(Co-authored with Ron Kasznik and Ido Spector. Revise and resubmit at Journal of Accounting and Economics.) We investigate whether CEOs’ adherence to cultural norms that enshrine the protection of honor is associated with lower receptiveness of their companies to being acquired. Our investigation is motivated by anthropology and social psychology research showing that people who grew up in cultures of honor feel obliged to retaliate whenever their status and property are threatened. We find target companies with CEOs who grew up in states with a culture of honor are less likely to be acquired than those with CEOs from non-honor states. Among target CEOs from honor states, those who grew up in rural counties, where honor norms have been more likely to persist, are even less receptive to M&A. Our findings continue to hold in a within-target analysis that focuses on targets with both withdrawn and completed deals but under different CEOs. The association between adherence to honor and lower receptiveness to being acquired is especially pronounced for founder CEOs, who presumably have greater power over their firms’ M&A decisions. Using a probabilistic measure based on merger arbitrage spreads, we find targets’ share prices reflect a lower implied probability of deal completion if their CEO is from an honor state. Finally, we find that target CEOs’ ethnic origin neither confounds nor mediates the association, suggesting regional norms, rather than ethnicity, shape the adherence to honor in our setting. Collectively, our findings offer a new perspective on the role CEOs’ cultural norms play in explaining corporate financial and investment choices.

(Co-authored with Brandon Gipper and Shawn Kim.) We examine whether firms that provide (more accurate) financial guidance are more likely to provide (more accurate) non-financial guidance. In particular, we examine forward-looking information about firms’ revenue targets and emission reduction plans. We show a positive association between the provision of financial and non-financial guidance and between the accuracy of the two. Firms that are (i) less financially constrained, (ii) have climate-related manager incentives, (iii) hear from analysts about and discuss environmental issues on conference calls, and (iv) seek assurance on their reported emissions, are more likely to provide forward-looking emission information when providing revenue targets. Some results do not hold for emission intensity targets, indicating some meaningful difference between intensity and absolute emission plans. Our results shed light on demand for firms to voluntarily and accurately disclose non-financial information, and they suggest a complementarity between financial and non-financial guidance, especially among firms that are serious about emissions or face greater emissions-related risks.