These papers are working drafts of research which often appear in final form in academic journals. The published versions may differ from the working versions provided here.
SSRN Research Paper Series
The Social Science Research Network’s Research Paper Series includes working papers produced by Stanford GSB and the Rock Center.
You may search for authors and topics and download copies of the work there.
The Empirical Foundations of The Arbitrage Pricing Theory I: The Empirical Tests
The last thirty years have witnessed great changes in the field of finance associated with institutionally oriented students has been transformed into one dominated by scholars with amore scientific orientation. The Capital Asset Pricing Model (…
The Empirical Foundations of the Arbitrage Pricing Theory II: The Optimal Construction of Basis Portfolios
Abstract not available.
Why Do We Have Nominal Government Debt?
The time-consistency literature suggests that there is no reason to have anything but indexed debt. We show that nominal debt provides valuable insurance against the financial effects of economic fluctuations and variations in government…
Collusion Via Switching Costs: How "Frequent -Flyer" Programs, Trading Stamps, and Technology Choices Aid Collusion
Competing brands that are ex ante homogeneous may become, after the purchase of one of them, ex post heterogeneous. The switching costs that differentiate these functionally identical products may be learning costs, transaction costs, or “…
Dissolving a Partnership Efficiently
Several partners jointly own an asset that may be traded among them. Each partner has a valuation for the asset; the valuations are known privately and drawn independently from a common probability distribution. We characterize the set of all…
Incentives, Compensation, and Social Welfare
Alternative reward structures under conditions of moral hazard are analyzed from a social welfare standpoint. We argue that social welfare judgments under uncertainty should incorporate ex post judgments; in particular, a distribution-sensitive…
New Evidence that Taxes Affect the Valuation of Dividends
This paper uses British data to examine the effects of dividend taxes on investors relative valuation of dividends and capital gains. British data offer great potential to illuminate the dividends and taxes question, since there have been two…
Organizational Considerations for the Space Station's Development: Autonomy and the Human Element in Space
Abstract not available.
Strategic Resource Extraction: When Easy Doesn't Do It
We show that, for strategic reasons, an oligopolist in a natural resource industry might employ a backstop technology to develop costly reserves even if it does not plan to exhaust all less expensive deposits. The reason is that an oligopolist…
The Role of Time and Information in Bargaining
This paper explores, within the context of a continuous-time noncooperative game, how time and information affect the rational behavior of bargainers. In the model, a buyer and a seller are engaged in the trade of a single object. Both bargainers…
An Intertemporal Disequilibrium Model of the Income-Accelerator Process
This paper develops an intertemporal general equilibrium model with optimizing agents which is nearly observationally equivalent to Samuelsons (1939) empirically appealing income accelerator framework. Given the flexibility of general equilibrium…
Bargaining With Incomplete Information: A Two-Period Model With Continuous Uncertainty
The resolution of any bargaining conflict depends crucially on the relative urgency of the agents to reach agreement, the information each agent has about the others’ preferences, and the agents’ ability to commit to particular bargaining…
Bargaining with Incomplete Information: An Infinite-Horizon Model with Continuous Uncertainty
The resolution of any bargaining conflict depends crucially on the relative urgency of the agents to reach agreement, the information each agent has about the others’ preferences, and the agents’ ability to commit to particular bargaining…
Expulsion Threats in Repeated Partnership Games
This paper considers the incentive role of expulsion threats for deviants in repeated partnership games as an alternative to the use of trigger strategies (where a perceived deviation from an agreement is followed by the adoption of single period…
Labor Contracts Under Asymmetric Information When Workers Are Not Bound
Abstract not available.
A Note on the Selection of Parameters and Estimators in the Hausman Specification Test
This note shows that when an investigator can write down his hypothesized specification error in parametric form, there are two forms of Hausmans specification test that are (at least asymptotically) equivalent to conventional tests of the…