Welcome! I am a Ph.D. Candidate in Economic Analysis & Policy at Stanford Graduate School of Business.
I am a microeconomic theorist working on bargaining theory and mechanism design.
Job Market Paper
This paper studies the effect of transparency in negotiations in the presence of outsiders. I consider a game in which two players (negotiators) engage in bargaining in the presence of a third player (outsider) who also cares about the outcome of the negotiation. As the bargaining progresses, the outsider takes a single irreversible action that brings him a payoff that depends on the allocation that the negotiators will agree to implement. The set of feasible allocations depends on the state of the world which is known to the negotiators but not to the outsider. The negotiators care about the bargaining outcome and have misaligned incentives regarding the outsider's decisions. When proposals are public (transparent negotiation), there is an equilibrium where negotiators engage in posturing behavior as a tactic to distort the outsider's action. This behavior reduces efficiency because the outsider makes a suboptimal decision, and sometimes, there is delay in the negotiation. Moreover, I show that these inefficiencies arise for a general class of equilibria. On the other hand, when proposals are private (non-transparent negotiation), the negotiators agree immediately, and the terms of the agreement are highly informative for the outsider. In this situation, I show that every equilibrium is approximately efficient.