monitoring	3:45-5:00 PM W104
November 30	Stephen Morris Princeton University	Correlated Equilibrium in Games with Incomplete Information	3:45-5:00 PM W104