We empower faculty to design and discover original research that challenges conventions and creates breakthroughs that push boundaries of knowledge.
Publication Types
Journal Articles
Books
Working Papers
Case Studies
Browse Publications
Arrow and General Equilibrium Theory
This is a review of the Collected Papers of Kenneth J. Arrow, Volume 2: General Equilibrium. The review focuses on Arrow’s contribution in three areas: the existence of equilibrium, the relationship between equilibria and Pareto optimality, and…
Bargaining Costs, Influence Costs and the Organization of Economic Activity
Abstract not available.
Bioerodible polymers for controlled release systems
Business, Strategy, Market Structure, and Risk Return Relationships: A Casual Interpretation
The present paper analyzes four questions both theoretically and empirically: 1) how are risk and return outcomes at the business-unit level related to each other?; 2) how does market share influence risk-return outcomes?; 3) to what extent is…
Changes in Expected Security Returns, Risk, and the Level of Interest Rates
Regressions of security returns on treasury bill rates implicitly indicate the behavior of conditional covariances with benchmark pricing variables. The information in one-month rates is sufficient to detect variation in the covariances for…
Computationally Feasible Bounds For Partially Observed Markov Decision Processes
A partially observed Markov decision process (POMDP) is a sequential decision problem where information concerning parameters of interest is incomplete, and possible actions include sampling, surveying, or otherwise collecting additional…
A Consumer Choice Health Plan For the 1990s: Cost and Budget Estimates and Supporting Detail
Abstract not available.
Coordination and the Potential for Self-Sacrifice
An extension of games is proposed, where players are given the option of incurring costs. This extension allows players to signal their intended strategy in the original game. We apply the logic of forwards and backwards induction, without…
Coordination through Committees and Markets
We discuss three common mechanisms for achieving coordination, with particular reference to the choice of compatibility standards. The first involves explicit communication and negotiation before irrevocable choices are made: it represents what…
Delegation as Commitment: The Case of Income Tax Audits
We study the value of delegating authority over income tax audit policy, arising from incompleteness of contracts. Suppose a utilitarian government’s ability to commit is limited to aggregate dimensions of its audit policy, as publicly verifiable…
Direct Financing, Intermediation and Credit Rationing
The coexistence of direct financing and intermediation is shown in a model with asymmetrically informed borrowers and lenders. Using a game theoretic approach we first prove the existence of optimal contracts between (a) firms and intermediaries…
Employee Involvement at Kaiser Permanente
Employment Contracts, Influence Activities, and Efficient Organizational Design
Efficient employment contracts usually fail to compensate workers for the effects of post-hiring events and decisions when changing jobs is costly. Then, when there are executives and managers with authority to make discretionary decisions,…
Errors and Biases in the Attribution Process
Evidence of Earnings Management from the Provision for Bad Debts
Our paper examines whether managers manipulate earnings. We begin by modeling how a specific accounting number, the provision for bad debts, would be reported in the absence of earnings management. This model is motivated by generally accepted…
First Mover Advantages
Awarded the 1996 Strategic Management Society/ John Wiley award for outstanding contribution to the development of the field of strategic management. For this award, a paper must have been published at least five years earlier.
Further Distribution Results for Correlation Coefficients and F Tests in Normal Samples
Fisher’s finite sample distribution results for squared multiple correlation coefficients and F tests are extended to situations in which the observations are drawn from independent, but not necessarily identical, normal samples. This…
Going Public
One explanation for the empirically observed underpricing of new issues is the existence of an adverse selection problem faced by uninformed investors in the presence of informed investors. Rather than excluding informed investors from initial…
Implementation via Augmented Revelation Mechanisms
Consider the problem of Bayesian implementation, i.e., of constructing mechanisms with the property that all equilibrium outcomes agree with a given choice rule. We show that a general procedure is to start with an incentive compatible revelation…