Political Economy

Through its research, teaching, and course development, the Stanford GSB political economy group has consistently led the way in business schools’ awakening to the enormous impact of nonmarket forces on business practice and performance.

Political economy courses blend cutting-edge research with contemporary business cases. Spanning theory and practice as such provides future managers with systematic frameworks for understanding behavior outside the traditional sphere of markets. Important features of the nonmarket environment include strategic aspects of NGOs and activists; business-government relations in lawmaking, rulemaking, and regulation (locally and globally); the legal environment of business; and the interplay of strategy and ethics.

The political economy faculty is composed of world-class economists and political scientists whose research epitomizes the unique benefits of rigorous interdisciplinary social science. The faculty not only strives for excellence in its own research and teaching but also takes pride in its incomparable PhD Program, which regularly trains the world’s best new political economists.

Recent Journal Articles in Political Economy

Neil Malhotra, Benoît Monin, Michael Tomz
American Political Science Review. February
2019, Vol. 113, Issue 1, Pages 19–37

Previous research has emphasized corporate lobbying as a pathway through which businesses influence government policy. This article examines a less-studied mode of influence: private regulation, defined as voluntary efforts by...

Benjamin J. Newman, Neil Malhotra
The Journal of Politics. January
2019, Vol. 81, Issue 1

Leading research is converging on the finding that citizens from immigrant-receiving nations strongly prefer the entry of high-skilled to low-skilled immigrants. Prior studies have largely interpreted this “skill premium” as...

David Broockman, Gregory Ferenstein, Neil Malhotra
American Journal of Political Science. January
2019, Vol. 63, Issue 1, Pages 212-233

Economic elites regularly seek to exert political influence. But what policies do they support? Many accounts implicitly assume economic elites are homogeneous and that increases in their political power will...

Takuo Sugaya, Alexander Wolitzky
Journal of Political Economy. December
2018, Vol. 126, Issue 6, Pages 2569-2607

It is conventional wisdom that transparency in cartels—monitoring of competitors’ prices, sales, and profits—facilitates collusion. However, in several recent cases cartels have instead worked to preserve the privacy of their...

Jonathan Bendor, Scott E. Page
Journal of Economics & Management Strategy (forthcoming) . December
2018

In this paper, we construct a framework for modeling teams of agents who apply techniques or procedures (tools) to solve problems. In our framework, tools differ in their likelihood of...