These papers are working drafts of research which often appear in final form in academic journals. The published versions may differ from the working versions provided here.
SSRN Research Paper Series
The Social Science Research Network’s Research Paper Series includes working papers produced by Stanford GSB the Rock Center.
You may search for authors and topics and download copies of the work there.
We analyze the classic problem of sustaining trust when cheating and leaving trading partners is easy, and outside enforcement is difficult. We construct equilibria where individuals are loyal to smaller groups– communities – that…
Political institutions often use decision making procedures that create veto players —individuals or groups who, despite lacking direct decision making authority, nevertheless have the power to block policy change. In this paper…
We present a theory of dynamic coalitions for a legislative bargaining game in which policies continue in effect in the absence of new legislation. We characterize Markov perfect equilibria with dynamic coalitions, which are…
I develop a simple hold-up model of political risk, which can be used to explore firms’ strategic options when their investments are subject to the threat of government expropriation. In the model, a firm decides whether to invest…
Two key features of the government bailout programs implemented in the 2008- 2009 financial crisis were: first, the general opposition of voters to these programs and second, the implementation of a variety of interventions…
Many lament that weak accountability and poor governance impede economic development in Africa. Politicians rely on ethnic allegiances that deliver the vote irrespective of performance, dampening electoral incentives. Giving…
An emergent theme in the study of organizations is the broad differences in managerial practice and performance across firms. We develop an explanation for these phenomena that turns on the complexity of the environments that…
The policy choices of governments are frequently durable. From the building of bridges to the creation of social programs, investments in public infrastructure typically last well beyond a single electoral cycle. In this paper we…
Although doctors and hospitals own their patients ’ medical records, state and federal laws require that they provide patients with a copy at “ reasonable cost. ” We examine the effects of state laws that cap the fees that doctors…
This paper examines the optimal degree of centralization that can be achieved with respect to bailout policies when a central authority cannot supervise the entire banking system of the economy. Part of the banking system is…
I study public liquidity provision in a liquidity-constrained economy in which government policy is decided by politicians subject to rent-seeking and electoral constraints. Public interventions are modeled as a choice between…
How do political predispositions shape the social relationships individuals create? To address these issues, we leverage the domain of online dating, in which we can observe people’s political identities and preferences before…
Psychologists have long observed that people conform to majority opinion, a phenomenon sometimes referred to as the “bandwagon effect.” In the political domain people learn about prevailing public opinion via ubiquitous polls…
Understanding the mechanisms by which political advertising affects voters is crucial for evaluating the welfare effects of campaign finance and election regulation. This paper develops a method to distinguish between two…
Fixed statutes and regulations often have variable consequences over time. If left unattended, such drift can severely erode the performance of government as an institution of representation. To better understand the mechanics of…
Four pure types of legislative organization are characterized as data generating processes for commonly used measures of preferences or, in the spatial vernacular, ideal points. The types of legislative organization are…
The role of deliberation among citizens to determine and forge agreement on policy is often seen as a crucial feature of democratic government. This paper provides the first large-N empirical evidence on the credibility of voice…
The failure to align the incentives of self-interested groups in favor of beneficial reform is often considered a major cause of persistent underdevelopment around the world. However, much less is known about strategies that have…
This paper illustrates a practical framework for understanding and predicting political economy risk for project managers operating in a variety of developing country settings, including non-democracies, ethnically diverse…
Can combat experience foster organizational skills that engender political collective action? We use the arbitrary assignment of troops to frontline combat in World War 2 to identify the effect of combat experience on two channels…