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SSRN Research Paper Series
The Social Science Research Network’s Research Paper Series includes working papers produced by Stanford GSB the Rock Center.
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An Intertemporal Disequilibrium Model of the Income-Accelerator Process
This paper develops an intertemporal general equilibrium model with optimizing agents which is nearly obeervationally equivalent to Samuelsons (1939) empirically appealing incomeaccelerator framework. Given the flexibility of general equilibrium…
Applying the Methodology of Grounded Theorizing in Strategic Management: A Summary of Recent Findings and Their Implications
The evolution of conceptualizations of substantive and formal aspects of the strategic process in large, complex organizations, based on the methodology of grounded theorizing, is summarized. Linkages with previous findings and major paradigms…
Bargaining With Incomplete Information: A Two-Period Model With Continuous Uncertainty
The resolution of any bargaining conflict depends crucially on the relative urgency of the agents to reach agreement, the information each agent has about the others’ preferences, and the agents’ ability to commit to particular bargaining…
Bargaining with Incomplete Information: An Infinite-Horizon Model with Continuous Uncertainty
The resolution of any bargaining conflict depends crucially on the relative urgency of the agents to reach agreement, the information each agent has about the others’ preferences, and the agents’ ability to commit to particular bargaining…
A Closed Form Solution for a Multi-Asset Rational Expectations Equilibrium Model
Abstract not available.
Decentralized Choice of Monitoring Systems
Abstract not available.
Delegated Expertise
We introduce an expert to the syndicate setting. An expert is, tautologically, one who acquires expertise. We define expertise in terms of private information that is too costly to communicate. When the costs of acquiring expertise are not…
Delegated Portfolio Management
A problem of screening agents with privately known forecasting abilities and reservation utilities and then eliciting truthful information from these agents once they are employed is considered. For the case of risk averse agents and large…
Experience Curves: Evidence, Empirical Issues and Applications
Abstract not available.
Expulsion Threats in Repeated Partnership Games
This paper considers the incentive role of expulsion threats for deviants in repeated partnership games as an alternative to the use of trigger strategies (where a perceived deviation from an agreement is followed by the adoption of single period…
Government Security Dealers' Positions, Information and Interest-Rate Expectations
In this paper, the inventory positions of government security dealers are analyzed for signs of superior information on their part relative to other participants in the market. Testing the 1966-1980 period on a monthly basis, it does not appear…
Identifying Opportunities for Repetition Minimization
Abstract not available.
Incentives, Information, and Iterative Planning
Abstract not available.
Inventory Policies for Periodic Review Systems
This paper introduces three new methods for computing approximately optimal inventory policies for discrete time shortage cost systems. Two of the methods are shortcuts based on the method of Freeland and Porteus [1980] and one is a heuristic…
Invisible Resources and Their Accumulation for Corporate Growth
The basic question behind this paper is deceptively simple: why can some firms continue to grow and some firms cannot even under very similar environmental conditions? What is the essential driving mechanism behind successful corporate growth? My…
Labor Contracts Under Asymmetric Information When Workers Are Not Bound
Abstract not available.
Minimum Wage Effects with Output Stabilization
Abstract not available.
Monitoring Multiple Agents: The Role of Hierarchies
This paper presents an analysis of principal/multiple-agent, problems when there are monitoring possibilities. A principal/owner of a firm has to decide whether or not to employ one or more supervisors who can observe noisy signals on the workers…
A Note on Performance Evaluation
Problems in distinguishing between market timing and security selection ability are reviewed. It is shown that the ability of a manager who receives signals with continuous distributions can be consistently measured the assumption of a…