Publications

A non-equilibrium model of rational strategic behavior that can be viewed as a refinement of (normal form) rationalizability is developed for both normal form and extensive form games. The resulting solution concept, called a tau-theory, allows…

This article analyzes renegotiation in an agency model where a principal observes a noisy signal about the agent’s effort before the renegotiation. This signal is not verifiable by an outsider or is not contractible in the initial contract.…

Abstract not available.

Theorists disagree sharply about the likelihood and consequences of organizational change. This paper suggests that when viewed dynamically, change can be both adaptive and disruptive. Similarly, the same forces that make organizations inert also…

We study environments in which agents may borrow sequentially from more than one lender. Although debt is prioritized, additional lending imposes an externality on prior debt because, with moral hazard, the probability of repayment of prior…

Strategic management theorists face a dilemma in choosing methods for studying strategy formulation and strategic decision making. The choice of a research method involves inherent trade-offs of generalizability, control, and realism. This paper…

Organizations often hire workers whom they will not promote, a practice we believe triggers career interdependence, where hiring nonpromotable workers sometimes harms but in some cases helps the mobility chances of other employees. We identify…

This paper explores the significance of status processes for generating and reproducing hierarchy among producers in a market. A producer’s status is defined as the degree to which market participants perceive the quality of its product to be…

This paper examines the differences in an internal auditor’s (a firm’s ) equilibrium testing strategy when employees have different abilities to steal from line items. I contrast two models. In the strategic employee model there are two employees…

We examine the assumption of the probabilistic independence of consideration of different brands in the marketplace for a market with substantial product differentiation. Our hypothesis is that probabilistic independence may not hold in such a…

Organizations have different competitive abilities. Theory predicts that this variation will follow a general pattern: whether through learning or selection, older organizations — on average — will have greater competitive strength. Furthermore,…

Abstract not available.

We establish conditions under which cooperative strategies will stabilize in conflict situations modelled as tournaments of iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma (IPD) games. Our results resolve the controversy over the issue of stability of cooperative…

The advantages of collective action by organizations are discussed often, but no attention has been paid to the possibility that engaging in collective action can make organizations less viable. In this paper, I explain that a liability of…

Sociological work on markets has called into question the validity of certain traditionally accepted distinctions between social and economic exchange. Work in this area has shown economic exchange to be structural in the sense stressed by…

The present research investigates how social identification and interpersonal accountability affect decision making during negotiations. We hypothesize that when a share social identity is salient and feelings of interpersonal accountability…