Fairness Norms and the Potential for Mutual Agreements Involving Majority and Minority Groups

Most theories of interpersonal and intergroup behavior stress the role of self-serving and group-serving motives in the choice of procedures for allocating resources and determining representation. The present research suggests that such motives are tempered by fairness norms that recognize both the entitlements of majority groups and the need to protect the interests and rights of minority groups. In particular, members of minority groups show sensitivity to proportional fairness by allocating more money to majority outgroups than to their own group, and members of majority groups show sensitivity to the “need” principle of justice by providing miniority outgroups members with access to opportunities that is disaproportionate to their numbers. In choosing and evaluating conflict resolution procedures, majority and minority group members alike endorse representation and voting schemes that provide both majority and minority group members alike endorse representation and voting schemes that provide both majority and minority groups with “veto power” or “mutual control.” The theoretical and practical implications of the results, and problem of designing procedures that both limit the potential “tryranny of the majority” and prevent priviledged, entrenched majorities from perpetuating their advantaged status, are discussed and placed in the context of American political history and practice.