Zunda Winston Xu

Zunda Winston Xu
PhD Student, Finance
PhD Program Office Graduate School of Business Stanford University 655 Knight Way Stanford, CA 94305

Zunda Winston Xu

I am a Ph.D. candidate in Finance at Stanford Graduate School of Business. My research interests are the economics of innovation and regulation. My job market paper studies why firms acquire startups to obtain their teams rather than hire the workers directly, and how restricting acqui-hires would affect aggregate innovation production and diffusion.

I am on the 2026–2027 academic job market.

Research Interests

  • Economics of Innovation
  • Economics of Regulation
  • Corporate Finance

Job Market Paper

PDF

Why do firms acquire startups primarily to obtain their teams when they could hire the workers directly? Acqui-hires preserve teams, but require purchasing a firm rather than recruiting its employees. I argue that acquisition can overcome a contracting problem: hiring workers separately may fragment teams and destroy the gains from their accumulated complementarities. I identify 12,271 acqui-hires in U.S. acquisition records. Relative to matched direct-hiring events, acqui-hires preserve substantially more of the original team and are associated with nearly three times as many patents per team member within two years. COVID-19 disruptions to in-person coordination weaken the acqui-hire advantage in joint invention and shift firms toward direct hiring, consistent with team complementarity driving this organizational choice. Acqui-hires also redirect invention toward the acquirer’s technology, potentially limiting diffusion to other firms. In an estimated equilibrium model, banning acqui-hires induces substantial substitution toward partial-team hiring and reduces startup entry. The resulting losses in invention outweigh the gains from preserving independent innovation direction, so both aggregate innovation production and diffusion fall. Restricting acquisitions may thus preserve independent ownership without preserving the teams responsible for innovation.

Working Papers

(with Josh Lerner, Namrata Narain, Dimitris Papanikolaou and Amit Seru)

Work in Progress

Innovation Diffusion, the Extent of the Market, and Growth

(With Stephen Haber, Dimitris Papanikolaou and Amit Seru)

State Coordination and the Organization of Innovation

(With Josh Lerner, Namrata Narain, Dimitris Papanikolaou and Amit Seru)

Protect Consumers or Banks: Why Do States Regulate Nonbanks?

(With Susan Cherry, Gregor Matvos, and Amit Seru)