In November 2018, a Boeing 737 MAX airplane crashed off the coast of Indonesia, killing all 189 passengers and crew members. Four months later, a second 737 MAX flying from Ethiopia to Nairobi crashed, killing 157 individuals. In this Closer Look, we examine the organizational, cultural, and leadership breakdowns that contributed to the failure of the aircraft.
We ask:
- Why did the board not recognize the negative impact that organizational pressure had on the design and certification of the MAX?
- From a competitive standpoint, could Boeing have afforded to cede the market to Airbus for the additional years required to make a more complete redesign?
- What role did the board play in this strategic choice?
- What “red flags” indicated that the company’s development schedule was too aggressive?
- What organizational and communication failures prevented the escalation of these concerns to senior leadership and the board?
- How valid is criticism that the failure of the MAX was precipitated by a cultural shift whereby an engineering culture was replaced by a finance culture?
- How can non-engineering professionals effectively oversee engineering talent in the design and development of complex products?