Daria Matviienko
Daria Matviienko
I am a PhD Candidate in Economic Analysis & Policy at the Stanford Graduate School of Business. I am on the 2026–2027 job market. My research is in macroeconomics, with a focus on economic growth, industry concentration, political economy, and household finance. I am originally from Ukraine.
Research Interests
- Macroeconomics
- Economic Growth
- Innovation
- Household Finance
Job Market Paper
A long-established concern about corporate lobbying is regulatory capture: incumbent firms shaping regulation in their favor. We study which regulations firms lobby for and how this affects concentration, innovation, and welfare. Using LLMs, we classify federal lobbying reports of public firms and trade associations, assigning each request to a policy tool from a new comprehensive taxonomy, with the direction and scope of the requested change. Lobbying for firm-specific benefits such as tax decreases and government contracts is one-sided: nearly every firm asks for more. Lobbying over regulatory costs is instead contested: the largest firms are the most likely to ask for higher costs, while trade associations mostly ask for lower ones. To quantify the consequences of lobbying, we build a dynamic general equilibrium model of oligopolistic competition and innovation in which firms lobby for firm-specific transfers and over industry-wide regulatory costs, set in a contest between strategic incumbents and an association of the competitive fringe. In the model estimated on US data, lobbying raises regulatory costs and lowers welfare through industry composition: each incumbent innovates more, but industries become more concentrated, lowering output and growth. Almost all the welfare loss comes from lobbying over regulation rather than for benefits.
Working Papers
Using microdata from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics, we document that households with a history of high net worth but low liquid savings are more likely to default on their mortgages, even after controlling for current and lagged income, lagged liquid wealth, and lagged home equity. A household that held little liquid wealth at every earlier interview has a default probability about twice the average, while a history of low net worth has no such association. To explain these facts, we estimate a structural life-cycle model of housing and mortgage choice with aggregate and idiosyncratic income and house price risk, in which households may differ in their discount factors and intertemporal elasticities of substitution. A model with two preference types reproduces the relationship, while the best-fitting single-type model does not. The model implies that 60% of households are the more impatient type, and that they account for nearly 90% of foreclosures. With the estimated model, we evaluate a one-time assistance fund that pays the mortgages of owners who would otherwise default in 2008–2012. The fund reduces net foreclosures by 70% at a cost of $41,000 per foreclosure prevented. Preventing a foreclosure is 22% cheaper for patient households, who also keep 71 cents of every dollar received as net worth, compared with 29 cents for impatient households.
This paper addresses the disconnect between the macroeconomic literature on the green transition and the finance literature on sustainable investing by funds and individual investors, as well as green-asset purchases by central banks. It examines the hypothesis that raising the cost of capital for multiproduct firms engaged in both dirty and clean production may hinder green innovation and slow the green transition. It develops a parsimonious perfect-foresight general-equilibrium model with directed technical change and cross-sector innovation spillovers to evaluate the effects of a change in the cost of capital on emissions and innovation. I show that while a rise in dirty input taxes and a rise in a clean research subsidy reduce emissions, an increase in the cost of capital has an ambiguous effect: it amplifies the existing asymmetry in clean versus dirty research productivity. Thus, if dirty innovation is more productive than clean innovation, a higher cost of capital makes firms focus more on dirty innovation, potentially disrupting the green transition. In the calibration, this effect is small relative to the effect of a dirty input tax. Therefore, ESG investing strategies and central bank green-asset purchases should be based not only on a company's ESG score or emissions intensity, but also on the degree of substitution between its clean and dirty production, the relative productivity of its clean and dirty innovation, and the structure of the innovation process.