We conduct a field experiment within a property tax reform in Sierra Leone to test two hypotheses on converting digital tax tools into compliance. First, rather than marginally boosting general perceptions of enforcement among taxpayers, governments must implement targeted tax enforcement itself. Second, enforcement can be complemented by leveraging local social structures that shape taxpayers’ behavior. We test these hypotheses through two interventions. The first is an enforcement program involving enforcement notices, court hearings chaired by traditional chiefs, and penalties implemented by the local government. The second is a public campaign where religious authorities motivated taxpayers to comply with the tax through direct door-to-door visits using normative appeals and references to religious scripture. Each treatment is allocated following a factorial experiment design and we exploit variation in geographic treatment saturation to evaluate spillovers. We find that enforcement action increases the compliance rate by 53.4 p.p. This is 16 times the average effect in the main literature on compliance. The visits by religious leaders increased compliance by 4.9 p.p. Both interventions cause spillovers from treated property owners towards their neighbors. Finally, survey data on over 6,000 property owners suggests substantive improvements in taxpayers perceived credibility of enforcement and peer compliance, willingness to comply with the tax, and legitimacy of compliance.