Working Papers

These papers are working drafts of research which often appear in final form in academic journals. The published versions may differ from the working versions provided here.

SSRN Research Paper Series

The Social Science Research Network’s Research Paper Series includes working papers produced by Stanford GSB and the Rock Center.

You may search for authors and topics and download copies of the work there.

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Demand for Computer Products and Services by Large European Organizations

Garth Saloner, W. Steinmueller
1996

Abstract not available.

Strategic Trading in a Dynamic Noisy Market

Dimitri Vayanos
1996

This paper studies a dynamic, stationary model of a financial market with a large trader and small noise trader. At each period the large trader receives a privately observed stock endowment, and trades with competitive market-makers in order to…

Time and Surplus Allocation Within Marriage

Robin Wells, Maria Maher
1996

We construct a non-cooperative dynamic model of time and surplus allocation between partners in a marriage. Partners must choose between allocating time to household public goods production or career activities, and both activities exhibit…

Dynamic Efficiency and the Regulated Firm: Evidence from Interfirm Trade in Electricity Markets

Matthew W. White
1995

This paper presents an empirical analysis of the value of a coordinated market exchange mechanism. I present a model of efficient trading mechanisms under uncertainty, and develop a measure of the value of an interfirm trade agreement in the…

Regulating Bypass

Matthew W. White
1995

This paper examines optimal regulatory response to a customer considering bypass: service from an unregulated, fringe supplier. Bypass is costly to a regulator concerned with the allocation of a franchise monopoly’s revenues among consumers. I…

A Dynamic Model of an Imperfectly Competitive Bid-Ask Market

Dimitri Vayanos
1994

This paper studies a dynamic model of a financial market with some large, strategic traders. These traders are risk-averse and exchange a risky asset for hedging purposes. The only private information in the model concerns their hedging demands.…

Large-Firms' Demand for Computer Products and Services: Competing Market Models, Inertia, and Enabling Strategic Change

Garth Saloner, Timothy Bresnahan
1994

The organization of the value chain in the computer industry is undergoing profound change. The nature of this change is caricatured in two contrasting market models. In the “vertical” market model, large vertically integrated vendors of…

Mentoring, Discrimination and Diversity in Organizations

Susan Athey, Christopher Avery, Peter Zemsky
1994

This paper studies the economic forces which shape the diversity of an organization over time. We introduce a direct connection between a worker’s attributes (such as gender or cultural background) and her productivity in a given firm.…

The Allocation of Decisions in Organizations

Susan Athey, Joshua Gans, Scott Schaefer, Scott Stern
1994

This paper is motivated by an often-observed but under-studied phenomenon of the modern business enterprise, management by exception. The term describes the relative infrequency of management interference in the lower tiers of an organizational…

The Japanese Financial Market: Evidence on the Effects of Group Membership and Deregulation on Investment

Pei-Shun Hsieh, Robin Wells
1994

What is the optimal structure of the banking industry? Is it one in which firms have close long-term relationships with a single bank or one in which firms have arms-length relationships with multiple creditors? And what is the effect of…

On the Bayesian View in Game Theory and Economics

Faruk Gul
1992

An analysis of the information model is presented to challenge the assertions that the information model and the notion of correlated equilibrium are consequences of the subjectivist, Bayesian view of uncertainty.

Renegotiation in Agency Contracts and Information Acquisition before Renegotiation

Shinsuke Kambe
1992

This article analyzes renegotiation in an agency model where a principal observes a noisy signal about the agent’s effort before the renegotiation. This signal is not verifiable by an outsider or is not contractible in the initial contract.…

Strategic Learning: A Design Perspective on the Dynamics of Strategic Behaviors and Organizations

Kataro Kuwada
1991

This paper introduces the concept of strategic learning to explain long run dynamics of strategic behaviors and organizations. Strategic learning is organizational learning which improves the strategic capability of the organization and changes…

Foreign Investment Economic Growth and Technology Transfer in the Republic of China

Yow Iuan Hsu, Bruce McKern
1990

This paper examines the impact of foreign direct investment on the transfer of technology to the Republic of China (Taiwan). Using a macroeconomic approach based on aggregate statistical data and a macroeconomic approach based on a questionnaire…

Homework in Macroeconomics I: Basic Theory

Jess Benhabib, Richard Rogerson, Randall Wright
1990

This paper argues that the home, or nonmarket, sector is empirically large, whether measured in terms of the time devoted to household production activities or in terms of the value of home produced output. We also argue that there may be a good…

Salesforce Compensation Plans: An Empirical Test of the Agency Theory Framework

Rajiv Lal, Richard Lambert, Donald Outland, Richard Staelin
1990

A series of recent papers have attempted to investigate the issue of how to compensate a salesforce using the agency theory paradigm. These investigations hypothesize various factors to affect the form of the compensation plan defined in terms of…

A Dynamic Stochastic Model of Entry and Exit to an Industry

Hugo A. Hopenhayn
1989

This paper develops and analyzes a dynamic stochastic model for a competitive industry which endogenously determines processes for entry and exit and for individual firms output and employment. The concept of stationary equilibrium is introduced…

Entry and Competition in Concentrated Markets

Timothy Bresnahan, Peter C. Reiss
1989

This paper proposes an empirical framework for measuring the effects of entry in concentrated markets. Building on models of entry in atomistically competitive markets, we show how the number of producers in an oligopolistic market varies with…

Optimality of Debt Contracts for Financial Intermediaries

Stefan Krasa
1989

We first prove that the debt contract is the optimal contract between entrepreneurs and arbitrary financial intermediaries in a model where the bank faces an endogenous bankruptcy penalty (as in Diamond (1984)) - the optimality for depositors has…