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SSRN Research Paper Series
The Social Science Research Network’s Research Paper Series includes working papers produced by Stanford GSB the Rock Center.
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The Learning Curve and Competitive Strategy
The learning curve has become a central concept for corporate strategic planning. However, strategies based on the learning curve often fail to achieve their intended results. This paper explores the implications of the learning curve for…
The Learning Curve and Pricing in the Chemical Processing Industries
This pager uses data on 37 chemical products to test a number of hypotheses about the learning curve and industrial price behavior. The results document a strong and consistent learning effect. Learning is found to be a function of cumulated…
The Paradox of "Corporate Culture" : Reconciling Ourselves to Socialization
Abstract not available.
The Role of Time and Information in Bargaining
This paper explores, within the context of a continuous-time noncooperative game, how time and information affect the rational behavior of bargainers. In the model, a buyer and a seller are engaged in the trade of a single object. Both bargainers…
The Role of the Division General Manager in Corporate Strategic Management
Abstract not available.
The Value of Information in Speculative Trading
This paper analyzes the value of information that is used in speculative trading. There is an important externality effect in the valuation of information in this context. The value of information depends, through its dependence on the…
A Theory of Regulation and Information in a Continuing Relationship
Abstract not available.
Undiscounted Approximations of Discounted Regenerative Models
This paper approximates the discounted average cost in regenerative models by an undiscounted average cost. A financial holding cost is assessed on expenditures that are incurred earlier than the middle of each cycle. Explicit upper and lower…
Will the Prospective Payment System Solve Medicare's Financial Problem?
Abstract not available.
When Injustice Is Irrelevant: Relative Deprivation and Collective Action
The determinants of collective behavior were studied in a laboratory setting. Subjects were members of a disadvantaged group. In a 3 x 2 factorial design two independent variables were manipulated. The magnitude of pay inequality…
Psychological and Sociological Barriers to Collective Action in Organizations
There are striking gaps in what is known about discontent in the workplace. Job and pay satisfaction are among the most frequently studied topics in organizational behavior, yet we know little about when discontent will be translated into…
Accrual Mobility: Job Mobility in Higher Education Through Responsibility Accrual
No abstract available.
Alpha, Beta, and Gamma Change in Modeling-Based Organization Development
Abstract not available.
An Intertemporal Disequilibrium Model of the Income-Accelerator Process
This paper develops an intertemporal general equilibrium model with optimizing agents which is nearly observationally equivalent to Samuelsons (1939) empirically appealing income accelerator framework. Given the flexibility of general equilibrium…
Applying the Methodology of Grounded Theorizing in Strategic Management: A Summary of Recent Findings and Their Implications
The evolution of conceptualizations of substantive and formal aspects of the strategic process in large, complex organizations, based on the methodology of grounded theorizing, is summarized. Linkages with previous findings and major paradigms…
Bargaining With Incomplete Information: A Two-Period Model With Continuous Uncertainty
The resolution of any bargaining conflict depends crucially on the relative urgency of the agents to reach agreement, the information each agent has about the others’ preferences, and the agents’ ability to commit to particular bargaining…
Bargaining with Incomplete Information: An Infinite-Horizon Model with Continuous Uncertainty
The resolution of any bargaining conflict depends crucially on the relative urgency of the agents to reach agreement, the information each agent has about the others’ preferences, and the agents’ ability to commit to particular bargaining…
A Closed Form Solution for a Multi-Asset Rational Expectations Equilibrium Model
Abstract not available.
Decentralized Choice of Monitoring Systems
Abstract not available.
Delegated Expertise
We introduce an expert to the syndicate setting. An expert is, tautologically, one who acquires expertise. We define expertise in terms of private information that is too costly to communicate. When the costs of acquiring expertise are not…