Welcome! I’m a Ph.D. candidate in Economics Analysis and Policy. My areas of interest are Microeconomic Theory, Organizational Economics, and Industrial Organization. Within those areas, I have focused on understanding how organizations change and analyzing monopolization and abuse of dominance. I will be available for interviews at the European Job Market in Rotterdam (Dec 18-19) and the ASSA Annual Meeting in San Diego (Jan 3-5).
- Microeconomic Theory
- Organizational Economics
- Industrial Organization
Job Market Paper
We study a dynamic relationship in which a principal chooses the timing of reorganizations but delegates implementation to an agent. The implementation process requires front-loaded effort and time to yield results. There is no asymmetric information, but the agent's effort is not verifiable. The principal, moreover, cannot commit to a reorganization policy in advance. The equilibrium is unique and inefficient. Furthermore, compared to the first-best, the organization waits too little for new reorganizations to yield results, but retains the status quo longer when successful reorganizations lead to profitable new business. We discuss how these results might shed light on two seemingly contradictory perceptions commonly held about the frequency of reorganizations.