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SSRN Research Paper Series
The Social Science Research Network’s Research Paper Series includes working papers produced by Stanford GSB the Rock Center.
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Designing a Central Bank in a Federal System: The Deutsche Bundesbank 1957-1992.
This chapter analyzes the political dispute surrounding the 957 replacement of the Bank deutscher Lander by the Deutsche Bundesbank and the 1992 changes to the Bundesbank law necessitated by German unification. The evidence suggests that the…
Information, Access and Contributions: A Signaling Model of Lobbying
This paper develops a signaling model of competitive lobbying. Interest groups pay a monetary contribution to gain access and provide information to a policymaker. If their interests are aligned with those of the policymaker’s constituency, they…
On Testing Theories of Leaders and Institutions: A Re-examination of the 1987 Smoking Ban on Domestic Flights
Rather than portray institutions as de jure constraints on behavior that bind in all circumstances, recent formal theories of legislatures have begun to portray institutions more plausibly as de facto constraints on behavior in most circumstances…
The Economics and Politics of Regulation: Perspectives, Agenda, and Approaches
This paper provides perspectives on research on regulation, identifies an agenda of research topics, and discusses approaches to some of those topics. The focus is on a set of presently-identified issues on which social science research may be…
A Theory of Collective Choice for Government Programs
A limitation of the collective choice approach to the study of resource allocation through political institutions is the absence of a method capable of providing predictions of behavior and outcomes over a range of choice problems. The prevailing…
Understanding the Political Dynamics of Developing New Products
A qualitative inductive field study of a market-driven development effort is used to generate a model of political influence in new product development. The data indicate susceptible to political activity. These contexts are shaped by the joint…
Characterization of Solution Concepts in Standard Evolutionary Games
In this paper we prove that any strategy in any evolutionary game may result in four different types of evolutionary stability. We formulate and prove necessary and sufficient conditions for all four types of stability. We argue that only two of…
Competitive Political Action and Policy Neutrality
This paper develops a signaling theory of competitive political action. Despite the free rider problem associated with mass political participation, rational and self-interested individuals may take costly political action to inform or manipulate…
Condorcet Dynamics
The Condorcet Jury Theorem has classically presumed a static context: the decision making group faces a fixed set of alternatives, compares the options in a pairwise fashion, and the process ends when the group makes a final choice. This is a…
The Emergence and Stability of Cooperation
We establish conditions under which cooperative strategies will stabilize in conflict situations modelled as tournaments of iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma (IPD) games. Our results resolve the controversy over the issue of stability of cooperative…
A Welfare Analysis of Political Action
In earlier work, I examine the situation where information pertinent to political decisions is dispersed among the members of a society. Rational, self-interested individuals may take costly political action to signal their private information to…
A Consumer Choice Health Plan For the 1990s: Cost and Budget Estimates and Supporting Detail
Abstract not available.
Regulatory Incentive Mechanisms, Commitment, and Political Action
Abstract not available.
Turnout and the Calculation of Swing Ratios
A perennial topic of interest among legislative scholars is the relationship between votes won by parties in the electoral arena and seats won in the legislative arena. In studying this relationship scholars rely on a common concept—the swing…
An Efficiency Analysis of Proposed Rules to Limit Resistance to Tender Offers
Easterbrook and Fischel have proposed a passivity rule that would prohibit target management from resisting a tender offer. For a m model in which target management has private information about the true value of the target and tender offers are…
Commitment in Multiperiod Information Models
The role of commitment is studied in the context of a multiperiod contracting model in which a supplier has private information about his costs. When the purchaser is able to make commitments for the duration of the relationship, a separating…
Will the Prospective Payment System Solve Medicare's Financial Problem?
Abstract not available.
Competition of Alternative Health Care Delivery Systems
Abstract not available.
How to Develop Nuclear Power While Limiting Its Dangers: Proposed Chances in the International Nuclear System
Abstract not available.