Enrique Ide

Enrique Ide
PhD Program, Economics
PhD Program Office
Graduate School of Business
Stanford University
655 Knight Way
Stanford, CA 94305

Enrique Ide

Welcome! I’m a Ph.D. candidate in Economics Analysis and Policy. My areas of interest are Microeconomic Theory, Organizational Economics, and Industrial Organization. Within those areas, I have focused on understanding how organizations change and analyzing monopolization and abuse of dominance. I will be available for interviews at the European Job Market in Rotterdam (Dec 18-19) and the ASSA Annual Meeting in San Diego (Jan 3-5).
Research Interests
Microeconomic Theory
Organizational Economics
Industrial Organization

Job Market Paper

Reorganizations PDF
We study a dynamic relationship in which a principal chooses the timing of reorganizations but delegates implementation to an agent. The implementation process requires front-loaded effort and time to yield results. There is no asymmetric information, but the agent's effort is not verifiable. The principal, moreover, cannot commit to a reorganization policy in advance. The equilibrium is unique and inefficient. Furthermore, compared to the first-best, the organization waits too little for new reorganizations to yield results, but retains the status quo longer when successful reorganizations lead to profitable new business. We discuss how these results might shed light on two seemingly contradictory perceptions commonly held about the frequency of reorganizations.
Publications
Discounts as a Barrier to Entry PDF
Ide, Enrique, Juan-Pablo Montero and Nicolás Figueroa (2016). American Economic Review, 106(7): 1849–1877
Online Appendix for: Discounts as a Barrier to Entry PDF
Working Papers
A Theory of Must-Have (with J.P. Montero) PDF
"Must-have" items --items that retailers need to compete effectively in the marketplace-- have played a central role in many recent antitrust cases, notably U.S. v AT&T et al. (2018). We advance a theory formalizing the notion of "must-have" and study its antitrust implications in two different settings: abuse of dominance and vertical mergers. We show that a manufacturer of a must-have item can monopolize an adjacent, competitive market under circumstances in which a manufacturer of a standard monopoly item cannot. We also show that a vertical merger involving a manufacturer of a must-have item is more likely to be anticompetitive than one involving a manufacturer of a standard monopoly product.
Online Appendix for: A Theory of Must-Have PDF
Last Updated 10 Jul 2020